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### THE MEMOIR OF MAJOR-GENERAL E.J. WILD, BENGAL ARMY, DURING THE MUTINY OF 1857-1858

#### PART 1: EVENTS LEADING TO THE RELIEF OF ARRAH

Tony Kerrison

Edward John Wild, second son of Colonel Charles Frederick Wild<sup>1</sup> C.B. of the Bengal Army, was born in Delhi in 1826. Contrary to his father's wishes, he joined the army in 1846 and eventually retired as Major General E.J. Wild in 1877. He was serving as a Lieutenant with the 40th Bengal Native Infantry when the mutiny broke out at Dinapore in July 1857 and subsequently had some fairly intense experiences until it was finally over. Fortunately for posterity, he kept a written account of his adventures. It has remained with the family and has not been published until now. This first part of his story deals with events at Dinapore and Arrah. Subsequent to this, Lieutenant Wild went on with Vincent Eyre's column to Jugdespore in pursuit of the rebel leader Koer Singh<sup>2</sup>, before going to Cawnpore to visit the scene of the tragic events that had taken place there.

The causes of the mutiny have been the subject of many articles and books, and most of the more recent accounts are in general agreement. However, it is interesting to note, in the light of present-day problems, that Wild attaches importance to the machinations of some of the Muslim population, aimed at restoring themselves to what they regarded as their right to rule in India. Furthermore C.F. Wild told his son, as early as 1845, that he thought there would be a mutiny in the Indian Army 'within fifteen years', and he was proved exactly right.

#### EDWARD WILD NOW TAKES UP HIS NARRATIVE

The first indication of mutiny was in the 38th Regt Native Infantry who refused to go to Burmah when war was declared against it in 1852, as they said they were not a seagoing regiment, - i.e. that when they enlisted they took the oath to go by land only to wherever they might be ordered, and not by sea.<sup>3</sup>

After joining my regiment, the Jemadar Narain Sing of the Grenadier company, who used to speak a little English, came often to my rooms to have a talk and to play chess about 3 or 4 times a week, so we became great friends, and this went on for years, and I used to hear from him all

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<sup>1</sup> Edward John Wild joined the HEIC's service on 13 June 1846 and was posted to the 40th Bengal NI on 7 June 1847, remaining with this regiment until it mutinied at Dinapore on 25 July 1857. During this period his only field service was with the Burma Expedition of 1852 when he was present at the operations in the vicinity and capture of Rangoon. After this, probably because the rigours of the campaign had affected his health, he was sent on extensive furlough for three years. According to the four editions of the East India Register spanning the period January 1860 to July 1861, he was detached for duty as District Superintendent of Police at Futtehpore, a major town alongside the Ganges between Allahabad and Cawnpore. Thereafter he continued to be listed with the Bengal Army but without details of his postings. He retired to the Non-effective List (Bengal) as a Major General on 15 November 1877.

<sup>2</sup> Also known as Kunwar Singh or the Rajah of Jugdespore

<sup>3</sup> Others have said there were indications of unrest much earlier than this, such as the Vellore mutiny in 1806 [vide Dr TA Heathcote, *Mutiny & Insurgency in India 1857-58*, chapter 1]. However, the Mutiny of 1857-58 was far more widespread than any previous disturbance. The Hindu officers and other ranks of the 38th Bengal NI would have feared losing caste by travelling across the sea or kala pani (literally 'black water').

that was going on in the regiment amongst the men. When the Burmah war broke out in '52, and we were ordered there instead of the 38th, Narain Sing came but seldom - but there was a plausible reason for it as we were constantly on duty and by the end of the year I was so ill that I had to leave on sick certificate for England. On rejoining my regiment in '56, stationed at Dinapore, I used constantly to ask him to come up to my house as in old times, but he would not 'till the mutiny broke out, and then it occurred to one that he was afraid that he might in the course of conversation say something to reveal what was going on, and so let the cat out of the bag.

I will now relate what was going on in Dinapore.

General Lloyd<sup>4</sup> and his staff used to live out of the military station of Dinapore, at a place called Deega. About a week before the troops in Dinapore mutinied, the General and his staff came to live in the barracks as they thought it safer than in Deega, which was on the other side of our Sudder Bazaar (cantonment market), and about half-way to Patna. When General Lloyd and his staff took up their quarters in the barracks they took their meals at our mess, of which they were honorary members. One night, just as we had finished dinner, the Khunsamah (head-butler) came in to say that some Europeans in native costume wished to speak with the General. Some of us got up to see who they were, and what they wanted. On going to the verandah we saw some persons standing there who were so sunburnt that we took them for natives and we could not make out who they were 'till they informed us that they were fugitives from Gorruckpore, - they had been attacked by the mutineers from Segowlie, and other budmashes (scoundrels), and for safety's sake had put on native dress, and were making for Patna.

They had secured a couple of boats, and the whole Christian population of Gorruckpore - Europeans and half-castes - had got into the boats and dropped down the Goomtee river, keeping as near the centre as possible, & not daring to row as they were followed by the mutineers on both banks who kept firing into them. During the day they had to lie down in the boats with the hot sun beating on them, and it is a wonder that they did not all get sunstroke, and at night they were exposed to the dew or rain, so their progress was not very rapid until they got into the Ganges, when they could row, and were out of reach of the rebels' shots, and on arrival at Dinapore they came to claim shelter for themselves and the whole party - and also food, as they were almost starving. The married officers sent their wives down to the ghaut (ferry or landing place) to take the womenfolk and children to their houses, the men came to our mess and were looked after by us. The ladies and children were sent off to Calcutta by the first steamer, and the ladies and children of the station were also sent off, as it was no longer safe for them to remain.

On the 25th of July our turn came for the native troops to mutiny. On the previous day's orders I had been warned for main guard duty as Captain of the Day, and late that night the General had been persuaded to take at least the percussion caps away from the regimental magazines of the native regiments as without them the ammunition was useless. Unfortunately, they had a considerable number of them in their pouches which were served out to them at times, and never taken back, so that many of them had more than fifty, and these ought to have been taken at the same time - but it was only in the afternoon that they were to be taken away. I had not seen this order, and on marching the new guard to the Main Guard, I had to pass through the barrack squares which formed the parade-grounds of HM's 10th Foot, and I was astonished to see that regiment drawn up in line with the Artillery on their right, their slow matches lit as if they were going into action, - and could not guess why, until one of my brother officers living next to the

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<sup>4</sup> General George William Aylmer Lloyd, CB, 28th Bengal Native Infantry, commanding Dinapore Division from 20 June 1854

Main Guard, on his returning from his inspection parade, told me that one of the artillery wagons had been sent to the native magazines with the Quartermasters of regiments to bring away the percussion-caps of the 7th, 8th and 40th Regiments of [Bengal] Native Infantry.

The Native lines were on the right of the road and on the banks of the river Ganges, and in the lines was a strip of ground used as parade-grounds running the whole length of the lines. It was a narrow strip, and was used for inspection parades, and on the left of the road were the big parade-grounds. The lines of the 40th Regt NI were nearest the barracks and adjoining the hospitals, then came the 8th lines, and next to them, those of the 7th NI. The wagon had passed the 40th and 8th, and was in front of the 7th. The regiments were all being inspected that morning as it was the usual inspection day. When the wagon arrived in front of the 7th NI the Sepoys of that and the 8th Regt cried out 'Stop the wagon, - they are going to take the ammunition away!' - and some of them rushed forward to stop it. On this the Grenadier and No 1 Companies of my regiment rushed forward, loading their muskets, and shouted that they would shoot anyone who tried to stop the wagon. It was then allowed to proceed and brought away the caps. The magazines were on the left of the road just beyond the 7th NI lines, and close to Daudpore, a small village of Chumaz (Chamars - people of low-caste).

All that had taken place was reported to the General, but still he would not be persuaded to disarm the Native Regiments as he did not consider it mutinous conduct; he might have disarmed the 7th & 8th and that would have prevented the 40th joining these two Regts. At noon orders were issued to take away the percussion-caps from the Sepoys' pouches at 2 p.m. The native troops were drawn up at that time in front of their lines, and the officers had also to fall in with their respective Companies. At the Main Guard where I was nothing out of the common took place. The men, as usual, had gone to their dinner, and had returned by 2pm and accoutred themselves, and the sentries had just been relieved when firing was heard from the direction of the Native lines, and the Sepoys - without orders - began loading their muskets. On hearing the commotion amongst the guard I went out of the guardroom into the verandah when the sentry levelled his musket at me and drew the trigger, but as the cap was not properly put on it missed fire or I should have been a dead man, but God in his mercy saved me, as he has on many other occasions since. A Corporal's party of the 10th Foot was also on duty at the main guard. The Corporal seized the musket before another cap could be put on, and the Sepoys were disarmed and the muskets placed under charge of European sentries, and the Sepoys sneaked away into the Sudder Bazaar.

Between the morning parade and 2 p.m., when the caps in the pouches were to be taken away it appears that the Brahmin and Mahomedan Sepoys of the 7th & 8th went over to the 40th's lines and talked the men of my regiment over to join them and mutiny, with the exception of about 200. At 2 p.m., the three Native regiments paraded according to orders, but all the morning there had been a sullen feeling visible amongst the Sepoys, which boded no good.

The 10th Foot and Artillery were also paraded in case the Native troops should mutiny, and were drawn up on the road leading to the lines, but out of sight of the Native lines. At 2 p.m. the officers of the Native regiments proceeded to their respective parades, but were fired on, and had to return. The Colonel of my Regiment, Colonel Cumberland<sup>5</sup>, always drove to parades in his buggy & mounted his charger on the road in front of our parade, as one of his legs was shorter than the other, he having been wounded in action years before, and this afternoon he was

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<sup>5</sup> Colonel Edward Altham Cumberland, Officiating Commandant, 40th Bengal Native Infantry; the commandant Colonel C.W. Hamilton, was on furlough

mounting his horse with the officers close to him when they were fired on by their men and had to retire. The Colonel was getting into his buggy again when he was fired on by the men, but, fortunately, he was not hit, but the horse had a slight wound inflicted. However, all the officers retired in safety. The guns were brought to the front, and also the 10th Foot, and as soon as the mutineers saw the guns they bolted through their lines to the river and found their way under cover to Daudpore, the village near the magazines, in front of which the three regiments formed up in line and fired a volley at us, though their shots did not fall half way, they being half a mile away. After this the Artillery opened fire, and the mutineers bolted for the River Soane<sup>6</sup> to cross it and make for Arrah. This would have been the moment to have followed them up and decimated them, but it was not done. General Lloyd, instead of being present, had gone on a steamer - as he said - to the mouth of the Soane to see if he could see anything of them. The Assistant Adjutant-General<sup>7</sup> was not to be found and was supposed to be with the General, nor was the next senior officer to be found. When General Lloyd returned he said it was too late to follow them up, so the golden opportunity was lost, - and perhaps it was as well, for we would all have felt a tinge of remorse to have shot down the men we had led into battle and gained victories with.

By orders, the native lines and Daudpore were set on fire and destroyed, so as to give no shelter if the mutineers should wish to return and attack the hospital. When the regiments mutinied - as I said before - 200 men and native officers remained faithful and went to the regimental quarter-guard, saved the treasure-chest and colours and protected the Sergeant-Majors and Quartermaster Sgts, and also the Christian Bandsmen.

In the evening I went my rounds to visit the station guards, but found they had all absconded, and the guardrooms were empty. Next morning - the 26th - after being relieved, I went round the station to see what had been done. The native lines were deserted and smouldering. On returning home a brother officer of mine came in and told me that he had received orders from the Assistant Adjutant-General to tell me that I was appointed Interpreter and Staff Officer to a detachment of the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers, and that I should receive written orders in due course, but I was to be ready by noon as the steamer was to leave at that hour.<sup>8</sup>

A soldier has to be ready sometimes to move at a moment's notice, so I had to make my arrangements to start, and then I went to the General for orders, and was told that my duty was to urge on Captain L'Estrange of the Fifth<sup>9</sup> the necessity of proceeding without any delay to Allahabad, and then I was to return by first steamer. I had to leave everything standing in my house, I only took one servant, a Khidmutgar (valet or table servant, invariably a Musulman), with me, went on board and reported myself. My house stood on the banks of the Ganges, and as the steamer passed I had a last look at the house and several of my brother officers were in the summerhouse to see me pass, and I could sing out goodbye to them. They were envious of me,

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<sup>6</sup> More generally known as the 'Son' river in contemporary narratives

<sup>7</sup> The AAG at Dinapore was Major William Lydiard, 11th Bengal Native Infantry. This was a long-standing appointment dating back to 21 June 1843.

<sup>8</sup> Wild, born in Delhi in 1826 and having spent the larger part of his life in India, spoke one or more of the languages of the Subcontinent.

<sup>9</sup> Captain Ferdinand William L'Estrange, 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers); dangerously wounded at Lucknow on 26 September 1857 and died of his wounds

and would gladly have exchanged places with me. The Ganges was at its height, - so that the steamer passed within a dozen yards of the summerhouse. I was now fairly off from Dinapore, and had to make the acquaintance of my new comrades: Captain L'Estrange, commanding the detachment, Captain Scott<sup>10</sup>, Lieutenant Oldfield<sup>11</sup> and Ensign Wilmott<sup>12</sup>. They were all nice fellows, and wanted to know all about the Dinapore mutiny, which I had to tell them. The Regiment had just come from Mauritius and this was the first detachment, and I got on first-rate with them.

The river steamers always anchored every night about sunset and had a flat, or cargo boat in tow, sometimes two. We only had one, and as we were passing Chuprah, and it was sunset, we anchored for the night. Shortly after anchoring some civilians (from the town) came to ask us to take some treasure on board as they had received orders to desert Chuprah and to go to Patna. The country being in such a disturbed state that they were in fear of their lives, and could not take the treasure with them and did not like to leave it behind, so Captain L'Estrange sent thirty of his men to escort it down. We expected them to return by daybreak next morning, but they only returned at 10 a.m. On their return we started en route for Allahabad, and the civilians left in their boat for Patna. We were to look out for Sepoys trying to cross in boats whilst we were going up the river as they would most likely try it. Most of the men in my regiment came from Ghazepore and Chuprah.

The detachment of the 5th Fusiliers on board had never been in the country, and in proceeding up the river they wanted to fire at the villagers working in the fields and those they saw peering out of the villages, putting them all down to be mutineers and Sepoys, and it was with the greatest difficulty they were prevented from firing at them as they were all anxious to have their first shot at a Sepoy. Even the officers were asking 'Are not those Sepoys, as they are dressed in clean clothes?' - and I fear many an innocent man would have been shot if I had not been there.

On the afternoon of the 30th July we reached Buxar, one of the coaling stations for the river steamers, and here we anchored for the night to coal. There is also a large government horse stud at this place. We had been at anchor about an hour when Captain Hastings<sup>13</sup>, the Superintendent of Studs, came with a message from Major Vincent Eyre<sup>14</sup> of the Bengal Artillery to order Captain L'Estrange to land his detachment to go to the relief of Arrah, as the Dinapore mutineers had surrounded the civil station, and he was only waiting for the first detachment of European infantry to proceed at once to its relief. Of course, Captain L'Estrange said he had positive orders from General Lloyd to proceed without a moments' unnecessary delay to Allahabad, as the steamer had to return to Calcutta for a fresh batch of troops, and he appealed to me to corroborate these orders which we had both received, and I did so. We were in a fix, then he

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<sup>10</sup> Captain Arthur Scott, H.M.'s 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers); severely wounded at Lucknow on 6 October 1857

<sup>11</sup> Lieutenant Edwin John Oldfield, 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers); slightly wounded at Goojeragunge on 2 August 1857

<sup>12</sup> The identity of this officer has not been established.

<sup>13</sup> Captain the Hon. Edward Plantagenet Robin Hood Hastings, 32nd Bengal Native Infantry; appointed Sub-Assistant in the Stud Department from 15 July 1853. In this capacity he was in charge of the Stud depot at Buxar. The 'Superintendent' of the Stud Department was a Lieutenant Colonel based in Meerut.

<sup>14</sup> Major Vincent Eyre, Bengal Army; commanding No.5 Field Battery, 1st Company 5th Battalion Bengal Foot Artillery

asked me what he had better do, and so I said 'You are now under General Guy's<sup>15</sup> orders, and Maj. Vincent Eyre has orders from him to stop the first detachment of troops passing up, so you will have to obey General Guy's orders'.

Shortly after, Major Eyre came on board and took all the responsibilities of detaining us and the steamer. As soon as the men heard that they were to proceed against the Dinapore mutineers there was great rejoicing, and by next evening everything was ready for a start - owing chiefly to Captain Hastings' great assistance, as he supplied bullocks and carts from the stud department and also bullocks for the artillery's guns. Captain Hastings came with us to Arrah, and acted as Brigade Major. He was a first-rate officer, and without his assistance I do not believe Arrah would have been relieved. He acted also as Commissariat Officer. Only a few men were left on board for the protection of the detachment's property. No tents were taken as the weather was pretty fine and we had to move rapidly. Major Eyre wrote a despatch to General Lloyd that, by order of General Guy, he had taken the detachment under Capt L'Estrange to relieve Arrah, and he hoped to be there by 5th August towards evening, and if a party could be sent from Dinapore to co-operate with his party it would be of great assistance, and we should have the mutineers between two fires. Major Eyre ordered the steamer captain to detach his flat, and proceed alone to Dinapore, and deliver his despatches at once on arrival to General Lloyd.

On the evening of the 31st July, we commenced our march for the relief of Arrah. Our force was a very small one, but all were animated with the one desire to be in time for the relief of the brave people of Arrah at any cost to themselves. Our force consisted of 50 artillerymen with one 24-lb howitzer, and two 12-pounder muzzle-loading smooth-bore guns<sup>16</sup>, about 120 of the 5th Fusiliers, and 4 or 5 railway Engineers. These, being mounted, acted as cavalry. Everything seemed to favour us, - even the bullocks that had only pulled carts pulled the guns first-rate, and were not frightened on their being fired. On starting, I had a presentiment that I should not be wounded, which was a rather encouraging feeling, at that time little thinking what we were to encounter, - expecting that the mutineers would bolt after the first attack. By daybreak next morning we had made 18 miles, meeting with no opposition, when we halted for rest and breakfast. About noon we started again 'till dusk, when we encamped in the open. The next morning, after an early repast, we started again, and, after a long march, came to a village. A little in front of it was a bridge, which the Sepoys, the first we had met, and the villagers were destroying. A shell sent amongst them put them to flight, and we then made a halt and had our tiffin whilst the bridge was being repaired - which took some hours to do. When finished we crossed, and camped on the other side of the village, leaving a party to hold it and to prevent the mutineers occupying it during the night. Next morning we started, hoping to reach Arrah some time that afternoon. About a couple of miles ahead of our camp was a bit of jungle on the left of the road, and a tope of mango trees on the right.

As we advanced, the mutineers opened fire on us. We, in return, sent 3 or 4 round shot into it, but they would not leave it, and large bodies of mutineers were outflanking us on both sides, so Major Eyre ordered two parties of about 20 men each to advance - one to the right front, the other to the left front, and to take it with a rush. Captain Scott went with the party to the right. He had been in the Crimea wars. The other party went to the left under a subaltern who had never been in action. I went with this party. The firing was hot, and the men began to falter. I

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<sup>15</sup> Colonel & Acting Major General Philip Melmoth Nelson Guy, CB, H.M's 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers). He took over as Divisional Commander, Dinapore, from General George Lloyd who was ignominiously removed from command and sent on furlough. Colonel Guy went on to command an Infantry Brigade under Sir Hope Grant, and was present at the Allambagh during and after the second relief of Lucknow and at the final capture of the city.

<sup>16</sup> This was effectively a half-battery

rushed forward and told them to follow, and as we reached the jungle the mutineers cleared out, and those flanking us also disappeared when they saw they were not supported, and our whole detachment now advanced.

From this time on the men of the detachment had confidence in me, and would obey any order I gave them, and follow me anywhere as if I was one of their own officers.

Our whole force now advanced into the open fields, only leaving a few skirmishers to watch the jungle, but as the mutineers did not show themselves they (the skirmishers) followed us, and we advanced several miles until we came to a tope of mango trees, where we encamped during the heat of the day, and had our midday meal. About a mile ahead of us was a village, and a hundred yards or so on this side of it was a bridge crossing a nullah (stream or rivulet) which was full of water, and the railway engineers said that if the bridge was broken it would be impossible to cross 'till repaired. Mr Kelley, the head of the engineers<sup>17</sup> said he would make a slight detour to the side of the road and see if the mutineers had destroyed it. In the meantime I clambered up the highest tree with a binocular, saw that it was broken, and that they had tried to hide the breach by placing branches of trees in front. On coming down I reported to Major Eyre what I had seen, and said that I could see the mutineers in the village. Kelley soon after came back and reported the bridge broken, at the same time he said that he could lead us to the head of the nullah, about a mile to our right, and after crossing over we should be on the railway embankment with a straight road to Arrah, and, as the Water would not be deep at that spot, it was decided to take that road. The village was called Beebeegung, which was 7 or 8 miles from Arrah. At 2 p.m. we made a start. We had to advance a little distance along the road towards the village before we came to a field road leading to a copse of mango trees, which was close to the embankment.

As we advanced, we saw the mutineers had made their arrangements to give us a warm reception, for they streamed out of their village in thousands, and lined the edge of the nullah at the bridge - thinking that we did not know that the bridge was broken, and that we should try and cross it. Just at the point we were to branch off the road, Major Eyre fired a couple of shells at the village. The fuses were so well adjusted that the shells burst in front of the bridge, and must have caused sad havoc amongst them, for they all bolted into the village for cover, and we made for the tope. As soon as the mutineers saw our move they followed on the other side of the nullah, keeping a brisk fire on us, and especially on me, as all the Sepoys recognized me, and the officers of the detachment made the same remark, and said 'they seem to single you out'. I did not at this time know the reason, but found it out afterwards. When we reached the tope we halted, as it afforded us a little cover from the bullets flying around, and whilst we made arrangements to cross the nullah and reach the embankment, for, on reaching it, we should command the whole country around about us. I was sent in charge of 7 or 8 men of the 5th Fusiliers to protect a gun which was sent forward to cross the nullah - the other two guns being kept with the main body to fire into the mutineers following us - and also surrounding us. We were now in a most critical position - less than 200 Europeans surrounded by 5 or 6 thousand mutineers, flushed with victory, having beaten a party sent from Dinapore<sup>18</sup>. Our foes were under cover of brushwood and vegetation of all kinds, and indomitable courage was required by every individual of our force.

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<sup>17</sup> A civilian engineer - one of the large number of personnel working on railway construction at the time.

<sup>18</sup> On 29 July 1857, a badly led attempt to relieve Arrah had been made by a party of 373 European and 70 Sikh troops together with a few gentlemen volunteers, led by Captain Charles Dunbar, HM's 10th (North Lincolnshire) Regt of Foot. It was ambushed and ignominiously defeated, suffering heavy losses.

The advanced gun had just crossed the nullah and, in front of us, about 50 yards off, were a succession of brick kilns, lined with our foes - thirsting for our blood. Their fire was so hot that the gun had to be abandoned and we had to retire to the tope, but still keeping the gun under our protection. The mutineers were now in front, rear and on both flanks, so that we were in a bad way. They were within 50 yards of us, firing into us, and the wonder is how any one of us escaped.

For the next five minutes the fighting in Lucknow, I should say, could not have been so trying compared to what we underwent in these few minutes! Captain Hastings rode up to me and said: 'Major Eyre's orders are that you are to take those brick kilns by storm, and hold them at any cost'. I said I had only 3 men left with me, and he said: 'you must take them at any cost, - I will send you men as soon as I can.' I said to the 3 men - 'You have heard the Major's orders, and what we are expected to do, and must do. Fix bayonets and follow me'. I knew I could depend on them after the morning's charge and, though it appeared a forlorn hope, we went on to the last row of trees and then I told them - 'Now for the charge, - and no stopping 'till the kilns are reached'. We made the rush with a hurrah, and it was accomplished without the loss of a man. I said - 'now take a breath, and then rush to the second row of kilns'. As soon as we had gained breath, a rush was made for the next row of kilns, and, meeting no opposition, we went through them all. Whilst we were taking breath at the first row of kilns the mutineers were firing at us, and several shots hit the bricks near my head. They did their best to shoot me, but without success, and these were the last shots fired at us. We had got clear of the kilns, and were looking out for the mutineers, but instead saw a party of our own men on our left flank, and now waited for our main column to advance.

Whilst we were making our rush for the kilns the mutineers in our rear made a charge on the main body and two guns, and they expected to be overwhelmed. An order was sent to recall me and my party, but, fortunately, came too late, - or rather not at all, as I was in possession of the kilns, and at that moment I would not have left the kilns, even if I had received the order, as the aspect of things was changed since the order was sent. The mutineers had charged to within 60 yards of the guns (when I made my charge) and Major Eyre opened on them with shrapnel, and knocked over a lot of them, amongst them a nephew of Kooer [sic] Sing's - who was leading them - was slain, and this checked them, and they, seeing we were in possession of the kilns and might now attack them, they dispersed in all directions, and, after a few minutes, no mutineers were to be seen.

A few minutes before things looked very black, but in those minutes we had gained as hard-fought a victory as any troops have ever done, but God -in his mercy - saved us from a fate worse than the Dinapore party had suffered, for not a soul of our party would have been spared, and the brave Arrah garrison would have been murdered and tortured as the rebels would have captured 3 guns and knocked the house to pieces, - and Lucknow might also have fallen - for the troops could not have been pushed on so quickly.

As soon as we could, we pushed on for the railway embankment and found it deserted, and the rebels were seen running off in the distance. As soon as our force was all assembled on the embankment we tried to push on for Arrah, expecting to meet the Dinapore column, but, after marching a couple of miles, or more, we came to a deep nullah which we could not cross, and had to halt, and had our dinner before business. Whilst it was being cooked I saw a thing done I could scarcely credit. I had heard a good deal of the capabilities of the Enfield Rifle, but had never seen one 'till the 5th Fusiliers came to Dinapore. One of the men, by name of O'Brien, who was near me said: 'Do you see those three rebels, sir?' They were a thousand yards off, and were

on their way to Arrah<sup>19</sup>. 'Well,' said O'Brien, 'I will knock over the centre man.' I said: 'What folly! - firing at that distance, and wasting your ammunition.' He put up his rifle, and, sure enough, the centre man fell down, and the other two bolted. I at once acknowledged the shooting powers of the Enfield when in good hands.

On sitting down to dinner, I missed my Khidmutgur, and concluded that he must have been shot, but, on reaching Arrah, I found that he had been taken prisoner, taken into Arrah, and released there. When he returned to me he told me that the mutineers of my Regiment had recognized me, and their best shots had tried to shoot me, in case any of them were made prisoners, and then I could not give evidence against them, and they all said I must have a charmed life, as not one of them could hit me.

After dinner was over - although we were all very tired from the hard day's work, yet we set-to, to dam up the nullah with bricks, so as to make it narrow enough to throw over them some date trees we cut down to make a temporary bridge to get our guns over, - but it caused the nullah to rise. It was then decided to build a raft with the date trees. When the raft was finished, we found to our dismay that it would not support the weight of a gun, so we were again in a dilemma. However, we were not going to give in, and, as the nullah ceased rising, we took away bricks from the inner side of the pile to let some of the water escape. In this we were successful, so we pulled the raft to pieces and reconstructed the bridge. We worked at it all that night, and by daybreak it was passable. Kelley and some of the Engineers took their horses over and advanced towards Arrah to reconnoitre and find where the mutineers might be. Seeing no-one, they pushed on into the civil station where the gallant little band were shut up. As they rode up, they were recognized, and then the garrison opened their door, giving the Engineers hearty welcome and a cheer. Mr Wake, the Magistrate and Collector of the District<sup>20</sup> and Kelley returned to camp, and right glad we were to see him, and to know that our labour had not been in vain and that the heroic little band had been saved.

After breakfast, Wake accompanied us back to Arrah, which we reached about 2 p.m. By this time every obstruction was removed, and the whole garrison was there to give us a hearty welcome and we shook hands all round, Sikhs and all, and we congratulated them on their brave defence. Afterwards, we related to each other what we had gone through<sup>21</sup>. Later on we paid a visit to Kooer Sing's town house, and destroyed it, because he had proclaimed himself leader of the rebels.

The Sikhs are fond of spirits, so we offered the Subadar some brandy from a bottle we had just opened, and, as he had not his Lotah (brass cup) handy, and being a Hindoo<sup>22</sup>, he would not drink from our cup, and he drank it native fashion: one hand to his mouth, the other held the bottle, out of which he poured the brandy. When he had drunk half the bottle he returned it, and though asked to take more he said he did not want to get drunk, and if he took more it would have that effect on him, - but what he had taken would do him good after being shut up. So he proved himself to be a sensible man.

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<sup>19</sup> To be recognised from 1000 yards as a valid target, it is very probable that these 'rebels' were sepoys in full uniform (distinctive shako, red jacket and white 'hot weather' trousers for that time of year) and carrying arms.

<sup>20</sup> Herwald Craufurd Wake, Bengal Civil Service, Collector and Magistrate at Shahabad

<sup>21</sup> Assistant-Surgeon John James Halls' account praises the relief party, mentioning by name Eyre, Hastings, Jackson, L'Estrange, Scott, Oldfield, Lewis, Mason, Eteson, Melville, Siddale, Wylde (sic), Kelly, Nicholl, Barber and Burrows, and opines that '... all other triumphs and successes might not have been possible without Eyre's force and the stubborn defence of Arrah.'

<sup>22</sup> It is surprising that a man as experienced as Wild should confuse Sikh with Hindu

Towards evening, the detachment of the 5th Fusiliers were paraded to see how many cartridges they had left per man. They had started from Buxar with 60 rounds per man - thinking that would be ample, and none was taken in the carts, hoping that we should have the help of the Dinapore Party, but the stupidity of General Lloyd and his staff prevented it, and, after examination, I was told that most of the men had only two cartridges per man left. What a plight we should have been in if the Sepoys had not bolted, or if they had resisted our advance on Arrah - but providence watched over us.

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### **Editor's note**

Tony Kerrison, a member of the IMHS, is a great grandson of Major General Edward Wild. He has kindly transcribed his illustrious ancestor's memoirs for Durbar, and the narrative will be continued in future editions of the journal.

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### THE INDIAN CONTINGENTS IN AFRICA, 1891-1922

The late Brigadier H. Bullock, O.B.E., F.R.His.S.

*This article first appeared in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Volume 74, 1944, pp. 360-366, and it is reproduced here by kind permission of the USII.*

Now that East and West African troops are helping to defend India it is opportune to recall that from 1891 to 1922 Indian soldiers played an active part in fighting the slave raiders of South Central Africa, quelling a rebellion in Uganda, and generally helping to establish peaceful conditions in that Continent.

The magnificent exploits of our Indian Army at Keren and in the Western Desert, in fact, continued that long association the sepoy has had with Africa, and though those early sepoys are today almost forgotten, the good work they did lives on.

Their story starts on Lake Nyasa in 1891 and ends after many changes and chances in Somaliland in 1922. Between these terminal dates the formation of the present King's African Rifles on the first day of 1902 marked the introduction of a modern military system in our East

and Central African dependencies. The rank and file of the K.A.R. in its early years were largely Indian, another fact now unremembered.

The 'genealogy' of the Indian Contingents is rather involved. They derived from four main sources: (i) the armed police in the British Central Africa Protectorate, now Nyasaland, (ii) the contingent in the British East Africa Protectorate, now known as Kenya, (iii) the 1st Battalion of the Uganda Rifles, and (iv) the Indians in the armed forces in British Somaliland. It will be convenient to deal with them successively, and in that order. Their development will be set out in brief narrative: some details can be filled in by anyone who wishes to follow the matter further, from the literature of Africa, which for the first half of the period at least is fairly extensive, and from regimental histories and other military sources.

#### BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

One day the story of the Indian sepoy in Nyasaland must be told in full detail, for it abounds in strange circumstances and extends for more than twenty years. Deccani Musalman cavalymen and Mazbi Sikh pioneers manned and fought lake steamers, and Jat Sikhs, after fighting Yao slave raiders and serving Cecil Rhodes in Northern Rhodesia, went as far afield as Ashanti and even Gambia. Rarely can so few sepoys have done so much, yet all their gallant and astonishing adventures have fallen into unmerited oblivion.

When in 1891 the British Protectorate over the Shire Highlands was extended to the whole of Nyasaland (or as it was officially known from 1893 to 1907, British Central Africa), Sir H.H. Johnston, the Commissioner and Consul-General, with the assent of the Government of India, engaged Captain C.M. Maguire of the 1st Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent, to raise a small force of Indian troops to act as a nucleus for the local police force. They were about seventy strong; forty Mazbi Sikhs of the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers, and the rest Deccani Musalmans of the 1st and 2nd Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent. The sowars brought their horses, which soon died of horse-sickness and tsetse fly, with the result that the sowars were never employed as mounted men.

Johnston arrived from England in July 1891 and found Maguire with the Indians awaiting him. Within two days the little contingent took the offensive against the Yao Chieftain, Chikumbu. After a day or two of stiff fighting, the chief was put to flight and his brother captured. The next move was against Makanjira and other slave-trading Yao chiefs, the British force consisting of 70 Indians, 9 Zanzibaris, and a 7-pounder gun. A few shells from the gun brought one chief round on October 19, 1891, and it was then mounted on a small steamer, the *Domira*, hired from the African Lakes Corporation.

Johnston, Maguire and the Sikhs embarked and set off for Makanjira's settlement. Arriving early one morning, they found a yelling crowd of Yaos on the beach and immediately dispersed it by their first shell. Johnston landed with a few Sikhs under cover of Maguire's fire from the steamer, but was forced back to the ship with one or two casualties. The next morning Maguire landed in force, and after hard fighting, in which several Sikhs were severely wounded, took all Makanjira's defences and destroyed his town and dhows. For gallantry in these operations four cavalry sowars and four Sikhs were awarded the Indian Order of Merit, 3rd Class.

The fourth expedition ended in tragedy. In December 1891 Maguire received information of where two of Makanjira's dhows were hidden, and set off in the *Domira* with a few sepoy. Landing with a small force of 28 men on December 18, he was about to demolish the dhows when Makanjira, with two thousand followers, attacked him and forced his party back to the beach. There he found that his boat had been wrecked by a storm which had arisen, and the *Domira* herself, in endeavouring to come as close as possible inshore, had stuck on a sandbank not far off the beach.

After three Sikhs had been killed, Maguire told the others to wade out to the *Domira* whilst he and few men as rearguard kept off the Yaos with the bayonet. Almost at once he was shot dead, and the European master and engineer of the *Domira* were wounded; but the remainder of the sepoy embarked safely, whereupon they defended the stranded steamer against all comers for three days. Makanjira under a flag of truce then agreed, in return for a ransom – which was paid, to give up the bodies of Maguire and the three sepoy, and to assist in refloating the ship; but instead, by an act of treachery, he put to death the two remaining unwounded officers, the European first engineer and the Parsi doctor.

Once again the stranded *Domira* was besieged, this time for five days, till at last the sepoy and sowars under the direction of the wounded second engineer managed to get her off the sand bank into deep water, where she retreated whilst using her 7-pounder with great effect on Makanjira's men dancing round their camp-fires. For their gallantry during this week, December 15-21, 1891, one sowar of the 1st Lancers Hyderabad Contingent, two men of the 23rd and one of the 32nd Pioneers received the Indian Order of Merit, 3rd Class.

The time was not ripe for a renewal of the campaign against Makanjira, but in January and February 1892 Johnston carried on operations against two more vulnerable chieftains, the principal of whom was Zarafi. The Sikhs, led by volunteer officers, captured all his villages, but suffered a reverse in an ill-planned attack on his hill stronghold, in which six Sikhs were killed and the 7-pounder lost. The military situation was distinctly unsatisfactory till in June 1892 Captain E.E. Johnston, of the 36th Sikhs, arrived as the new commandant of the Indian Contingent, bringing with him ten Sikhs as a welcome reinforcement. A more substantial addition to the armed forces of the Protectorate was also on the way, in the shape of three gunboats sent out in sections from England.

The next fighting took place on the Upper Shire in January and February 1893, where a long-threatened outbreak of slave-traders at last took place. In April 1893 Lieut. C.A. Edwards, 36th Sikhs, arrived from India with 100 Jat Sikh sepoy to relieve the original contingent, whose term of service in the Protectorate was due to expire shortly. Later in the year Lieut. W.H. Manning brought out another 100 Jat Sikhs, the cost of whose services was guaranteed, and eventually paid to the extent of £4,000, by Cecil Rhodes; and the new strength, 200 sepoy, remained more or less constant for many years.

In August 1893 the Protectorate forces were able to take the field in much greater strength than ever before. The two gun-boats, H.M.S. *Mosquito* and *Pioneer*, were supported by the *Domira* and *Ilala* as troop-carriers, and the 7-pounder gun had been recovered. The stronghold of

Chiwara was stormed by 70 Sikhs and 30 armed Africans at a five hours' fight, after which a strong fort named Fort Maguire was established near the spot where that officer had been killed more than two years before.

Then, in January 1894, when Makanjira attacked the new fort in great strength, he was defeated with heavy loss by Captain Edwards. On this occasion a havildar of the 45th Sikhs received the I.O.M., 3rd class. There were also two or three smaller expeditions in the winter of 1893-94, and the summer of 1894. For the early campaigns up to the middle of 1894 the troops engaged were awarded a special Central Africa Medal with a distinctive ribbon, black, white and brown, signifying the three races which composed the Protectorate troops: African, European and Indian.

Space will not permit of details of the nine further expeditions in which the Sikhs took part, up to April 1898, in which they won nine more Indian Orders of Merit, 3rd class, and for which they were awarded the Central Africa Medal with a bar 'Central Africa 1894-98'. Several of these little wars were likewise amphibious.\*

In 1896 the Contingent, with the African trained soldiers, was designated the British Central Africa Rifles, losing its previous technical identity as police; and in 1898 the title was changed to 1st Bn. Central African Regiment. From 1897 forty of the Sikhs were earmarked for employment in Northern Rhodesia. This organization continued until the establishment of the King's African Rifles on January, 1902; but before this date the Sikhs from B.C.A. were to take part in even more varied operations.

From August to November 1899 there was a joint Anglo-Portuguese campaign (including 135 Sikhs) against the chief Nkwamba; from September to November 1899 there was another in N. E. Rhodesia against Kazembe, during which 100 men of the 1st C.A. Regiment marched 1,000 miles in two months; and in December 1900 yet a third against Kalulu. The troops engaged in these received in due course the new Africa General Service Medal with bar 'B.C.A. 1899-1900'.

For the Ashanti War and advance on Kumassi in 1900-01 some seventy Sikhs from B.C.A. accompanied the detachment of the 1st C.A. Regiment, which, with half the 2nd C.A. Regiment, there took part in the punitive expedition of 1901. Thus it came about that some Sikhs from B.C.A. received the Ashanti Medal with or without the bar 'Kumassi' and a few the Africa General Service Medal with bar 'Gambia'. A Sikh naik of the 12th Burma Infantry received the I.O.M. 3rd class for gallantry near Kumassi on August 6, 1900.

#### BRITISH EAST AFRICA

The Imperial British East Africa Company was dissolved on July 1, 1895, and the British Government thereupon declared British East Africa to be a Crown Protectorate, administered

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\* **Editor's note.** Details of all Indian Order of Merit awards granted to the Indian Contingents in Africa can be found in P.P. Hypher's compilation *Deeds of valour performed by Indian officers and soldiers during the period from 1860 to 1925* (Simla 1927). The campaign medals issued for service in Africa are described in Richard Magor's definitive work *African General Service Medals* (London 1993, 2nd edition).

through the Foreign Office. The existing military forces, all Africans, were formed into the East Africa Rifles; and one of the first acts of the new administration was to raise a contingent of 300 Punjabi Musalmans from India, by the secondment of trained officers and other ranks from their parent regiments. This Contingent was under the command of Major (later Major General) W.C. Barratt, with Captain (later Lieut.-General Sir) T.E. Scott as second-in-command, both Indian Army officers; and the date of arrival in Africa was about November 1895.

The new contingent was based on Mombasa, where its cantonment received the name of Barrattabad; and it was not long before most of it saw active service in the operations against the Mazrut rebels – otherwise known as the Mwele expedition – for which the East and West Africa medal was granted to all ranks and several of the officers received the Order of the Brilliant Star of Zanzibar from the Sultan.

Their next service was in the Uganda campaign of 1897-98 against the Sudanese mutineers and their adherents. Many of the Sudanese soldiers of the Old Uganda Rifles mutinied in September 1897, and much hard and difficult fighting followed on the northern shores of Lake Victoria and elsewhere in Uganda, right up to 1899, when the rebel ‘kings’ were captured and banished.

The Indian Contingent in B.E.A. went up into Uganda in November 1897, and remained there operating chiefly in small columns till late in the following year. For their services they received the East and Central Africa Medal with bar ‘Uganda 1897-98’ and, in many cases, the bar ‘Lubwa’s’ as well. Barratt and Scott were decorated with the D.S.O. and a sepoy, Jehan Khan, of the 27th Punjab Infantry serving in the Contingent received the I.O.M. 3rd class (24 February 1898).

By 1900, in which year it returned to India and was broken up the B.E.A. Indian Contingent had increased to 560 strong. Thenceforward the military forces of East Africa were all African, the Protectorate thus being the first of the four to break the Indian connection, though the police continued to include a number of Asiatics in its ranks, and a few regular officers of the Indian Army remained in East Africa in various capacities, the most notable of whom was Lieut.-Colonel B.C.R. Graham of the Guides, who was killed in action in 1915 when commanding the 3rd K.A.R.

#### UGANDA

As has been related, a large portion of the Sudanese in the Uganda Rifles mutinied in 1897, and to replace them a contingent of 200 Sikhs and 200 Punjabi Musalmans, raised by secondment in India, arrived at Mombasa in May 1898. To these were added two companies of Swahilis and two of Somalis, and the whole was soon afterwards designated the 1st Uganda Rifles.

The four Indian Companies, at a strength of about 350, took part in the later phases of the operations against the Ogaden Somalis in Jubaland at the end of July and in August 1898 for which they received the East and Central Africa Medal with clasp ‘1898’. In the next year, under their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel J.T. Evatt, they won distinction by defeating the last effective remnants of the Sudanese mutineers and the tribes which had harboured them, and

capturing King Kabarega who was then exiled to the Seychelles. For these services, between March 21 and May 2, 1899, they received the East and Central Africa Medal with bar 'Uganda 1899' or, in the case of those who already had the medal, the bar only.

Campaigns were an annual affair in East Africa at this time, and in 1900 part of the 1st Uganda Rifles took the field again for the operations in the Nandi country between July and October 1900. Some 105 of the Indian officers and rank and file received the new African General Service Medal with bar 'Uganda 1900' for this service, both Sikhs and Musalmans participating. In 1901 the strength of the regiment was given as 387 Indians and 1364 Africans. In 1902 it developed into the 4th and 5th King's African Rifles, the Indians forming the latter regiment, whose progress will be narrated later.

#### SOMALILAND

The Foreign Office took over the administration of the Somaliland Protectorate from the Indian Government in 1898. At that time the local forces consisted of a small police levy and camel corps, under the command of an Indian Army officer and in this body a few sepoys, seconded from Indian regiments, were employed as drill and musketry instructors.

A few of these sepoys took part in the first phase, in 1901, of the extensive Somaliland operations of 1901-04, and received the Africa General Service medal with bar 'Somaliland 1901'. The later development of the Indian Forces in the Protectorate is part of the King's African Rifles, and is given below.

#### THE KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES

When the East and Central African forces were formed into one organisation, on January 1 1902, the effect was as follows:

1st K.A.R. (formerly 1st Bn. Central Africa Regiment)

2nd KAR. (formerly 2nd Bn. Central Africa Regiment)

To these two battalions was attached the Indian Contingent in British Central Africa, two companies of Sikhs: strength in 1902, two British Officers, 160 other ranks.

3rd K.A.R. (formerly East Africa Rifles) – all Africans

4th K.A.R. (formerly the African component of the Uganda Rifles) – all Africans

5th K.A.R. (formerly the Indian component of the Uganda Rifles) – all Indians; four companies

6th K.A.R. (formerly the local forces in Somaliland) – all Africans (not actually formed till 1904)

From this time onward changes in establishment and composition of the various battalions were frequent, but it is only necessary to notice those which involved Indians.

The Indian Contingent attached to the 1st and 2nd (Nyasaland) K.A.R. was reduced in 1906 to one company (two British officers, 102 other ranks) and was disbanded in 1913, thus closing a connection which had lasted for twenty-three years. The 5th (Uganda) [all-Indian] K.A.R. had only a short life, being disbanded in 1904 when the terms of service of the majority of the men expired; but at the same time the 4th (Uganda) K.A.R. was reorganized so as to include two companies, each 100 strong, of sepoy. The Indian companies of the 4th K.A.R. took part in the Nandi operations of 1905-06 and received the Africa General Service Medal with bar 'Nandi 1905-06' in due course; but they were disbanded in March 1913.

The 6th (Somaliland) K.A.R., formed as an all-African unit in 1904, was in 1905 converted to all-Indian, with four companies. In 1908 Somalis were brought in, and the Indian constituent of the battalion reduced to one infantry company and one camel company, which took part in the Somaliland operations of 1908-10, and duly received the Africa General Service Medal with bar 'Somaliland 1908-10'.

The whole of the 6th K.A.R. was, however, disbanded in 1910 when the interior of the country was evacuated, and replaced by the Somaliland Indian Contingent, affiliated to the K.A.R., with an establishment of four British officers, two Indian officers, and 200 Punjabi Musalman soldiers with at least three years' service, seconded from their Indian units. In 1914 the contingent was reinforced by 100 more Punjabi Musalmans and 100 Hindustani Musalmans, with two more British and two more Indian officers. Of the 400 sepoy, 250 infantry and 150, mounted on camels, operated with the Somaliland Camel Constabulary, which also had three Somali companies (one being a pony company) each 150 strong.

The Somaliland Camel Constabulary was regularized under the name of the Somaliland Camel Corps in 1915, and saw almost continuous fighting, the principal incidents being the two attacks on the Dervish stronghold of Shimber Berris in November 1914 and February 1915, for gallantry at the former of which one Indian officer and one naik received the I.D.S.M. The Africa Service Medal was later awarded to those engaged, with the bar 'Shimber Berris 1914-15'. Finally, in 1920, the contingent – with forces of the Royal Navy, the R.A.F. and the Indian Army – took part in the last campaign against the Mad Mullah, and for this received the same medal with bar 'Somaliland 1920'. In the same year the infantry portion of the Contingent was broken up, and when in 1922 the Indian company of the Somaliland Camel Corps met with a similar fate, the last of the Indian Contingents in Africa ceased to exist.

## 13TH BENGAL IRREGULAR CAVALRY

Ashok Nath

The 12th Bengal Irregular Cavalry, as it was then known, was raised at Ferozepur on 2nd January 1846 by Major Thomas Quin of the 4th Bengal Light Cavalry (Lancers). Within one year, due to a rearrangement of precedent following inclusion of the Bundelkhand Legion as the 10th Bengal Irregular Cavalry, irregular cavalry regiments numbered '10' and upwards added a number -- hence the title of this regiment changed to 13th Irregular Cavalry.

The regiment had been raised specifically for service in the Second Sikh War, for which it earned two battle honours. In 1857 the 13th Irregular Cavalry was dispersed in detachments. In early June its commandant Captain Henry John Guise along with HQ and 70 men moved to Varanasi [Benares], strategically important for the British, being astride the Grand Trunk Road and the Ganges. On 4th June while watching the disarming of the 37th Bengal NI, Guise was shot dead by an infuriated sepoy. Shortly afterwards part of the 13th Irregulars mutinied<sup>1</sup>. One detachment had been sent from Varanasi, under Lieutenant Charles Henry Palliser, to escort a treasury from Azamgarh [Azimgarh], and had just started on the return journey when the sepoys of the 17th Bengal NI followed and seized the money. Although they did nothing to save the treasury, the sowars of the 13th protected their officers from the sepoys of the 17th, bringing them safely back to Varanasi. They mutinied there the very next day.

Some men of the 13th Bengal Irregular Cavalry went to Delhi with Bakht Khan's force, and took part in the defence of the city. A party of them, together with some of the 14th Bengal Irregular Cavalry, opposed Hodson's Horse and the Corps of Guides at Rohtak.

More than half of the regiment had effectively mutinied, and this led to its eventual disbandment. Most of the rebel sowars went off to Azamgarh, where they had rallied after their flight from Varanasi; from there they moved to Kanpur [Cawnpore], where they joined the Nana's army and are reported to have taken part in the infamous massacre of the Europeans at the Sati Chura Ghat. When driven from Kanpur they went to Avadh [Oudh] joining the popular uprising which had taken place there.

A loyal remnant of eighty sowars of the 13th rode with Palliser from Varanasi to Allahabad in June 1858 and joined Havelock's moveable column marching up to relieve Kanpur and Lucknow. A composite squadron was hastily put together, the 13th sowars being joined by around forty loyal troopers of the 3rd Cavalry Oudh Irregular Force, and this short-lived body was known as 'Palliser's Irregulars.' However most of these men were disaffected and refused to confront the rebel cavalry at Fatehpur [Futtehpur] on 15th July as Havelock's column was desperately trying to reach Kanpur. Although they were not dismissed, all but six of Palliser's men were disarmed and dismounted and relegated to fatigues and baggage duties.

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<sup>1</sup> It appears that they were dismayed by the humiliation meted out to Indian regiments and by the arrogance shown by Colonel J. Neill who had ordered the disarming parade

In spite of the wastage, there was still a significant body of up to one hundred and ninety-six 13th Irregular sowars available to provide the nucleus of the newly constituted Benares Horse officially raised at Gorakhpur in November 1857 but actually in existence as early as July that year. This nucleus may have included a handful of the men disarmed at Fatehpur six of whom, including three officers, are known to have claimed medals for service with the Benares Horse during the final capture of Lucknow in March 1858.<sup>2</sup>

BATTLE HONOURS  
Punjaub, Goojerat.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION  
Hindustani Muslims were in majority. There were also Rajputs and Brahmins from Avadh.

REGIMENTAL BADGES  
An example of a helmet badge in copper, possibly gilt at one time, has survived. The design features an ornate pattern that was standard to the irregular cavalry. The crescent<sup>3</sup> was used as a device by many of the early Indian Army regiments. The pouch badge, also a standard pattern for the irregular cavalry, was in gilt. Both badges were worn between 1847 and 1858.

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<sup>2</sup> Ressaïdar Maharaj Sing, Jemadars Kurruck Sing and Shaik Jewan, and three other ranks, all on the strength of 13th BIC and with Palliser's Horse during the first Relief of Lucknow, served with the Benares Horse at the final capture of Lucknow in Mar 1858.

<sup>3</sup> The crescent is actually a pre Islamic symbol; however, since its association with the Ottoman Turks, it came to be perceived as a Muslim symbol. In 1299, conquering what is now Turkey, Sultan Osman had a vision of a crescent moon stretching over the world; it thus became a symbol of the Ottoman dynasty, and when Constantinople fell to Muhammad II in 1453, the crescent came to represent both Islam and the Turkish Empire. A star was added to the crescent by Sultan Selim III in 1793.



**Officer's helmet badge introduced circa 1847**

Roman numeral XIII with scroll beneath inscribed IRREGULAR CAVALRY fixed upon a shield-shaped device resting on a laurel or oak wreath.



**Officer's pouch badge in gilt or brass, 1847-1858**

Roman numeral XIII surmounting monogram *BIC*

## Editor's note

This article appears by kind permission of member Ashok Nath and is based on an excerpt from his forthcoming book '*IZZAT, historical records and iconography of Indian Cavalry regiments 1750-2007*' soon to be published by the USI of India. (**Web site note** – now published).

There is an excellent article by Tim Ash in the *Journal of the Order & Medals Research Society*, Vol. 29, Spring 1990, No.1, pp. 11-15 entitled 'Mutiny Medals to the Benares Horse, and the Demise of the 13th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry'. Taking account of the 'evil reputation attributable to the 13th Irregular Cavalry by participating in the Cawnpore boat massacre', Tim reasons that this regiment would hardly have been considered the antecedent of the Benares Horse. He underlines this by citing the small number of 13th Irregulars taken into the Benares Horse upon raising although Ashok's description of the origins of the regiment appears to conflict with this, as also do the records of the Benares Horse published in parliamentary papers.<sup>4</sup> This source points towards a link albeit possibly tenuous between the two regiments.

In fortnightly returns detailing locations and strengths of men and horses, the remarks column opposite the Benares Horse listings includes the notation 'Late 13th Bengal Irregular Cavalry.' Strength is recorded as 172 men and 125 horses on 1st August 1857, of whom 64 men with 61 horses were present for duty. The remaining 108 men with 64 horses were on leave (being *silladar* cavalry they would have gone home with their horses), of whom only 4 were AWOL. The explanation for the large numbers of men on leave, and the imbalance between men and horses, is explained in a correspondence dated Dinapore, 9th August 1860, from Major J.B.Y. Matheson, commanding the Benares Horse. 'I here beg to point out that the men returned in the column of remarks as absent of leave from July 1857 to November 1857 were men of the late 13th Irregular Cavalry who were on furlough; afterwards, when their furlough expired, they were returned as absent without leave, and were subsequently discharged. The men returned as dismounted [*i.e.* 40 of those on leave excluding 4 who were AWOL] are men of the late 13th Bengal Irregular Cavalry who were disarmed and dismounted by the late Sir Henry Havelock, and remain dismounted, pending orders from His Excellency the Commander in Chief relative to their disposal.'<sup>5</sup> In trying to reconcile the available figures, it appears that the number of mounted men available for service prior to the official raising date of the Benares Horse varied between forty-one and sixty-three.

Tim Ash suggests one possible means of further examining the progress of the Benares Horse would be to consult Bengal Military Statements for 1858 in the India Office Records, shelf mark L/Mil/8/65. Do any readers have more evidence of a formal link to the 13th Bengal Irregular Cavalry?

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<sup>4</sup> *East India (Native Cavalry), Return of the Number of Regular and Irregular Regiments of Native Cavalry in India which have been employed upon Field Service from April 1857 to December 1859, Military Secretary, India Office 18 Feb 1861* (House of Commons, 22 Feb 1861); page 84

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, page 9.

## THE BURTONS OF KOTA

Tim Ash

The family tree outlined below follows from Victoria Singh's interesting article 'Kotah and the Uprising of 1857-58' in the Autumn 2007 edition of *Durbar*. It is intended to clarify some detail regarding the Burton family members. As far as the writer is aware, there are no direct descendants alive today.

**James Burton** 1745-1825 - Clerk in Holy Orders

(Son)

**Charles William Burton**

Baptised at Iffley 23 Apr 1780. Captain 8th Bengal Native Infantry. Arrived India 6 Feb 1802. Operations in Jumna Doab 1803, Sasni. 2nd Maratha War, Capture of Deig, Siege of Bhurtpore. Nepal War 1816. Died at Mirzapur 30 Oct 1816.

(married)

**May Anne**

Daughter of John Borthwick Gilchrist, LI. D.. Married at Calcutta 6 Jun 1810. She remarried Metcalf Stanwix Hogg.

**The Burton Family of Kota**

(Son of Charles William and May Anne)

**Charles Aeneas Burton**

Born Dinapore 6 Feb 1812. Brevet Major 40th Bengal Native Infantry. Assistant to Agent and Commissioner of Delhi 1841-3. Gwalior Campaign 1843, Bronze Star for Battle of Maharajpore, Assistant to Governor General's Agent for Rajpootana 1848, Political Agent Harowtee, Kota 1845 until murdered at Kota, 15 Oct 1857.

(married)

**Elizabeth Jane**

Born 31 Dec 1799, daughter of Edmond Burton, widow of H. Bradley. Married in London 1 Mar 1832. She was her husband's father's 1st cousin. Died at Jullundur, the Punjab, 18 May 1881

(elder daughter of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane)

**Cecelia Elizabeth** Born c.17 Nov 1832. Died at Calcutta 17 Mar 1833.

(eldest son of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane)

### **Charles William**

Born Allyghur 18 Nov 1833. Bengal Uncovenanted Civil Service 1857. Assistant Superintendent, Jewud, Neemuch. 1858 Lieutenant Bombay Army. 1859 Ensign H.M's 89th Regt. 1864 Lieutenant. 1866 transferred to H.M's 12th Foot. 1868 transferred to Bengal Staff Corps. 1876 Captain, Political Assistant Rajputana, Bikaner. Died there 28 Jul 1878 and buried at Ajmer, Rajputana. Served in the Indian Mutiny campaign 1857-58. Action at Neembarah (wounded). Siege of Neemuch as a civilian volunteer. Siege of Kota Mar 1858. Actions at Chota Oodeypore and Vasselghur. Several times mentioned in despatches. Medal with clasp for Central India.

(married)

### **Florence Elizabeth**

Daughter of Charles St Cloud, born 22 Aug 1848. Married in London 28 Dec 1864. She re-married at Cannanore 7 Jun 1880 to Noel Overbury, Madras Civil Service. He died 14 Aug 1884. She died at Nice, France, 20 Jan 1903. Children - not known

(second son of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane)

### **James Edmond**

Born 20 Nov 1834 at Fort William, Calcutta. Appointed Bengal Civil Service (Uncovenanted) 1858. District Superintendent of Police, Bankipore, Lucknow, in Oude. Died in London whilst on furlough 25 Feb 1876. Served in the Indian Mutiny as a civilian volunteer. Present at the action of Neembarah and siege of Neemuch. Mentioned in despatches and medal.

(married)

### **Harriet Goodall**

Survived her husband. No further details known. Children - not known

(third son of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane - twin)

### **Cecil Morton**

Born 22 Sep 1836 at Kyak Phyoo, Arracan, Burma. Twin with Arthur Robert. Appointed Bengal Civil Service Uncovenanted 1858. Asst Commissioner in the Punjab. Died at Jullundur, Punjab, 1 Dec 1889. Served in the Indian Mutiny as a civilian volunteer; present at the siege of Neemuch. Medal.

(married)

### **Agnes Florence**

Survived husband. At his death their surviving children were: one son, three daughters.

(fourth son of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane – twin)

**Arthur Robert**

Born 22 Sep 1836 at Kyak Phyoo, Arracan, Burma. Twin with Cecil Morton. Murdered at Kota with his father and younger brother, Francis Clerke, on 15 Oct 1857.

(fifth son of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane)

**Francis Clerke**

Born 15 Feb 1838, Capetown, South Africa (?). Murdered at Kota with his father and elder brother, Arthur Robert, 15 Oct 1857

(sixth son of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane)

**Henry Deane**

Born at Calcutta, 22 Jul 1839. Assumed died prior to 1857.

(younger daughter of Charles Aeneas and Elizabeth Jane)

**Mary Elizabeth**

Born Dinapore 30 Oct 1840. Died at Kota 25 May 1854.

**Editor's note**

There is no significance to the alternative spellings of Kota and Kotah; both were used in contemporary records. The two principalities of Bundi and Kota, with their respective capital towns of the same name, were located within the region generally known as Harowtee in Rajpootana. The appointment of Major C.A. Burton as 'Personal Assistant under the Governor General's Agent for the States of Rajpootana' (G.O. 10 Jun. 1848) was supplementary to his concurrent appointment as Political Agent at Kota (G.O. 22 Aug 1845) [ref. Charles Burton's service records provided by Tim]. See also the Spring 2008 edition of Durbar for Brian Steven's comments on Victoria Singh's article.



## BENGAL FOOT ARTILLERY ON FIELD SERVICE IN 1857

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE 3RD COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION BENGAL ARTILLERY AT DELHI

Brian Stevens & Cliff Parrett

At the opening of the Indian Mutiny campaign in 1857, the foot artillery of the Bengal Army consisted of six European battalions numbered '1' to '6' each having four companies and three Native battalions numbered '7' to '9' each having six companies. They were designated by numerals within their battalions.<sup>1</sup> Although there were variances between the personnel required for a European and a Native company and between the descriptive titles of their corresponding ranks, overall strengths were not significantly different.<sup>2</sup>

### **European company**

Captain	1	
2nd Captain	1	
Lieutenant	4	
Staff sergeant	1	
Sergeant	6	
Corporals	6	
Bombardiers	6	
Buglers	2	
Half pay buglers	2	(also known as 'Boys')
Gunners	62	

Lascar detail when  
att'd to Horse Field  
Battery

Lascar detail when att'd to  
other types of draught

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<sup>1</sup> Major General F.W. Stubbs, *History of the Organisation, Equipment, and War Services of the Regiment of Bengal Artillery* (London 1895), vol. iii, pp. 601-603 (citing *inter al* G.G.O. of 23rd May 1845). Stubbs provides an analysis of personnel on the establishment of companies, but gives no details of personnel in field batteries.

<sup>2</sup> Establishment strengths of artillery are recorded in the Bengal Army List.

Jemadar	-	Subedar	1
		(or Jemadar) <sup>3</sup>	
Havildar	1	Havildar	2
Naiks	2	Naiks	2
Privates	24	Privates	31
<b>Total</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>127</b>

For each of the European companies, whether ‘in battery’ in not, an additional detail of Indian gun lascars was provided. For reasons which are not clear, the number of lascars was reduced from 31 to 24 when companies were attached to a Horse Light Field Battery (LFB). They were not required for Native companies irrespective of draught.

In the European companies to which bullock batteries were attached, Lascar Details included subadars and jemadars alternatively. Thus a European artillery battalion of four companies with four bullock LFBs attached would have had, in theory, subadars for the 1st and 3rd Companies, and jemadars for the 2nd and 4th Companies. However, on the occasions when for example the 2nd and 4th were detached from battalion headquarters and were both serving at the same station, which was not unusual, a subedar would have been cross posted to one or other of the companies in lieu of a jemadar. The relevance of the rules governing alternation of Native officers gradually diminished as the number of bullock batteries declined. By January 1857 only one European battalion had more than one bullock battery attached (1-3 Ben.A and 2-3 Ben.A with No.4 and No.12 Bullock LFB respectively).<sup>4</sup> The conversion of No.12 LFB to horse draft was authorised later that same year (G.O.C.C. 7th July 1857), and thereafter only one European company, 1-3 Ben.A, continued to serve a bullock draft battery. This battery (No. 4 LFB), along with ‘M’ Company of Drivers was transferred to Madras where it was attached to B Company 4th Madras Foot Artillery.

#### **Native company**

Captain	1
2nd Captain	1

<sup>3</sup> Native officers were subadars or jemadars alternatively.

<sup>4</sup> The combined total of Bullock LFBs attached to both European and Native battalions had fallen to just five in 1857.

Lieutenants	2
Subedar	1
Jemadars	2
Havildars	6
Naiks	6
Buglers	2
Privates	88
<b>Total</b>	<b>109</b>

In principle there was no permanence to the allotment of duties, and all forty-two companies, whether European or Native, were liable to be assigned either to garrison duties or to any one of the field batteries without notice. Although there was no hard and fast rule, it usually worked out that at any one time half of them were on garrison service and half were attached to field batteries. In practice, companies were often attached to the same battery for many years, as was 2-7 Ben.A from about 1818 until it mutinied at Nasirabad in 1857, except for a three-year tour with Battalion H.Q. at Cawnpore which ended in 1830.

The equipment and additional personnel required for the twenty-one *companies* allotted to field service were provided by a matching establishment of twenty-one *batteries*, employing either horse or bullock draught. Until 1852 bullock draught was preferred; indeed in 1831 all the field batteries were thus drawn. However, the experience of campaigning in the Punjab brought a new perspective to the employment of artillery, and from the mid-1840's the proportion of bullock to horse batteries steadily declined. Indeed, by 1846 there were already eight horse drawn batteries out of nineteen. At the opening of the Mutiny campaign, seventeen of the twenty-one batteries were horsed. During the period of the Mutiny campaign, the 23rd and 24th Batteries were raised but for some reason not a 22nd Battery. This might be due to the fact that a Peshawar Light Field Battery was raised from European soldiers at that station, and it might have been considered as the 22nd Field Battery, but this is purely speculation.

In effect, the batteries were attached to companies and not the other way around, and so '3rd Company, 3rd Battalion Bengal Artillery with No 14 Light Field Battery attached' was the

strictly correct terminology.<sup>5</sup> It happened that, in May 1857, ten of the Native foot artillery companies were attached to field batteries.<sup>6</sup>

Generally speaking, the armament of a field artillery battery included five 9-pdr guns and one 24-pdr howitzer, both weighing 10 hundredweight. On occasion, the howitzer was replaced by either an 18-pdr gun or an 8-inch mortar although this probably applied only to bullock batteries as the established number of horses in a field battery would not have been sufficient to move these equipments.

Light field batteries were designated both by numbers, from '1' to '21', and by descriptive terminology such as 'No. 1 Horse Light Field Battery' or 'No. 2 Bullock Light Field Battery' depending on type of draught animal employed.

Whether the artillery company itself was European or Native, the field battery to which it was attached came with its own company of Indian drivers about sixty strong with one or two European sergeants. In addition, in horse draught batteries there was a substantial complement of syces and grass cutters. Together with the syce-drivers, they were mustered and entitled to Pension and the Benefit of the Invalid Establishment. Unlike the personnel of the companies of gunners who were regularly moved *en bloc* from battery to battery, the companies of drivers, which were lettered (*i.e.* 'P Company Syce Drivers'), were less likely to be transferred from battery to battery and were considered to be more of a *permanent* personnel. Nevertheless they were occasionally moved, usually on a change of station.

<b>Horse Light Field Battery</b>	<i>War</i>	<i>Peace</i>
	<i>Establishment</i> <sup>7</sup>	<i>Establishment</i>
Rough Rider & Farrier Sergeant	1	1
Asst Farrier & Saddler Sergeant	1	1
Jemadar <sup>8</sup>	1	-
Havildars	3	2
Naiks	3	2
Syce Drivers	60	54
Salutri (native farrier)	1	1

<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that when Battle Honours were granted, the company and not the battery was the recipient. The sole exception was the award of 'Jellalabad' to No. 6 Light Field Battery (see f/n 8).

<sup>6</sup> Colonel J.R.J. Jocelyn, *History of the Royal and Indian Artillery in the Mutiny of 1857* (London 1915), pp. 433-4. Jocelyn provides a tantalisingly brief summary of the Bengal Artillery organisation.

<sup>7</sup> *India Office Records*, shelf mark L/Mil/8/64, Bengal Military Statement 1856-1857; war establishment of No 14 LFB stationed at Meerut.

<sup>8</sup> No. 6 Light Field Battery had, as an exceptional Honour for Jellalabad, one 'Jemadar of Drivers', this being offset by one havildar less.

Moochie (leather worker)	1	1
Bhisti	1	1
Syces	70	44
Jorawallah Grass-cutters <sup>9</sup>	46	46
Grass-cutters	38	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>159</b>
Horses <sup>10</sup>	130	98

### **Bullock Light Field Battery**

Bullock Sergeant	1
Sirdars	4
Ordnance Drivers	59
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>
Bullocks	106

There was provision for a number of ordnance bullocks to be attached to a Horse Field Battery for general duties and haulage. This varied depending upon whether the battery was in cantonments, when it had two carts in general use, or on field service when it had a further seven wagons, four carts and an ordnance carriage. This would have been the case for batteries sent to Delhi to support the siege operations. Two years before the Mutiny broke out, the establishment of bullocks had been regularised by G.G.O. No. 214 of 1855 which fixed the number of ordnance bullocks to a Horse Field Battery at a total of 69 when on field service. There was a lot of additional weight to be pulled, for which the extra strength of bullocks was an essential requirement.

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<sup>9</sup> *Jorawallahs* were grass-cutters who, for double pay, kept a pony and provided fodder for two horses (G.G.O. No 34 of 1846). Grass-cutters had one horse each allotted.

<sup>10</sup> When a Light Field Battery was attached to a Native company, the former had three additional horses for the Native officers with three additional syces and three additional grass-cutters. In the case of No. 6 LFB, having a jemadar of drivers, there were four additional horses, syces and grass-cutters.

## Bullock establishment for a Horse Light Field Battery on Field Service

6 extra wagons (6 animals each)	36
spare animals	6
3 carts (each 6 animals each)	18
spare animals	3
1 spare ordnance carriage	6
<b>total number of bullocks</b>	<b>69</b>

To ensure that draught animals and equipment were maintained in serviceable condition in the field, a transportable forge, known as the 'Train Establishment', was included in the strength of the Light Field Battery. It was headed by a Mistri [Foreman] Smith accompanied by 2 Filemen, 2 Firemen, 2 Hammermen, a Mistri Carpenter and 2 Carpenters.

The 3rd Company, 3rd Battalion Bengal Artillery was a company of European gunners.<sup>11</sup> It was attached to the 14th Light Field Battery with its establishment of Indian drivers, syces and grass cutters.<sup>12</sup> The draught animals were horses. The roll of claims for the Mutiny medal put in by 3-3 Ben.A for service at Delhi illustrates the typical composition of personnel serving a Bengal Foot Artillery battery of six guns on field service.<sup>13</sup> The British ranks of 3-3 Ben.A consisted of five officers and ninety non-commissioned officers and gunners, in close accord with the correct establishment strength.<sup>14</sup> However the lascar detail, forming part of the *company* personnel, was somewhat below strength with only twenty all ranks including Jemadar Suffee Allie (sic)<sup>15</sup>, one havildar, one naik and seventeen privates.

The personnel of 14 LFB included 'R Company Syce Drivers'<sup>16</sup>, with the appropriate brace of European sergeants (farrier and saddler), a jemadar, three havildars, three naiks, fifty-eight drivers (two short of establishment) and a *salutri* (Indian farrier). The Farrier Sergeant doubled as a Rough Rider.<sup>17</sup> The main duty of the Rough Rider was to assist the Riding Master, if that post existed, to train soldiers or drivers to ride and to break in Remounts. These animals

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<sup>11</sup> The 3-3 Ben.A was absorbed into the Royal Artillery in 1861 and by 1901 its title had evolved to 97th Coy RGA. As a result of all RA batteries being numbered consecutively from the 1st April 1947, 3-3 Ben.A was designated as 92 Light Anti-Aircraft, and in 1949 as 92 Light Anti-Aircraft/Searchlight Battery. It was placed in Suspended Animation on the 1st October 1958. Having been raised on the 14th February 1802 as the 6th Coy 1st Bn Bengal Artillery, it had been in existence for over 156 years.

<sup>12</sup> The 14 LFB had been converted from camel draught to horse draught under the authority of a G.O.C.C. dated 2nd October 1852 when stationed at Multan.

<sup>13</sup> *India Office Records*, shelf mark L/Mil/5/79, folios 199-204; medal roll. The headcount given in this article is limited to officers and other ranks who served before Delhi. Although not the case with 3-3 Ben.A, most of the artillery units serving before Delhi in 1857 were below strength. An additional medal roll (L/Mil/5/103, ff 13-16) recorded casualties although it duplicates names that also appear on the main roll.

<sup>14</sup> An Indian Mutiny medal with Delhi clasp named to 'Syce Sookah, 3<sup>d</sup> C<sup>o</sup> 3<sup>d</sup> B<sup>n</sup> B<sup>l</sup> Arty' has been recorded in a private collection. However, the extant roll of 3-3 Ben.A does not include claims of any of its substantial complement of syces. They are probably on a supplementary roll that has been misfiled or otherwise lost.

<sup>15</sup> There was no authority for a 'Jemadar of Gun Lascars' with a Horsed Light Field Battery. In theory, the presence of Jemadar Suffee Allie with 3-3 Ben.A could be explained by his availability as an unemployed Supernumerary Jemadar at Meerut, when it would have been understandable for the Company to have absorbed him prior to marching to Delhi. On the other hand he might have been on the permanent strength of 14 LFB, having been specially promoted for services to the Government. Yet again, it may be an anachronism dating back to the time when 14 LFB was a camel draught battery. Further investigation of the India Office Records may resolve this conundrum.

<sup>16</sup> The medal roll describes the driver element, unconventionally for a horse draught battery, as 'Ordnance Drivers.'

<sup>17</sup> In many respects the Bengal Army took its leads from the Crown forces. It is likely that the duties of the Rough Rider of Bengal Artillery were very much the same as those of his counterpart in the R.A. The Standing Orders of the Royal Regiment of Artillery summarises these. 'The Rough Rider is to instruct recruits in riding and sword drills. He is to break and reform the remount horses.'

generally arrived at their respective units almost unbroken and perhaps never having had a saddle of their backs.

No evidence has yet been found that the establishment of a Horse Light Field Battery included a Riding Master, and the responsibility for training men to ride and to break remounts appears to have rested with the officer ultimately commanding the battery. To this effect, the officer received a monthly allowance of Rs. 5 for providing the following Riding School equipment: 60 cavessons [bridles]; 60 whips; 60 rings with boxes and posts; 12 wooden heads with posts; 400 male bamboos (a particularly strong bamboo pole).

When the Indian Mutiny broke out on 10th May 1857, the 3-3 Ben.A commanded by Captain Scott<sup>18</sup> was stationed at Meerut.<sup>19</sup> About two weeks earlier there had been trouble in the artillery lines when a few unattested Indian artillery recruits refused to receive the old-pattern ammunition.<sup>20</sup> They had been summarily paid off and discharged. There is no record of any disturbances amongst the Indian lascars and drivers serving the European artillery units stationed in Meerut during this critical period, and 3-3 Ben.A remained calm albeit inactive and out of harm's way. On 26th May, Brigadier Wilson<sup>21</sup> was ordered to leave Meerut with all available forces and advance on Delhi. The 3-3 Ben.A was one of two and a half Bengal Foot Artillery companies in his small column. It was intended that, en route, he should join up with the main British army under General Barnard<sup>22</sup> at Alipore.

Before affecting the junction with Barnard, Wilson had to fight his way across the Hindun River on 30th and 31st May against fierce rebel opposition. The Bengal Artillery was fully employed but it failed to silence the enemy's well-sheltered guns. Eventually a surprise flanking movement by Sir Adrian Hope Grant's cavalry brigade, which had crossed the river well up-stream, caused the enemy to retire in confusion with the loss of all stores and guns. Following close upon the debacle at Meerut, it was a small but significant victory that did much to restore the morale of the harassed British forces.

In the meantime, urgent steps had been taken to assemble a siege train so that offensive operations could be undertaken at Delhi with the minimum of delay. Orders for the equipment of the train, which was located at Phillaur in the Jullundur division of the Punjab, had been received by 1st Lieutenant Griffith<sup>23</sup> on 17th May, and within one week it was ready to move. It was a remarkably fast turn-around, although it was a small train of only twenty-two artillery pieces ranging from 18-pndr guns to 5½-inch mortars. The 1-7 Ben.A, a company of Indian gunners, was at Phillaur and escorted the siege train as far as Umballa, but it was not considered wise to allow it to advance further with the train.<sup>24</sup> An urgent request for European gunners brought the 4-6 Ben.A down from Firozepore by bullock draught. This Company, commanded by Captain Kaye<sup>25</sup>, was under strength for the task and received reinforcements from Meerut in due course. The train marched into Alipore on 6th June, an excellent performance as the men and animals were exposed to the fiery heat of the hottest period of the Indian summer. One day

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<sup>18</sup> Capt & Brevet Major Edward William Smyth Scott, Ben. Arty

<sup>19</sup> The 3-3 Ben.A arrived at Meerut from Umballa on 17 Nov. 1854 with 14 LFB attached (*Bengal Army List*, edition updated to 22 Dec 1854)

<sup>20</sup> The root causes of mutiny went far deeper than the problem with cartridges, although refusal to use them was a demonstrative act of disaffection.

<sup>21</sup> Brigadier Archdale Wilson, Ben. Arty; commanding the Meerut District

<sup>22</sup> Maj. Gen. Sir Henry William Barnard KCB, H.M.'s service; cmdg Delhi Field Force

<sup>23</sup> 1st Lieut Joseph Carncross Griffith, Ben. Arty

<sup>24</sup> According to the Bengal Army List corrected to January 1859, the 1-7 Ben.A remained stationed at Umballa with a Bullock Battery attached, ordnance consisting of five 6-pndr guns and one 12-pndr howitzer. But by July 1859 it had been disbanded.

<sup>25</sup> Capt & Brevet Major Edward Kaye, Ben. Arty

later, on 7th June, Wilson's column also came in to swell Barnard's division. They were allowed only a few hours to recuperate.

It was known that the rebels had set up a roadblock across the Grand Trunk Road from Alipore, some six miles before Delhi. Strongly positioned around the thick walls of an old *caravanserai* known as Badli-ki-Serai were substantial numbers of infantry and cavalry supported by thirty guns. Barnard decided to immediately attack the rebel position before dawn on 8th June, and to this end he set out in the pitch dark at 1 o'clock in the morning, leaving his baggage and park at Alipore guarded by a small detachment of troops. He sent his cavalry brigade by a circuitous route to fall on the enemy's left flank. His infantry was divided into two brigades. One under Brigadier Showers<sup>26</sup> was to attack the *serai* frontally with the artillery in support, while the other under Brigadier Graves<sup>27</sup> inclined to the left to cut off the enemy's retreat. The artillery included Scott's 3-3 Ben.A and Kaye's 4-6 Ben.A, the latter serving an improvised heavy bullock-drawn field battery with two 18-pndr guns and two 8-inch howitzers.

As Showers' frontal attack developed, it was evident that the cavalry brigade had not reached its starting point. At this stage, the rebels opened a heavy and accurate artillery fire from well-screened shelters, and Barnard's guns were unable to silence them. Men began to fall, some of Kaye's bullock drivers ran away, and an ammunition wagon was blown up. Barnard ordered Showers' infantry, H.M's 75th Foot supported by the 1st Bengal European Regiment, to make a bayonet charge on the centre of the enemy's position, being a sandbagged mound containing a battery of five heavy artillery pieces, flanked by well-sited field guns. As the rebel battery was stormed, Graves' Brigade, which had marched around a *jheel*<sup>28</sup>, hove into sight at the very same moment as Tombs' troop of horse artillery<sup>29</sup>, spear-heading the attack of the Cavalry Brigade, came into action on the enemy's left flank.

The rebels then abandoned their position and retired towards Delhi, leaving behind their guns and camp stores in Barnard's hands. However, the day's work was not yet done. Barnard pressed on towards Delhi in pursuit of the fleeing rebels and took possession of the Ridge overlooking the city, of crucial importance to the planned siege operations and a great loss to the rebels. It had to be defended against a strong enemy counter-attack before the long day was over. The British force had been under arms for sixteen hours in the hottest season of the year. The enemy casualties were not known and were probably not very heavy, and yet twenty-six guns had been captured including some useful 18-pndrs and 24-pndrs.

The defences of Delhi were formidable. The wide river Jumna, in full flood at that time of year, protected the eastern approaches to the city walls. The other sides were surrounded by imposing walls of immense thickness, with bastions and other emplacements for guns at regular intervals, forming an arc around the city of which the river was the chord. The defenders were well equipped with guns, howitzers and mortars of varying calibre and an ample supply of ammunition. When mutiny had first broken out in Delhi, a desperate attempt was made by a small band of eight Europeans under Lieutenant George Dobson Willoughby of the Bengal Artillery, Deputy Commissary of Ordnance at Delhi, to keep the Arsenal out of rebel hands,. Having lost all hope of success, Willoughby determined that he would diminish the value of this hugely important prize by blowing up the magazine. It was a suicidal business and a very brave

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<sup>26</sup> Colonel St. George Daniel Showers, 2nd Ben. Eur. Regt

<sup>27</sup> Colonel Harry Meggs Graves, 13th Ben. NI, Brigadier cmdg Delhi District

<sup>28</sup> An expanse of static flood water; a mere or lagoon

<sup>29</sup> 2nd Troop 1st Brigade Ben. Horse Arty (European) commanded by Capt Henry Tombs, Ben. Arty

act. Unfortunately he only succeeded in destroying the small-arms magazine. He survived the enormous explosion together with just three of his small band who were eventually decorated with the Victoria Cross. But not the gallant Willoughby himself, who was killed on the road to Meerut while trying to reach safety.

An initial shortage of gunners hampered the rebel defence. This was resolved by employing lascars and volunteers from the Delhi Magazine. In effect, the rebel guns were superior in numbers and weight of metal, and were unquestionably well served. Both sides were strengthened as the siege progressed, an initial imbalance in favour of the defenders being somewhat redressed.

During the early days it was not feasible for the besiegers to make regular approaches on the city due to scarcity of supplies and a shortage of engineers. It was also difficult to furnish working parties of infantrymen who could hardly be spared from defending the perimeter of the British camp from constant attacks. So at first they did little more than maintain their position, firing from batteries on the Ridge.

The heavy artillery was positioned in the so-called Ridge Batteries, where it concentrated on battering the immensely strong city walls. Meanwhile the field artillery had a different role to play. The 3-3 Ben.A remained with 14 LFB. A gun and howitzer, commanded by Lieutenant Elliot<sup>30</sup>, were permanently assigned to Reid's Brigade<sup>31</sup> defending the Main Picquet at Hindu Rao's House on the exposed right flank of the British position close to the Subzi Mandi suburbs. They were frequently in action, and did good service.

Lieutenant Elliot's gun and howitzer of 3-3 Ben.A were worked in the open at the Main Picket, and their service was one of great danger. On [21st June] they were under fire from the Subzi Mandi buildings on one side and under shot and shrapnel fire from the city walls on the other. Early in the day, the gun was disabled, right wheel smashed and trail loop-eye shot off. The howitzer had a shot through the axletree bed, but was serviceable. Lieutenant Elliot placed his men under cover of the rocks as well as he could, and with two others worked the piece for several hours.<sup>32</sup>

Two other guns of 3-3 Ben.A accompanied the column sent out on 4th July to relieve Alipore from the rebel sortie against that city. It was important to deal with this incursion as it threatened the British line of communication between Delhi and the Punjab, whence came vital reinforcements of both men and materials. But swampy ground held up the artillery and the rebels, though repelled, suffered no significant damage.

In spite of the increasing pressure for all artillery resources, irrespective of calibre, to concentrate on siege activities, the 3-3 Ben.A was left to continue in its role as mobile field artillery in support of the picquets, although during the final stages of the siege and assault it was concentrated in camp and held as a reserve. Casualties suffered by 3-3 Ben.A and 14 LFB during the period of the siege were substantial, amounting altogether to forty-two all ranks.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> 2nd Lieut Minto Elliot, Ben.A

<sup>31</sup> Major Charles Reid, 10th Ben.NI; commandant Sirmoor Rifle Bn w.e.f. 24th February 1857. He commanded No. 4 Column during the final assault on Delhi.

<sup>32</sup> *Jocelyn*, p. 86

<sup>33</sup> I.T. Tavender, *Casualty Roll for the Indian Mutiny 1857-59* (London 1983). Tavender lists only British officers and other ranks who were killed or died of wounds, and omits deaths from sickness or disease. The medal roll (see f/n 13) lists all ranks who died but makes no note of wounds in the case of survivors. The casualty roll lists only Europeans, including wounded

The 3-3 Ben.A saw further active field service after the fall of Delhi, most notably in the Rohilkhund district of the North West Provinces between 5th and 25th May 1858 when it was attached to the Rohilkhund Field Force under the Commander in Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, being present at the actions of Bareilly, Shahjahanpore, Burnai and Mohamdee.

An indication of the significant numbers of lascars and drivers who served with the European companies of artillery can be gauged by looking through the rolls of medal claims. Most of these are available in the British Library's 'India Office Records' on microfilm.

The extent to which the European artillery of all three Presidencies depended on the services of loyal Indian personnel is sometimes overlooked. Without their cooperation in 1857, the field artillery and siege artillery would have been enormously disadvantaged, if not completely hamstrung. The gallantry of some of these brave men, including two who served with 3-3 Ben.A at Delhi, was recognised by admission to the Indian Order of Merit.

GO 814 of 7th June 1859

3RD COMPANY, 3RD BATTALION BENGAL ARTILLERY

GUN LASCAR DETAIL

**Jemadar Suffer Ally (3<sup>rd</sup> Class Order of Merit)**

NO. 14 HORSE LIGHT FIELD BATTERY

R COMPANY SYCE DRIVERS

**Jemadar Bucktawar (3<sup>rd</sup> Class Order of Merit)<sup>34</sup>**

Granted the Order of Merit in recognition of the loyalty displayed by them during the earliest stages of the Mutiny, a time when their desertion or misconduct would possibly have paralysed the efforts of the first force that met the enemy in the field; also as a reward for their unshaken fidelity proved through the lengthened and very trying period of the siege of Delhi, during which their Battery was constantly engaged with an enemy of overwhelming numbers and themselves subjected to temptations which could not but have been pressing.<sup>35</sup>

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survivors. In effect, no record of lascars and drivers who were wounded and survived has been traced. Overall known casualties were: killed 5 NCOs/gunners, 1 lascar, 3 drivers; died of wounds 5 NCOs/gunners, 1 driver; died from other causes 8 NCOs/gunners, 1 driver; wounded 2 officers, 16 NCOs/gunners.

<sup>34</sup> As previously mentioned (f/n 8 above), No. 6 Light Field Battery was allowed one 'Jemadar of Drivers' as an exceptional honour. Although the order authorising a jemadar with 14 LFB has not yet been traced, the existence of a jemadar with this battery, very likely resulting from service at Delhi in 1857, is confirmed in Bengal Military Statements for 1857-58 (*India Office Records*, L/Mil/8/65). In addition to the General Order admitting Bucktawar to the Order of Merit, he also appears on the medal roll as a jemadar.

<sup>35</sup> P.P. Hypher, *Deeds of Valour of the Indian Soldier which won the Indian Order of Merit during the period from 1837 to 1859* (Army Department, Simla 1925); p. 200

### Editor's note referring to the foregoing article

It is assumed that both syces and grass cutters, being mustered, were eligible for the Indian Mutiny medal. There is also the evidence of at least one recorded medal named to a syce (see f/n 14, and the illustration below). However, no rolls have yet been found that list their claims with any of the field batteries. Can our members throw any light on this?

Some medal collectors will be familiar with the different styles of naming on Indian Mutiny medals distributed to Indian recipients. Seven typical examples are illustrated in Spinks' new edition of *'British Battles & Medals'* (London, 2006). The Editor has drawn a few tentative conclusions from handling a number of these medals over the years. Unlike those issued to British personnel that were named at the Royal Mint in a standard form of impressed lettering before shipment, medals destined for Indian recipients were shipped unnamed to the Military Department of the respective Presidency where they were named in differing styles. It appears that the majority of medals distributed to Indian ranks of the Bengal Army were named in engraved cursive script [see below], although irregularly impressed capitals have also been recorded. Those distributed to Indian ranks of the Madras Army and Bombay Army were invariably impressed, somewhat irregularly, and differ in varying degrees from the Royal Mint standard. Exceptionally, the medals forwarded from India to Katmandu for distribution to eligible troops of the Nepalese forces were not named. Do these conclusions fit with the experience of others who have recorded the naming styles of Mutiny medals issued to Indian recipients?

#### Engraved naming on the rim of an Indian Mutiny Medal



*Syce Sookhah, 3<sup>d</sup> Co 3<sup>d</sup> B<sup>n</sup> B<sup>t</sup> Arty.*

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#### CORRESPONDENCE AND QUERIES FROM MEMBERS

The following comments have been received from Brian Stevens arising from Part III of Alan Harfield's article on the Java Campaign of 1811-16 (Durbar, Autumn 2007, Vol. 24, No. 3). Brian's generosity in making available his extensive notes collected from the National Archives of India was acknowledged earlier by Alan (Durbar, Vol. 24, No. 1, page 56).

● The European Woman mentioned in the Disembarkation Returns included in the Bengal Military Consultations dated 19th May 1815 Nos. 50 & 51 was not Mrs Eliza Peret. There was no allowance in respect of wives of the Company's Officers in any circumstances. In those days a clear distinction was made between Officers' Ladies and the Wives of European Other Ranks, who in the case of the Company's soldiers were classified either as European Women or East Indian Women. Since the 23rd August 1781 (Military Consultation of that date) the former were entitled to an allowance of R.8 per month. Non-European Wives did not become entitled to an allowance of R.4 per month until the 1st September 1821.

It is likely that the European Woman in question was either the wife of Sergeant Major Rickaby or the Quarter Master Sergeant. The Military Statement for the year 1813-14 (Java Light Cavalry Section) shows two European Women in receipt of the allowance. The Statement for 1814-15 shows the allowance being drawn in respect of one woman. There is no information concerning the second woman. Unfortunately the Statements do not mention the names of the Soldiers in whose name the allowance was drawn.

There were two European Staff Serjeants, to use the contemporary spelling, on the strength of the Java Light Cavalry, one holding the appointment of Serjeant Major, whose name was Rickaby, and the other that of Quarter Master Serjeant. These Staff Sergeants were extra-regimentally employed being detached from the Company's European artillery and infantry regiments. On being selected for duty with Native regiments they were struck off the strength of their parent unit and posted to the Fort William Town Major's List.

The Military Consultations of the 29th July 1815 include Papers Nos. 32-35 regarding the Reduction of the Java Light Cavalry and Horse Artillery, No.35 being a Return or Nominal Roll containing the names of Riding Master McAuliffe, two Serjeant Majors, two Quarter Master Serjeants, four Serjeants and two Corporals. The Roll is made up of five columns.

- 1 Rank & Name
- 2 From which Division of the Corps,
- 3 Original Corps
- 4 Which Corps they wish to join i.e. Cavalry or Horse Artillery
- 5 Remarks

The entry for Serjeant Major Rickaby is as under.

- 1 Serjeant Major J.A. Rickaby
- 2 Cavalry
- 3 8th Regiment Native Cavalry
- 4 8th Regiment Native Cavalry
- 5 Was ten years in His Majesty's 8th Light Dragoons, transferred to the 8th Native Cavalry. Promoted by the C-in-C on the formation of the Java Light Cavalry in 1812 to the Appointment of Serjeant Major. Wishes to rejoin the 8th Native Cavalry as a Supernumerary and succeed to the first vacancy in the Cavalry.

I have not transcribed the details of the remaining nine names on the Roll but I did note that one of the Corporals had been reduced to that rank for misconduct whilst in Java.

Regarding Cornet Peret, his Pay and Allowances amounted to R.309.5.4 per month of which R.50 was in respect of Tent Allowance. The Statement does not show him as drawing Rent

Allowance in lieu, so presumably he had to find Private accommodation for his wife and himself.

It would be interesting to know why he was Court Martialled. If he had been serving in Bengal, the Trial, Charge and Verdict would have been published in General Orders by the Commander in Chief, but I do not know where, if they still exist, the Records of those held in Java are held or if the G.O.C. Java had the authority to confirm the findings of a Court Martial.

If Peret's wife did not accompany him back to Calcutta, he or she would have had to find her Passage Money from their own pocket, unless what was known as a Charter Passage was authorized by the Governor of Java or the Governor General.

Finally, a reason for Peret returning to Java in 1817-18 might be to see if he could obtain a Commission in the Dutch East Indian Army which included the 7th Hussars raised specifically for service in the East Indies. His nationality would present no problems as the Netherlands Home Army included four Swiss Regiments.

Those Sepoys of the 7th (Light Infantry) Battalion returned to Bengal were extremely lucky. All of them had been sentenced either to death or to receive 800 lashes, and their sentences had been confirmed. But Lord Moira remitted the sentences and discharged them from the Army.

The 'small locally enlisted cavalry troop' mentioned in Alan's article may be the two troop unit known as the Java Hussars. The existence of this Corps is mentioned on page 39 of the Spring 2007 edition of *Durbar* (viz. Java GO 13 Aug 1813). It is further noted on pages 136 and 137 of the Winter edition.

The Java Hussars evidently included some British soldiers. A G.O.G.G. dated 17th February 1817, and promulgated in a G.O.C.C. dated the 18th, orders that Private George Brodie, late of the Colonial Corps of Java Hussars be placed under the charge of the Town Major of Fort William by whom he is to be subsisted. A further G.O.G.G. dated the 21st and a G.O.C.C. dated the 22nd February 1817 mention that he has been reduced to a state of total blindness and is transferred to the Invalid Establishment on a Private's Pension and allow him to reside at Chunar, the Station of the Invalid Companies.

Referring to Part IV of Alan's article on page 135 (Vol. 24, No. 4), the full name of the Bengal Riding Master is Richard McCauliffe and his parent corps was the Bengal Horse Artillery in which he had previously been serving as a Serjeant Major. During his service in Java he was attached to the Java Light Cavalry and the Horse Artillery as Riding Master (BL, [IOR], Bengal Military Consultations, 29 July 1815, No. 35). Riding Masters were Warrant Officers and not Civilians, and they existed in the Bodyguard, the Horse Artillery and the Native Light Cavalry.

● Alan Harfield has responded to Brian Steven's comments with some further observations on Riding Master McCauliffe, and Cornet Peret and his wife Eliza.

I am grateful to Brian Stevens for the additional information in respect of the Riding Master of the Java Light Horse and Artillery and the question of Mrs Peret, both of which are most helpful. Riding Master Richard McCauliffe is shown as serving with the Java Light Cavalry and Horse Artillery in the following documents in the British Library (India Office Records):

- Java Light Cavalry and Horse Artillery Bengal Military Statements

- For the year 1812-1813 L/MIL/8/22 page 205
- For the year 1813-1814 L/MIL/8/23 page 205
- For the year 1814-1815 L/MIL/8/24 page 233. McCauliffe is not listed in the Statement for 1815-1816.

The information given by Brian concerning the woman who accompanied the unit, on its return to India, as being either the wife of Sergeant Major Rickaby or the Quarter Master Sergeant is extremely useful. However it raises the question of when and how Mrs Eliza Peret returned to India.

As will have been seen in Part 3 (Durbar, Autumn 2007, Vol. 24, p96), Cornet Frederick Peret had breached military law, or had been involved in some major disagreement with his Commanding Officer, Major Lucius Robert O'Brien. He was remanded to be tried by Court Martial. The Court acquitted him of all charges and the 'Findings' were approved by Lieutenant General Sir Miles Nightingall.

It was at this time that Peret and his wife's estrangement came to the notice of the General. The sequence of events is:

- Peret was married to Eliza Hutchinson at Calcutta on 16 July 1812.
- Peret was stationed at Salatiga, Java, from March 1813.
- It can be assumed that Mrs Eliza Peret travelled privately to Batavia and joined her husband at Salatiga.
- Peret, who was not allocated an official married quarter, would therefore have set up home in a privately rented bungalow.

Prior to September 1814 Peret and his wife were 'in dispute', their marriage having lasted approximately two years. The fact that marital problems had been referred to General Nightingall tends to confirm that Eliza Peret was living in Java.

Peret was granted furlough to Java and died at Samarang on 28 April 1818. The reason for his return can only be surmised. He may have purchased an interest in an estate, or he may even have formed a romantic attachment during his service in Java.

Approximately ten years ago the Court Martial papers of Cornet Peret were auctioned by a major London saleroom. I was permitted to see these papers, which were original, and can confirm the authenticity. I was not permitted to make any notes of the documents. The provenance of the papers showed that they had been accepted by the saleroom from a private vendor. The reserve price was £2,000, and I believe that they were purchased by a private collector. The saleroom would not permit me to have the name and address of the purchaser.

The outstanding question is: when and on what ship did Eliza Peret return to Bengal? Only an extensive search through passenger lists will provide an answer, providing that such lists can be traced.

• Further to Ashok Math's article 'Martial Race Theory in the South Asian context' published in the Spring 2008 edition of Durbar, Brigadier J. P. Randle OBE MC has made the following observations.

I read Ashok Nath's article with great interest. It is certainly food for considerable thought. I do however question the general thrust of his article - that there is no such thing as a martial race.

Any impartial study of nineteenth and twentieth century history would surely conclude, for example - that the Germans, as a race, were much more successful in the military arts than, say, the Italians.

In pre-colonial Africa, the Zulus, and their sub-clans of the Swazi and the Matabele were overwhelmingly dominant because of their military prowess. The same could be said of the Masai in East Africa and the Hausa in Nigeria.

I have not been in India for many years and so am quite out of touch with the extent of the secularisation of Indian Society. I do wonder however, in units enlisted across the board regardless of race and religion, how they cope with those day-to-day matters, so dear to a soldier's heart - the selection and preparation of food; alcohol; smoking; the observance of religious customs such as daylight fasting during Ramzan (Ramadan); and their effect on the efficiency and simplicity of the unit's administration.

● Ashok Nath has responded to Brigadier Randle's letter with these comments:

What did the British officers really mean? At the time the term 'martial race' was in its heyday, the British officers of the old Indian Army knew no better word to describe soldiers of a particular group whom they perceived as having martial qualities. A more accurate terminology perhaps would be 'martial cultures' to describe those groups who exhibited a martial ethos. However this was not necessarily linked to race. History shows that this attribute is not confined to any particular society or race; it is a fluid term and can change over time and space. There are also other complex factors which need further investigation as I point out in my article. What better example than the peaceful Swedes with whom I have lived for over thirty years, at one time considered the 'Terror from the North'. Similarly the Sikhs, a peace loving sect who were transformed into warriors under Guru Gobind Singh. Italians, whom Brigadier Randle points out as being inferior in military arts to the Germans, happen to be the descendants of the mighty Roman Empire that had once conquered most of Europe. Similarly an interesting question one might ask: how does the German soldier of today compare with the German soldier under Nazi Germany? More recently there is the example of the LTTE cadres. At one time dubbed 'non martial' in Indian military circles, the Tamil is now rated as one of the world's most dreaded and ruthless fighters.

Regarding Brigadier Randle's query on how the present Indian Army copes with diverse groups, I can illustrate this from my own experience of service in a cavalry regiment of the Indian Army which still retains a type of class composition dating back to the old Indian Army era. The regiment consists of one squadron each of Jat Sikhs, Rajputs, and Kaim Khanis (a particular clan of Muslim Rajputs from Rajasthan). Each squadron has its separate kitchen and messing and observes its own religious or cultural festivals. In HQ Sqn, a mixture of all three classes, the messing is common. The Muslim troopers are provided with halal meat, and if for any reason it is not immediately available extra rations, usually milk and eggs in lieu of the meat, are supplied. In certain other regiments which recruit on an all-India all-class mixed basis, the class composition is mixed right down to troop level. In such regiments the messing is combined, and to the best of my knowledge no significant problems are encountered.

● The following fragments on Bhopawar, gleaned largely from correspondence from Brian Stevens and Tim Ash, relate to the request for information on the elusive 'Bhopawar Levy' mentioned by Sushil Talwar in his article on Risaldar-Major Isri Prasad Tiwari (Durbar, Spring 2008, Vol. 25, No. I).

In the Index to the 1858 volume of Bengal G.Os.C.C., under the Appointments section, there is a list of twenty-two Levy Corps but no Bhopawar Levy. On contemporary maps, Bhopawar is shown in Western Malwa (Gwalior State), about 330 miles southwest of Gwalior, and midway on a straight line between Indore and Baroda. It was at one time (and at least until 1847) the permanent Station of the 5th Local Horse, subsequently 5th Bengal Irregular Cavalry, which was raised in 1823 for service in Western Malwa but available if required for General Service. In February 1840 the Malwa Bheel Corps (Bengal Establishment) was raised at Bhopawar and appears to have retained a presence there, off and on, for the next twenty years [ref: various East India Registers and Bengal Army Lists from 1840 to 1861]. Captain Alexander Ross Elliot Hutchinson, late 13th Bengal NI, assumed responsibility for the Office of the Bheel Agent and of the Political Duties at Bhopawar on 22nd September 1851 [G.O. 16 Dec 1851]. He remained there until 2nd July 1857 when he, his family, Dr Chishlom [???], and the wife and children of Colonel G.C.T. Stockley [commandant of the Bheel Corps and at Indore in July 1857] were forced to flee as the remnants of the Bheel Corps, about 180 - 200 men all mutinied at Bhopawar. Generally speaking, the Bheels in HEIC service remained staunchly loyal to Government during the Mutiny disturbances, and the identity of the Bheel mutineers at Bhopawar has not been established.

There happens to be an error in Sushil's record of G.G.O. No. 773 in that the year was 1859 and not 1857. The full text of this G.G.O. is: 'H.E. the Governor General in Council is pleased to admit Ressaldar Issureepersaud [sic], of the Troop of Cavalry attached to the Bhopawar Levy (late Subadar of the United Malwa Contingent), to the Second Class of the Order of British India with the title of "Bahadoor" in consideration of his conspicuous loyalty and excellent conduct brought to notice.' His subsequent advancement to the 1st Class of the Order exemplifies the way in which strict application of the rules regulating the Order was occasionally overridden - albeit only by the Governor General himself. 'G.G.O. No. 762 of 1868. H.E. the Governor General in Council is pleased, as a special case, to promote Risaldar Major Isree Persdad, 'Bahadoor', of the 1st Regiment Central India Horse, to the 1st Class of the Order of British India with the title "Sirdar Bahadoor", as an extra member of that Order [i.e. additional to establishment], until he becomes absorbed in the 1st Class in his regular turn.'

● The following request has been received from Kimberley John Lindsay:

I am researching a Great Indian Peninsular Railway stalwart and keen Volunteer, Robert Stuart Moberley OBE, VD. I hold his medals and would like to write an article about his life. Above all I am searching for a photograph of Moberley (1888-1940). He was first commissioned on 1st November 1909 as a 2nd Lieutenant in the Great Indian Peninsular Railway Volunteer Rifle Corps and promoted Lieutenant in 1910. He was on active service from September 1916 to April 1919 attached to 1/32 Sikh Pioneers. His Indian Volunteer Forces Officers' Decoration (VD) was gazetted on 15th August 1925 and his OBE (Civil Division) was dated from 3rd June 1931, by which time he had been promoted to Major. He was appointed an Honorary Lieutenant Colonel and Honorary ADC to the Governor of Bombay (Rt. Hon. Michael Knatchbull, 5th Baron Brabourne) on 10th December 1933. If anyone has a photograph of Moberley I would be delighted to hear.

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## OBITUARY

Although not a member, we regret to record the passing of Major General D.K. (Monty) Palit in Delhi on 3rd April 2008 at the age of 89. A respected author on military subjects, he is particularly renowned for his *Essentials of Military Knowledge* and *War in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence* and *War in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence*. He commanded 3-9 Gorkha Rifles in the first J&K war, for which he was awarded the VrC and 7 Brigade in the China border in 1960-61. He was Director of Military Operations during the Indo-China War of 1962. For members of this Society he will best be remembered as the founder of the General Palit Military Studies Trust, established in 1985 with the object of awarding grants for the study of Indian military history. Several members of IMHS have benefited from a grant awarded by that Trust.

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SUBEDAR SANGALI NAIDU, 1<sup>ST</sup> BN 1<sup>ST</sup> (King George's Own) Madras Pioneers

King's Indian Orderly Officer 1930. He is wearing an ADC's 'royal lanyard'. He served in East Africa during WW1 and later in Afghanistan and Waziristan between 1919 and 1924.

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