DURBAR Volume 25, No.4, Winter 2008

THE MEMOIR OF MAJOR-GENERAL E.J. WILD, BENGAL ARMY, DURING THE MUTINY OF 1857-1858

PART 2: EVENTS FOLLOWING THE RELIEF OF ARRAH – JULY/AUGUST 1857

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After the relief of the garrison at Arrah, as related in the Summer 2008 edition of Durbar, Major Vincent Eyre's party was faced with the results of the ambush of the ill-fated relieving column from Dinapore.

GENERAL WILD'S MEMOIR CONTINUES

On the arrival of our column at Arrah, the native officials returned to the Kutcherie (Treasury) and made their reports to Mr Wake[1] as usual, and, amongst the reports was that of the disaster to the detachment from Dinapore on 1st August. The rebels had hung those they had wounded or killed, and, as they had not rope enough, they used the men's braces, and some of those who were hung were buried by friendly natives as soon as the Sepoys bolted - but only with a few inches of earth over them.[2]

Wake now gave orders for those still hanging to be taken down, and these, together with those already partly buried, we buried in the Arrah cemetery. I went next morning - the 5th August - with some of our party to see the place where the disaster to the Dinapore troops had happened. The braces and ropes were still on the boughs of the trees, as the officials had only cut the bodies down, and it was a disgusting sight to see those who had been buried with only a few inches of earth over them scratched up with their arms and legs sticking out of the ground - gnawed by the dogs and jackals that had been feasting on them. These were also buried with the others. The ground on both sides of the road was strewn with broken and useless rifles, the muzzles being split, and the butts of many being broken in self-defence. I followed up the traces of the route as far as the river Soane, the rifles being seen on both sides of the road the whole way. We also visited the ruined bungalows in the civil station: all furniture, crockery, glass windows, doors, looking-glasses, etc. broken to pieces.

I will now tell about the disaster that befell the troops sent from Dinapore, as it was told to me by the survivors I met in Dinapore about a fortnight after our relieving Arrah.

I related before that Major Eyre[3] had sent a message down by steamer from Buxar to General Lloyd[4], to request he send a force to co-operate with us, so as to attack the mutineers from both sides - which could easily have been accomplished, but, on receiving that communication he, Lloyd, was ill-advised, and said: 'We will have the credit of relieving

[1] Herwald Craufurd Wake, Bengal Civil Service, Collector and Magistrate at Shahabad
[2] Both sides in the Mutiny usually dealt summarily with their captives
[3] Maj. Vincent Eyre, commanding No.5 Field Bty, 1st Coy 5th Bn Bengal Artillery
[4] Gen. George William Aylmer Lloyd, CB, 28th Bengal NI, commanding Dinapore Div

Arrah'. So he ordered a force of about four hundred European troops (infantry) composed of detachments of the 10th Foot and 37th Foot to start that afternoon [27th July] to relieve Arrah. The 37th had only arrived the previous evening.

There were then two frightful blunders made, either of which was sufficient to cause the disaster, and they were both made by Major Fenwick[5], commanding H.M's 10th Foot - and must have been approved of by General Lloyd, or his Assistant Adjutant-General.

The first blunder was not having a senior Captain in the 10th Foot to the one in command of the detachment of the 37th Foot. So Fenwick ordered Captain Dunbar, his Paymaster, (and his only Captain available who was senior to those of the 37th) to take command of the two companies furnished by his Regiment, and Dunbar consequently took command of the whole force. Major Fenwick did that so that the credit of the relief of Arrah might fall to one of his Captains.[6]

Now, Captain Dunbar may have been a first-class Paymaster, but he was totally unfit to command a company on parade, and much less fitted to command a large detachment on active service as he had no experience. Besides, he was very stout and unwieldy, and could not ride.[7]

The second, and perhaps more fatal, mistake was taking away the 'Brown Bess'[8] to which the men of the 10th Foot were accustomed and knew how to use, and issuing them the Enfield Rifle, which they had never seen, and did not know how to load, or the use of the sights, but, as they had just been received, forsooth they must be issued, so Major Fenwick had them unpacked that afternoon and issued to the two companies ordered on service.

Before starting, the men were ordered to load, and they loaded them in the same way as they would the 'Brown Bess', *viz*: biting off the paper, turning the cartridge upside-down, shaking out the powder, and letting the bullet follow, by which the conical end of the bullet went down first, instead of turning the bullet over and putting the broad end down first. Even the officers did not understand the loading of these rifles, and could not show the men.

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[5] Major William Fenwick, H.M's 10th (The North Lincolnshire) Regt of Foot.

[6] It seems out of character for an officer to step back from the opportunity to lead a fighting force in the field. According to Thomas Rattray, the reason was that the original numbers of the force had been reduced when it became evident that the 'Bombay' with a flat in tow, earmarked to transport it up-river, was unable to accommodate them all. Having been reduced to 420 men overall, 'Fenwick, considering the size of the force was too small for a Senior Officer like himself to command, placed Captain Dunbar, with no previous experience of leading troops, in charge of the expedition' (McRae, p.39). Fenwick's decision to place a captain of his own regiment in charge was also controversial to the extent that the 10th Foot contributed fewer men than the 37th.

[7] Capt. Charles Dunbar, HM's 10th (North Lincolnshire) Regt of Foot; having been first commissioned in August 1826, he was also relatively advanced in years for a captain.

[8] In this context, the term 'Brown Bess' indicates a smooth-bore muzzle-loader.

The 37th Foot understood the loading process as they had been instructed before leaving England, and, seeing the 10th Foot armed with the Enfield, thought they had been duly instructed.[9]

The detachment under Captain Dunbar started in high glee [on 29th July], thinking it would be child's play to relieve Arrah, and that, as soon as they showed themselves, they expected the mutineers would bolt almost before a shot was fired, and on the march the officers and men were joking and laughing at the mutineers bolting - and what an easy victory they were to have.

By 10 p.m. the detachment had crossed the Soane without seeing anything of the mutineers, formed into marching order, and sent out the advance guard with flanking parties on each side, and commenced their night march on Arrah - marching at ease. Arrah was about 5 miles from the river, and when they had marched nearly 4 miles the order to halt was given.

Captain Dunbar now called in the advance guard and the flanking-parties as the officers were under the impression that the rebels had bolted. Not a noise was heard, and it seemed that the destruction of Dunbar's party was fated. About 100 yards ahead of them were topes of mango trees, and they were about 40 yards from the road on each side. Between the topes and road on each side was a thick row of young date trees, planted on raised ground, with a ditch in front and behind. In the ditch behind the date trees the mutineers were in ambush, lining the length of it - waiting the arrival of the Dinapore party.

In the daytime, the mutineers would scarcely have been seen, and on such a dark night as it was they certainly could not be seen. The mutineers had received orders to lay still and let the force advance, and, as soon as a shot should be fired from the front near Arrah, they were to fire a volley from each side, as that shot was to be the signal.

When the detachment had advanced well into the ambush the signal shot was fired, and a volley discharged into the doomed detachment from both sides of the road. How many fell, or were wounded, it is impossible to say. Captain Dunbar was shot through the head, and the officers and men, taken by surprise, bolted in all directions - principally back and into the open fields, where they formed themselves into small parties, and made for the different topes so as to be under the cover of the trees, and, not knowing who was friend or foe, kept firing into each other. The mutineers then retired into Arrah.

The 10th Foot now found the mistake they had made in loading their rifles, as after firing, the muzzles in front all split, so that they were useless - and doubly so, for they could not fix their bayonets, and said they had bad rifles served out to them.

At daybreak, those who had rifles found out that they had been firing into each other all night, and as they had no-one to rally them, each party made the best of its way back to the Soane. The 10th Foot, finding their rifles useless, many of them threw them away, and were

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[9] It seems inconceivable that an established British regiment would be issued with a new Enfield rifle on which they had no training, and be sent into the field not having ever fired so much as a sighting round in practice. Most accounts make no mention of this vital detail, which appears to have been kept out of official reports at the time.

at the mercy of the villagers, who turned out with clubs, and slaughtered them, and the mutineers, seeing them retreat, followed them up, and fired at them, but the 37th kept them partially back as they still had rifles, and used them. In crossing (the river) even more were wounded, and amongst them, Venour[10] of my Regiment (the 40th Bengal NI) was wounded in the knee. This detachment lost over 200 men. This victory was the cause of the mutineers being so plucky in attacking us at Beebeegung.

So, through the stupidity of General Lloyd and Major Fenwick the Dinapore detachment lost more than half their number, whereas if Major Eyre's request had been complied with, the mutineers - who styled themselves 'The Dinapore Brigade' -would probably have been decimated or broken up, and given us no further trouble, whereas they actually joined the Gwalior forces, and gave us trouble afterwards.[11]

Having accomplished the relief of the brave little garrison of Arrah, we were ready to return to Buxar, but Wake got news that the mutineers, and other budmashes, had gone with Kooer Sing[12] to Jugdespore, where his palace was, so at Wake's request, Major Eyre determined to drive them out of his district, as it was feared that, on our departure for Allahabad, they might return to Arrah, and another relief would have to be undertaken. Major Eyre and Mr Wake urged on General Lloyd the urgent necessity of driving the rebels away, and for that additional troops were wanted, and also ammunition for our party. Both requests were granted, and we were strengthened with 200 of the 10th Foot, and 100 Sikhs.

On the afternoon of 11th August our party started for Jugdespore, and we passed the brick kilns of glorious memory, and encamped 3 miles further on in the open fields. Wake, of course, accompanied us. The next morning - the 12th -we started at daybreak and found that the roads had been cut up, and the rebels tried as far as possible to prevent our advance by letting the water out of the paddy fields and onto the road, and the sides of them, so as to swamp them, but we advanced through every difficulty.

In the distance the rebels had mounted men to act as scouts, to let them know our movements, but as they did not interfere with us we left them alone, only firing a shot at one here and there, to let them know that we saw them.

By 9 a.m. we were in sight of the Jugdespore jungle, and advanced about a mile when we halted for breakfast and rest. Soon after midday we started again for Jugdespore. The rebels had taken up a strong position in a deep ditch, and in front of them was an embankment on which was a thick growth of khuskas grass, behind which they hid themselves. We brought up our guns and opened fire. A party of the 5th Fusiliers - with which I advanced - went to the left to cut off the rebels from joining their comrades in the village, and the Sikhs took the right. The 10th Foot were the main body, and had to protect the guns, but, as soon as they saw the rebels retiring, they advanced without orders to be revenged by shooting some

[10] Ensign Edwin Venour, 40th Bengal NI (Volunteers), had arrived in India as a newly commissioned officer earlier in the year.

[11] At the so-called 2nd Battle of Cawnpore in November 1857, the sortie by General Charles Windham's garrison was soundly defeated by Tantia Topi's army and the Gwalior Contingent mutineers, and Cawnpore itself was nearly lost.

[12] Also known as Koer Singh, Kunwar Singh, or the Rajah of Jugdespore

Sepoys, and left the guns to take care of themselves, and would not listen to their officers who tried to keep them back.

To show how insubordinate the men of the 10th Foot were, I will relate an incident that took place at Jugdespore.

After the taking of Jugdespore, some order was given by Major Eyre, and one of the Ensigns of the 10th Foot gave the order to his men. I was on the spot with some men of the 5th Fusiliers, and, as one of the men of the 10th Foot would not obey the Ensign then I gave him the order - and he still refused to obey it. So I pulled out my revolver, and, pointing it at him, repeated the order, and said, "If you do not obey at once, I will fire as I will not be disobeyed."

So, without further ado, he obeyed. The Ensign afterwards told me that I ought to be less severe in enforcing obedience, or they might have a shot at me, for he said after the disaster at Arrah the men were so insubordinate that they would hardly obey their own Regimental officers. I said, "No wonder, if you are afraid to make them obey, and thereby encourage insubordination, but my idea is strict obedience to orders given by the senior."[13]

Well, we drove the rebels out, and they took up a position in a village to their rear, out of which we again drove them without any loss on our own side. Their loss was put down at between 20 or 30. On entering the village, a horrible sight came to view: A native, - supposed to be one of our spies - was found stripped of all clothing, hung up by the heels to the bough of a tree with his throat cut, and hamstrung, and it appeared to have been done the day before. We advanced again through a bit of jungle in skirmishing order, the 5th Fusiliers leading, and, as we pushed on, the rebels retired in haste through several open fields with embankments, but we drove them from one to the other 'till we came to a village - which we took, but were recalled as we had advanced too far. The main body and guns had advanced to the first village when we rejoined them on our recall. They had advanced by the road, which wound round a hillock, and it was well for us skirmishers when we advanced that we had kept to the right of the road, for, on entering the village, our party found one of Kooer Sing's 3-pounder guns loaded with dumpies right to the muzzle, pointing down the road with a lighted slow match, but our entering the village on the side gave them no opportunity of firing it on us. Dumpies are small, square bits of copper, used as coin, & worth about half a farthing.

Our party, after setting the village on fire, advanced on Jugdespore village and took possession of it and of the palace as they were empty, and not a soul to be seen, and made it our headquarters during our stay. The palace had not a scrap of furniture, but we got some old charpoys out of the village to sleep on.

Kooer Sing was a very rich man, and was supposed to have had a good amount of treasure hidden away in the palace or village, but though search parties were sent to look for it they were not successful - not even the Sikhs - as they are known to be good hands at looting, and seem to smell where treasure has been hid. Kooer Sing had had a private pagoda built in the

[13] It is apparent that the occasional practice of disposing of 'unpopular' officers by 'accidental' shooting was not unheard-of in 1857

village, which cost him a hundred thousand rupees to build.[14] It was decided to blow it up, so the artillerymen made a mine in the centre of the building, put a hundredweight of powder in it, and when all was ready, a slow match was adjusted, and we all looked on from a safe distance, expecting to see bits of brickwork hurled in all directions, but we heard only a dull thud, and the ground shook, the building rising about a foot and coming down with a crash, throwing a cloud of dust all around. There lay the pagoda - a heap of ruins. I never saw such a neat and complete collapse of a building.

Next day, we made a raid on his summer palace in the middle of a jungle between 5 and 6 miles off, but it was empty, so we destroyed it, and returned to Jugdespore. Here we spent the next three days to see what the rebels would do.

Wake received information that the rebels had left for Gwalior, and we began our return march for Arrah on the 16th - but not by the same road we had come. Our object in taking another road was to show the villagers that we had beaten Kooer Sing and the rebels. We found the road in a very bad state as the mutineers had expected us to take this road and cut it up, and tried to deluge it. However, we reached Arrah nevertheless on the 18th. We heard that the mutineers had poisoned the wells along the road, so we had to drink the muddy water out of the ditches - which was not to our taste.

We halted in Arrah for several days to get orders from General Lloyd what we were to do.[15] In due course orders came for the 10th Foot to return to Dinapore, and we were not sorry to get rid of this insubordinate lot. They left on the 22nd.[16] I wished to visit Dinapore, and see some of my brother officers and other friends, and get the particulars of the Arrah disaster from those who accompanied that detachment, and got leave to do so. Some of the 5th Fusiliers came with me. Though it was a long ride, when I reached it everyone was glad to see me, and congratulated me on our victory, and I had to relate to them the relief of Arrah, and our hard-fought victory. I got more breakfasts and luncheons than I bargained for as wherever I went I had to take something.

Whilst at my mess I heard of a shocking tragedy performed by the 10th Foot in an open space in front of our mess house and the church. The native officers and men of my Regiment (the 40th NI) who had not mutinied were ordered to have their tents pitched on this open spot as, after the Arrah disaster, the 10th Foot were infuriated, and a bazaar rumour got abroad that the men of that regiment intended to murder any sepoys they came across, and to revenge themselves on those who remained faithful, and by bringing them into the square it was thought that it would be safer for them. When one day, in the middle of the night, there was

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[14] Heathcote (pp.149-151), The author explains that no treasure was found in Jugdespore because 'Kunwar Singh (sic)... a much respected Rajput nobleman....had fallen into debt.' He further mentions 'a Hindu Temple (Wild's Pagoda) that Kunwar Singh had ruined himself to build...'

[15] Wild says they waited for orders from General Lloyd in Dinapore from 18th August, but Heathcote (p.151) says that Sir James Outram had reached Dinapore on the 15th, so it may be assumed that any orders would have come from Outram.

[16] Heathcote (p.151) says: 'The 10th ...showed no mercy, and captured sepoys were hung after a drumhead court martial.' Wild's account has them barely under the control of their officers and still smarting from their defeat at Arrah, so these troops would probably have been allowed their revenge in order to placate them somewhat, with indiscriminate killing dignified with the title of 'Court Martial'.

an awful noise heard, the officers all turned out, not knowing what was taking place. When they got to the tents - for the noise came from thence - they heard that several men of the 10th Foot had come across from their barracks, and in a dastardly and cold-blooded manner, had murdered as many of the native officers and men in their sleep as they could 'till the shouting was too loud, and then they bolted back to their barracks, and though it was known in the Regiment who they were, and that they might easily have been arrested and identified as they returned by the blood on their bayonets - no notice was taken of it, and the reason given was that, if these murderers were punished, the whole regiment would break out into open mutiny, so the 10th Foot preferred the disgrace of having murderers in their ranks rather than giving them up to justice.

Whilst I was in Dinapore I was asked by my brother officers how it was that my name had been omitted in the report of the relief of Arrah by Major Eyre, as I was the only officer whose name was not mentioned by him. I had not seen the despatch, and, of course, felt very annoyed on hearing it, and said I could not say why my name had been omitted as I had done as much, and perhaps more than any other individual to make it a success. However, I was determined not to remonstrate, but leave it to time, but afterwards I heard from Dinapore that the mistake had been rectified, and that I ought to feel proud, as I had got a despatch all to myself in General Orders. The omission was rectified in the following way. The officers of the 5th Fusiliers in Arrah had remarked the omission and asked Captain L'Estrange to find out from Captain Hastings why my name had been left out, as they considered that if anyone was mentioned, I deserved it. So one day in marching back to Buxar, Major Eyre sent for me, and then apologized to me about it, and gave me a copy of a despatch he had subsequently sent in, and asked me if I was contented. It was in flattering terms, so I said "perfectly", and thanked him for his kindness.

I had intended returning the same evening from Dinapore to Arrah, but was persuaded to sleep there, and only started the next morning at 8 a.m. On reaching Arrah, I found it deserted. Major Eyre, wanting to reach Buxar by the 25th so as to meet Sir James Outram, who was expected to pass by Buxar on that day for Lucknow, had started that morning, and all civilians had gone with him as they had received orders to make Buxar their headquarters *pro tem* - instead of Arrah, as it was on the river, and, if attacked (they) could drop down the river to Patna.

On arriving at Arrah, I was obliged to break my journey to rest and feed my horse, and only caught up the column in the afternoon. We reached Buxar, in three forced marches, on the 25th, and so Major Eyre met Sir James Outram.

On the 26th we started for Allahabad by our steamer, which had been waiting for us. The Ganges was in flood, and, as we proceeded, we came in the afternoon to a sharp bend in the river, and in trying to get round it, the steamer and its flat attached, were swept away by the strong current, but, getting into slack water, came back to the point, and tried to round it again - but without success. We tried it three times, unsuccessfully. The steamer's captain did not want to anchor as we had still more than two hours of daylight, so he said he would try once more, and - if unsuccessful - we would be obliged to anchor 'till the river began to fall. Fortunately, he succeeded, and we proceeded till dusk, when we anchored.

We reached Mirzapore on the afternoon of the 29th August. This is a coaling station, so we anchored close to the shore, and took in our supply of coal, and by next morning we were ready for a start. The Engineer, coming on deck in the morning as we were making ready to

cast off, saw a slight split in the river wall under which we were anchored, rushed up to the steamer captain, and said, "For God's sake shove off, or we shall be swamped by the wall falling on board." By the time we had shoved off a couple of yards there was no doubting that the wall would fall as the crack was rapidly increasing. The river had undermined the wall, and our only hope of escape was to push off as fast as we could, - however we were too late to clear away out of its reach for down it came on the bows of the steamer, and broke three of its ribs, and sent it rolling as if in a gale.

At first it was reported that the steamer would not be able to proceed on her journey, however, the ship's Engineer and his mates strengthened it sufficiently to proceed, and we reached Allahabad by the 1st September.

The Detachment of the 5th Fusiliers joined their headquarters, and they having already an interpreter, my services to them were at an end. I reported myself to the Adjutant-General and told him the orders I had received from General Lloyd to return at once to Dinapore from Allahabad. At the same time I asked him if there was not a possibility to go on with Sir James Outram's force to Lucknow, and he said I had better obey the orders I had received, as I belonged to the Dinapore division.

I met some of the officers of the 5th Fusiliers I had been with, and they were very sorry to hear that I could not go on with them, and that things had turned out thus. I knew that, by returning to Dinapore, I should have little chance of seeing active service. I liked all the officers of the detachment, and their men, and they all took a liking to me - especially the men, who would have done anything for me.

I had not seen Major Eyre since leaving Buxar, as he went on his own steamer, but met him in the camp, and he asked me what I was doing, and if I was going on to Lucknow. I said I had to return to Dinapore, though I had tried to go on to Lucknow - or to Cawnpore at least, but the Adjutant-General had told me I must return to Dinapore - according to General Lloyd's orders. Then Major Eyre said, 'Oh no! - you must come on with us - just come with me to General Outram, and I will get you appointed as my Orderly Officer'.

Sir James, on hearing that I had been with the Major's force at Arrah, immediately signed the order appointing me Orderly Officer to Major Eyre.

When my name appeared in orders, the 5th Fusiliers were glad to see that I was to join Sir James's force to Lucknow, and sent me an invitation to be an honorary member of their mess - an honour I scarcely expected, but which I gladly accepted. I was then introduced to all the officers of the Regiment, and a nicer set it would be difficult to find.

We remained in camp at Allahabad, and whilst there I had a look at the old station and the bungalow I had lived in years before, but it was all burnt, and only the bare walls standing. The 6th Native Infantry who mutinied there set fire to the station. On the 3rd of September we commenced our march towards Cawnpore and Lucknow.

OBSERVATIONS BY THE COMPILER

In his book *The Great Mutiny, India 1857*, Christopher Hibbert says that 'Two hundred British soldiers & Sikhs were sent by steamer to rescue the garrison at Arrah; but the steamer ran aground in the night', and adds that a further one hundred and fifty men were sent along

to reinforce these originals. Yet Wild states in his memoir that the river steamers always stopped and anchored at night, precisely because of the dangers of running aground in shoal-infested rivers such as the Soane. It may be assumed, then, that such navigational problems as occurred happened earlier in the evening. Wild's account also says that Dunbar's party were ashore and on the march to Arrah at 10 p.m., which accords with Hibbert's assertion (p. 136) that '.... at eleven o'clock the moon went down.'

Recent renditions of the size of Dunbar's party are broadly in agreement on overall numbers. Hibbert gives 350, David in *The Indian Mutiny 1857* mentions a force of four hundred men, and Heathcote says the relieving force from Dinapore consisted of '.... 300 of the 10th Foot, 70 Sikhs and a dozen volunteers.' MacRae's detailed *History of the 45th Rattray's Sikhs* provides a more precise figure: 10th Foot - 150; 37th Foot - 200; Bengal Police Battalion - 50;[17] 7th Bengal NI - 20.[18] There was also a small band of European civilian volunteers. Regarding casualty figures, the nominal rolls given by Tavender indicate that all units involved at Arrah suffered similar proportionate losses of close to fifty per cent.[19] The 37th Foot lost three officers in this battle; Lieutenants G. Bagenall and E. Birkett, and Ensign S. Sale. Another officer to share the same fate was Lieutenant R.M. Ingilby of the 7th Bengal NI.[20] He and his small remnant of loyal sepoys served as the Advance Guard of the doomed force.

Wild lays the blame for the debacle at Arrah squarely at the door of General Lloyd and his staff, and at that of Major Fenwick of the 10th Foot. Initially, he would have had no reason for personal enmity against that Regiment, but it appears that their behaviour on this occasion, plus later evidence of their insubordination and poor discipline, coloured his views. Although the whole episode was an unmitigated disaster, there were many acts of outstanding gallantry and two awards of the Victoria Cross were granted.[21]

In the light of the comment in footnote 15 above, it seems unlikely that Wild was told to return to Dinapore on the grounds that he belonged to the Dinapore Division under General Lloyd. By this time Lloyd been replaced by Outram, who was present at Allahabad, so, given that Wild was essentially unattached and temporarily unemployed, it would have needed no

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[17] Raised in the Punjab in May 1856 by Captain Thomas Rattray, 64th Bengal NI; became 1st Bengal Military Police Bn in 1858; 45th [Rattray's Sikhs] Regt of Bengal NI in 1864; 45th Rattray's Sikhs in 1903

[18] The 7th Bengal NI had mutinied at Dinapore on 25th July. Among this small but extremely loyal remnant was Sepoy (later Subedar) Nehal Singh who was admitted to the Indian Order of Merit retrospectively (GO No. 137 of 12 Feb 1866) for gallantry in carrying out of action the unfortunate Charles Garstin, Deputy Magistrate of Buxar, who had been shot through the loin.

[19] Tavender records: 10th Foot - 66 (47 kia); 37th Foot - 95 (71 kia). McRae records Bengal Sikh Bn - 25 (21 kia). No details of 7th Bengal NI casualties have been traced.

[20] McRae, p. 43. This gallant officer lost his life attempting to retreat across the river. "It was stated that Lieut Ingelby [sic] was the last man to leave the shore. He stepped into a burning boat as it was putting off, and ere it was half-way across the stream, the flames had so spread that all on board were compelled to take to the water. Ingelby was struck on the neck by a musket ball and went down; rising again to the surface, he threw up his arms, cried aloud 'Goodbye Grenadiers', and sank, never to be seen alive again."

[21] Sgt Denis Dempsey, H.M's 10th Foot (London Gazette, 17 Feb 1860; the attempted relief of Arrah was one of three actions cited in Sgt Dempsey's VC recommendation); William Fraser McDonnell, BCS (*London Gazette*, 20 Jan 1860).

more than formal authorisation from Outram to allow Wild to go on to Lucknow with Eyre. Perhaps Wild, writing of events some while after they occurred, had confused himself over how they had actually unfolded. As we shall see, Wild elected to transfer himself to an ad hoc cavalry unit as a trooper under the direct command of Outram, rather than stay as Eyre's Orderly Officer.

The final part will appear in the next edition of Durbar.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL C.J. GODBY - 4TH PUNJAB CAVALRY, PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE

The carte-de-visite on the following page, by society photographers Lock & Whitfield of Regent Street, is of Lieut. Col. Christopher James Godby. It was most probably taken in 1872, when the subject was on furlough. The *Times* records Major Godby attending a Levee at St James Palace on 19th June 1867, when he was amongst those presented to the Prince of Wales. He attended a similar Levee in May 1872 – when his rank was Lieut. Colonel. An identical photograph captioned 'Colonel Godby 4th Punjab Cavalry' resides in Sir N. Cavagnari's album of cartes-de-visite in the National Army Museum archives. Godby wears uniform in accordance with the 1865 dress regulations of the Punjab Cavalry, largely adopted from the 1863 dress regulations of the Bengal Cavalry (for regiments numbered from nine onwards).

A group photo of the 4th Punjab Cavalry dated 1865 appears in 'Special Indian Cavalry Issue No.1' of the defunct "*Tradition*" magazine. The seated officer wearing choga and chain-mail arm defences, incorrectly identified as Godby, is actually Major John Gillespie. The commandant, Godby, stands at the centre.

Dress regulations for the 4th Punjab Cavalry called for a dark green tunic with scarlet facings edged with gold cord and quadruple rows of gold cord hanging loose in the style of the French staff jacket. The helmet was covered in grey felt with gilt fittings. The Kummerbund, a Cashmere shawl, had embroidered ends hanging to the right side, and overalls were in blue, with double gold lace stripe, three-quarters inch wide. The monogram 'PIC' (Punjab Irregular Cavalry), with Roman numeral 'IV' below, had previously been worn as a pouch badge in gilding metal but probably became redundant in 1865 when the amended title 4th Cavalry Punjab Frontier Force was introduced. A later badge or crest of the regiment is illustrated on

the following page. A detailed description of accoutrements etc. is provided in the late Bill Carmen's *magnum opus* on Indian Army uniforms.

The 4th Punjab Cavalry was raised on 18th May 1849 at Pind Dadan Khan, by Captain Ralph Dowson [sic] of the 5th Bengal NI. It was soon fulfilling the role for which it was raised, taking part in expeditions against the Orakzais in 1855 and the Miranzais in 1855-56. It remained guarding the North Western Frontier, including the period of the Sepoy Revolt, and saw its final service in 1881 in an expedition against hostile Mahsud Wazir tribesmen. It was disbanded in 1882 as part of the general reduction of troops recommended by the Eden Commission following the Second Afghan War [GGO 210 of 1882].

LIEUTENANT COLONEL C.J. GODBY, 4TH PUNJAB CAVALRY

Godby's military career started in 1845 upon joining the HEIC Army as a Cornet. The first seven years were spent with the 36th Bengal NI. He served in the Sutlej Campaign of 1845-46, including the affair at Buddiwal, action of Aliwal, surrender of Fort Phillour, and operations in the Jullundur Doab. This was followed by service in the Punjab Campaign of 1848-49 including the passage of the Chenab, and actions of Ramnuggur, Sadoolapur and Chillianwallah where he was dangerously wounded in a hand to hand while defending the regimental colours. In November 1852 he was posted to the Punjab Irregular Force, the start of an association that lasted more than twenty years. At first he was attached to the Corps of Guides, becoming 2-in-c in February 1856. He was wounded by an assassin in December 1853 when in charge of the Eusoffzie frontier, and was employed in hunting down hill robbers on the Peshawar Frontier. It is unlikely that he was directly involved in campaigning against the rebels during the 1857-59 rebellion. In April 1859 he was appointed Commandant of the 4th Punjab Cavalry, and remained as such until the regiment was disbanded in 1882, in which year he retired from the service as a full Colonel. He was appointed an Honorary A-de-C of the Viceroy in April 1876, and his probable full medal entitlement was the Sutlej medal without clasp, the Punjab medal with Chillianwallah clasp, and the IGS with Northwest frontier clasp.

The photograph of Lt Col. Godby resides in Sean Weir's collection. Several IMHS members helped Sean compile the narrative. The illustration of the 4PC badge appears with the kind permission of Ashok Nath, and is taken from his forthcoming book *IZZAT, Historical Records and Iconography of India Cavalry Regiments 1750-2007*. (**Web site note –** since published)

G.E. LEACHMAN (1880-1920) AND THE MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL: REVALUATION OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF AN 'ARABIAN PALADIN'

Sarkees Najmuddin and Omer Tarin

Part II[1]

After reaching Bushire (16th November 1909) and Baghdad (2nd December), Leachman eventually moved on to the Holy City of Karbala on the Euphrates, quietly gleaning all sorts of intelligence along the way and noting down all kinds of facts and sights. In Karbala he stayed with the Persian Prince (and Anglophile) Majid Khan, and was avidly received by the British consul, who also introduced him to the Ottoman *Mutasarrif*, Jelal Bey.[2] At the same time, Leachman also moved in other social circles in the small Karbala community, as well as spending time in the bazaar and among the Bedouin who visited this holy shrine. Norman Bray states that, 'He [Leachman] wished to create for himself such a reputation that he could meet the great men as well as the lesser, so that his knowledge might be complete."[3] In this quest for vital 'knowledge' - intelligence - Leachman also went to Kufa, and to Najaf. This area, the Euphrates territory from Baghdad to Karbala, Najaf and Kufa, would remain his special care, or 'parish' in espionage jargon; the centre of his life's work; and 'Seldom has a man moved with more open and transparent aggression, ... as Leachman.[4] He was single-mindedly focused on his own goals, for the sake of his country, so nothing else mattered, no obstacle or hardship was big or strong enough to withstand his manic energies.

Following Christmas 1909 spent in Baghdad (where he also practiced wearing Arab dress) Leachman returned to Karbala and contacted Sheikh Abdullah of the Abda section of the Shammar tribe, via a 'reliable' Bedouin intermediary, in a bid to arrange safe passage into the desert. The Shammar patrolled the northern deserts of Arabia on behalf of the Rashids, the rulers of Hail. Their consent and aid was vital to any attempt to venture into northern and/or north-eastern Arabia and this, now, seemed forthcoming. Thus, Leachman set off on the first stage of his journey, on 13th January 1910, accompanied by his Bedouin guide of the Beni Hassan, one Khidr Ibn Abbas.

Leachman, was 'dressed in soiled Arab garb which had the look of authenticity, armed with just enough Arabic to convey essential greetings and the most abrupt instructions.'[5] In this manner, Leachman came to the Shammar encampment a few miles in the desert. Abdullah and his kinsmen would help him, hopefully, to reach Hail, their tribal capital, possibly without the Turks finding out he was there. However, as luck would have it, things worked out rather differently. An 'uneasy alliance' was being formed at that time between the Shammar and Muntafiq tribes, against their common enemy Ibn Saud of Riyadh and his supporter/backer, the Sheikh of Kuwait. Leachman was to an extent Britain's emissary to the pro-Turk Rushids but, since Britain was wary of committing itself either way, also the prime reporter and intelligencer on the spot.

[1] This final part is continued from the Autumn 2008 edition of Durbar
[2] Winstone, *Leachman: OC Desert, op cit*, p.77
[3] Bray, *A Paladin of Arabia, op cit*, p.137
[4] Winstone, *Leachman: OC Desert, op cit*, p.78
[5] *Ibid*, p.79

By the end of January, Leachman was making his way deeper into the desert with the tribesmen under Majid Ibn Ajil, a close kinsman of the Rashidi princes of Hail, through flat miles of previously unmapped wasteland. Shakespear, we know, left Kuwait (where he was based then) at the same time,[6] possibly with the intention of converging unto some common spot - but this meeting was not to be. Ibn Rashid, the paramount prince of Hail, was himself coming in that direction with a vast army of his tribesmen. The desert was in ferment, so Leachman also considered it wiser to change his plan of going to Hail for the moment, sticking around where the 'real action' was.

Leachman *incognito* in Arab dress

By February 3rd, Leachman had travelled almost exactly 107 miles and was at Wadi al-Jarathim and after journeying a little further, came to the great dry Wadi al-Khur. No European had ever before recorded a sighting of the Wadi at its extremity, as it 'faded into the sands below the Euphrates.'[7] He had made his first major geographical discovery.[8]

On 5th February, news reached Leachman's group that the Anaizah tribes, blood enemies of the Shammar whom they'd set out to combat, were also on the warpath, led by Sheikh Ibn Shalen (Ruwalla section) to the east and Sheikh Fahad Bey Ibn Hadhal to the west. Majid's men now became more cautious, being outnumbered and fearful of an attack by the Anaizah. In his article published in the *Geographical Journal* (March 1911), Leachman wrote:

[6] *Ibid*, pp.81-82
[7] *Ibid*, p.82
[8] It is to be noted that Leachman had been made a member of the Royal Geographical Society during his furlough in England in 1907.

> All this country is in the 'dirat' of the great tribe of the Anaiza [sic], that is to say, they have grazing and watering rights over it. The Anaiza are the hereditary enemies of the Shammar...[9]

Adventure now followed upon adventure, in quick succession. By 6th February, Anaizah tribesmen were sighted on the fringes of Majid's camp and they had to move on rapidly to avoid any skirmishing, trying to join up with the main Rashidi host. Meanwhile, news also reached them that Ibn Saud, to the south, was raising a joint Saudi-Kuwaiti army to attack them if and when he could. On 12th February, Majid's group was attacked by the Ruwalla who soon overwhelmed them after 'a running fight',[10] but Leachman and his small band of three (guide and two servants) managed to get away and succeeded in reaching Sheikh Fahad, who received them quite kindly, thanks to the presence of the 'neutral' guide of the Bani Hassan. All this seems a rather placid, matter of fact account, but one can easily guess the danger involved.

Leachman, ever-true to his vocation, now had time to assess Sheikh Fahad, the first of the Anaizah chiefs that he encountered; who, for his part, knew that he had an English agent in his camp, and did not want to upset the Turks. Leachman was amongst the sworn enemies of his former (Rashidi) hosts and in a rather tenuous position but with considerable *sang froid* kept up very cheerful, friendly relations with Sheikh Fahad and his entourage, as they marched. According to Winstone:

> His letters and notes, and his brief article in the *Geographical Journal*, provide, a uniquely factual account of a desert army on the march, for the few explorers and soldiers who have travelled with such armies....have usually been tempted to spice their stories with imaginative accounts...Leachman has neither the desire nor the ability to embellish his impressions...[11]

The tables were about to be turned on the Anaizah at this point, as they often did in the fluctuating fortunes of desert warfare. At Jumaima they were suddenly confronted by a big Rashidi force, of some 3,500 tents, better armed and disciplined. The Anaizah retreated strategically and Leachman and company were free, once again united with Majid Ibn Ajil, their Rashidi host. On February 17th, the Shammar/Rashidi fell on the retreating Anaizah's camp. The Anaizah ran off in panic and after this victory, Leachman was taken to meet the Regent of Hail and Chief Commander of the victorious host, Zamil Ibn Subhan. At this camp, 'Lijman' (as he was now called by the Bedouin) the *Faranji* (European/Frank/foreigner) was put to work helping tend to the wounded, under the assumption that all whites were medical doctors. He made a sufficiently good impression and was called to the royal tent next day (February 18th) to pay his respects to the young Rashidi Amir, his uncle and Regent Ibn Subhan. Nobody spoke any English but Leachman's Arabic was quite adequate now and he carried out a reasonably useful conversation with these august personages. He thereafter remained in the Rashidi camp for about five weeks and gained a lot of vital information or 'knowledge', as he'd put it.[12]

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[9] Quoted in Bray, *A Paladin of Arabia, op cit,* p. 147
[10] Winstone, *Leachman: OC Desert, op cit,* p.83
[11] *Ibid*,pp.84-85
[12] *Ibid*,, p.93. Some of this was relayed to Captain W. Shakespear, whom he still had not met, in a letter dated 23rd February 1910.

By March, Leachman's fantastic run of luck, in having generally escaped too glaring a notice in the eyes of the Turkish overlords of the region, was running out. The Governor of Basra now formally asked the Rashidi to expel him from their camp and on 25th March he bid farewell to his hosts and set off on a very quick forced march, back whence he had come. Along the way, he kept his eyes and ears open and gleaned a further lot of 'interesting' information and was also able to meet some of the other important 'players' in the desert at the time.[13] On 21st April he finally reached Baghdad, having been away for three months and one week approximately. The Turks, by now aware of (and alarmed by) his desert journey, and the contacts he had made, 'kept an eye open for him but they would not have suspected the unkempt [Bedouin] ruffian who made his way on camel-back to the Tigris.'[14] Later that evening he was given a good dinner by the British Resident, by which time he was shaved, bathed and dressed in Lieutenant's uniform.

Leachman in uniform

While he hadn't been able to reach Hail, he had met the Rashidi princes; and although he hadn't got to Riyadh in Central Arabia (he would achieve this later, in 1912) he had gathered valuable new intelligence, recced an impressively large portion of the desert hinterland and won the trust or at least met up with many of the important chiefs of both Shammar and Anaizah. All in all, a highly laudable achievement by someone comparatively 'new' on the scene but, seemingly, taking to it like the proverbial duck to water.

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[13] Including the impressive Ibn Sadun, Sheikh of the Muntafiq, and the notorious 'Fat Faisal', Ibn Ad Danish, Chief of the Mutair, who was to become famous throughout the world as a leader of the fanatical Ikhwan (The Brotherhood), spearheading the Wahabi revivalist movement which eventually led to Ibn Saud's paramountcy.

[14] Winstone, *Leachman: OC Desert, op cit*, p.100

On 10th May 1910 Leachman set out on the second leg of his astounding debut, this time on a 'remarkable 1300 - miles trek through the mountainous region of Kurdistan.'[15] Travelling through the Hamrin range, he reached Kara Tepe, crossed the Lesser Zab river and reached Mosul, the Kurdistani Capital, on 8th June. He made friends there with the local Turkish governor, the legendary Muhammad Pasha Daghistani, then re-crossed the Zab and headed towards the disputed Turko-Persian border. Going via Balaal Zaqiq and Rowandiz, he skirted the western shore of Lake Urmia along the Persian frontier (Tabriz being close to the Persian side of the lake) and then headed off into Armenia[16], crossing the Turko-Persian border and making for the Van area. Conditions were pretty harsh - with perpetual infestation of fleas on the hard, rocky and intensely cold mountainsides, most of the ponies carrying the baggage nearly lame and Leachman suffering from a severe case of dysentery. But 'Leachman [dragged] himself forward, unwilling to give in to pain or sickness, always obsessed by the need to move on to the next objective,'[17] no doubt continuing his recce and gathering intelligence, too, as he went along. In any case, he reached Lake Van on 10th July and plodded on, reaching Bitlis on the 30th of the month and Diarbakir in Turkey on 5th August. He finally reached the end of his second recce, in Aleppo, on 14th August 1910, almost totally physically exhausted. By any standards, these two remarkable excursions stand out as the special achievements of a unique person, worthy of the MacGregor Memorial Medal that he eventually received, as well as many other honours and awards.

On Thursday 6th October, Leachman arrived back in Baghdad. On the final day of his journey back he wrote in his diary the 'enigmatic lines from Kipling's *The Winners'*, which go thus: 'Down to Jahannum / or up on the throne, / He travels fastest / who travels alone.'[18] For the time being, his 'Arabian adventure' was over and he returned to rejoin his regiment in India, near the end of 1910.

Much was still to come in that short but intensely eventful life: the 1912 expedition to Riyadh (the first Briton to be ever received there by Ibn Saud); his gallantry at the Siege of Kut in World War I (December 1915) which made him a Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, also winning him the C.I.E. (1915), and the D.S.O. (1919) for his exploits; his appointment as military governor of Kurdistan after the war; and his strange and tragic death on August 12th 1920, in itself a story.[19] It is certainly no exaggeration that his exploits before and

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[15] *Ibid*, p. 104

[16] All this territory was disputed, with the Persians making their own claims and the Czar of Russia in forced possession of Urmia, but the world generally recognizing the area as part of the decaying Ottoman Empire.

[17] Winstone, *Leachman: OC Desert, op cit*, p. 107

[18] *Ibid*, p.117. The lines seem to suggest the essential solitariness at the very core of Leachman's personality, emphasizing the solace, or freedom, that he found in the wildest, loneliest, toughest places, like a number of other English explorers and travellers over the ages.

[19] Leachman was assassinated - shot in the back at a police post while making his way towards Al Falujah. At the time the British believed he was set up by his enemies, but the motives may have been more mundane. One theory is that he was murdered by an Arab seeking revenge for being badly treated by Leachman in-full view of his relatives.

immediately after the First World War were exceptional, indeed 'legendary' and inspirational for the many officers who admired him and held him in the highest esteem[20] and, certainly, more than 'inviting comparison' with the likes of T.E. Lawrence et al. A number of views on Leachman, by friends and foes, are given by Bray in his biography[21] and though it would be impossible to discuss all of these in detail here, a brief analysis of Leachman's role, in comparison with some contemporaries and within the contexts of his time and career, would be worthwhile.

LEACHMAN IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS

G.E. Leachman's career and exploits are usually - inevitably - compared with those of T.E. Lawrence and their mutual animosity is often highlighted. Bray gives a detailed account of their meeting, when Leachman (already carrying a big Mesopotamian reputation) visited the Hijaz in April 1917,[22] though Leachman's own rather contemptuous opinion of Lawrence is chiefly unwritten, only recorded by others. In any case, Lawrence's views are on record, in a letter to A. Dixon, who had sought out his views/opinion on Leachman:

Leachman was a thin jumpy nervous long fellow, with a plucked face and neck. He was full of courage, and as hard as French nails. He had an abiding contempt for everything native .... Leachman allowed it to be a rule of conduct. This made him inconsiderate, harsh, overbearing towards his servants and subjects ... I should call him a man too little sensitive to be aware of other points of view than his own; too little fine to see degrees of greatness, degrees of tightness in others. He was blunt and outspoken to a degree. Such is a good point in a preacher, a bad point in a diplomat ... in Hijaz we were not prepared. 'Leachman.' It was a great name and repute in Mesopotamia and we thought to find a colleague in him. After less than a week we had to return him on board ship ....[23]

As 'el-Aurans' obtained an international reputation, a quasi-immortal status in the annals of history, his writings, views, opinions and statements prevailed, took over the whole Middle Eastern 'discourse as far as the Arab War, within the framework of World War I, was concerned. Hence the decline and near-anonymity of Leachman and all the attendant

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[20] A very fine example of this esteem and veneration is enshrined in the article by Capt. I. Charmers entitled 'OC Desert', published in *Blackwood's Magazine* of February 1932 and reproduced in its entirety as Chapters 20-22 of Bray, pp.308-350

[21] Bray, *A Paladin of Arabia, op cit,* pp.349, 379, 408, 419-422

[22] *Ibid*, pp.297-298. In 1917, Gen. Wingate had replaced McMahon in charge of the Arab Bureau in Cairo. Wingate's representative in this different sphere, the Hijaz, was Col. Wilson at the court of the Sharif of Mecca, with Col. Parker and Capt. Bray working for him. When Leachman visited this theatre of operations, he went to Rabegh and Wejh and at the latter place attended on Prince Faisal, son of the Sharif Hussain Ibn Ali, where Lawrence was also present. They had a meal together and discussed various matters at length. It seems (at least by Bray's account) that the real Leachman-Lawrence animosity developed here, at this time. Bray found the 'contrast between the two Englishmen patent': Lawrence seemed to be playacting in his 'magnificent clothes', seemed to be unduly servile to Prince Faisal and, somehow, 'unreal' to Bray; whereas Leachman was 'straightforward', 'decisive', 'obviously and unashamedly the Englishman' in his Khaki uniform and with his 'masterful' manner.

[23] Garnet [Editor], *The Letters of T.E. Lawrence*; letter No. 126: T.E. Lawrence to A. Dixon, 29th December 1925

controversy. Objectively speaking, one could today offer the following points by way of analysis:

(i) The basic 'clash' between Leachman and Lawrence is not only restricted to their personalities and/or opposed characters/natures. It is a larger clash, too, a manifestation of the conflict that existed between the 'politicals' or civilian intelligence agents (quite plentiful after 1915-1916, operating largely out of Cairo and including the likes of Lawrence himself, Gertrude Bell and others) on the one hand, and the 'military' intelligence apparatus on the other (best represented by the likes of Leachman and Shakespear, operating out of Mesopotamia and, by extension, Simla). The military 'regulars' had little or no respect for the politicals/civilians, whom they deemed to be amateurs; on their part, the latter considered the soldiers to be rough, insensitive fools. In Lawrence's case, this view coincided with his own highly complex, somewhat egotistical personality that could relegate the achievements of all others 'as asides to his own thunderous achievements.[24] His attitude vis-a-vis regular military agents is very well highlighted in Seven Pillars of Wisdom, where he remarks how 'unwilling' he was to take on the Hijaz assignment, hating the responsibility, since 'all my life objects had been gladder to me than persons, and ideas than objects...the duty of succeeding with men .... would be doubly hard to me. They were not my medium; I was not practiced in that technique. I was unlike a soldier; hated soldering.'[25]

(ii) Furthermore, one must also consider that by 1917, when Leachman visited the Hijaz, Lawrence was already 'established' in his own place, in his own way or manner, in his own particular 'parish' or theatre of operations. The Hijaz was only a little portion of the larger Arabian/Middle Eastern picture (where Leachman probably held wider sway) but Lawrence was intensely protective, even jealous of others interfering within his ambit. The Hijaz potentates were of a very different type to those of Central and North-East Arabia. They were less fanatical, less direct and certainly more diplomatic and worldly. It had taken Lawrence considerable time and effort to cultivate the trust of the likes of Prince Faisal of Mecca and, in this particular environment, Lawrence's authority sprang entirely out of the support/backing of the Sharifs - unlike Leachman, who had regular 'official' authority in Mesopotamia. Thus, Lawrence might easily have felt threatened by Leachman's excessive, undiplomatic bluntness which seemed to be able to undo what Lawrence had achieved. For his part, Leachman (or possibly his admirer Bray) might have easily mistaken Lawrence's respect for Prince Faisal for some sort of fawning servility, offensive to his intensely 'English', colonial creed. On the firmest evidence, it cannot be denied that Leachman was quite frequently very harsh, very blunt, even very prejudiced or biased where most local or 'natives' were concerned, whether in India or Arabia. This was a fault in him, in an otherwise passionate, impulsive and sincere nature. But who is without faults? The bigger the person, the more marked the virtues and the vices. Obviously, both G.E. Leachman and T.E. Lawrence were larger-than-life personalities and not necessarily sympathetic to each other; cut out in totally different moulds.

(iii) Yet, it would be highly unfair to denigrate either one. They both had their relative (and significant) places, or roles, to perform. They were both on the same side, even

[24] Winstone, *Leachman: OC Desert, op cit*, p.l81
[25] T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Penguin/Cape, 1962 ed.), p. 117

> though their methods, their modus operandi, was different and they both made valuable contributions in ensuring their- side won the war in Arabia, ultimately. The achievements of both need to be studied, understood and appreciated, in their own ways.

A better, more apt, comparison oft neglected is that between Leachman and his exact contemporary, Shakespear. They had a similar military background, the same sort of training in India and very similar aspirations and interests. They were both enamoured of Arabia and both shared 'the vigil of the Arabian heartland.'[26] Capt. W.H.I. Shakespear had been seconded to the Indian Political Service (IPS), although retaining his commission, in 1904. He had been appointed as a deputy to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, Percy Cox, and had later been sent as Consul-General to Bandar Abbas. In 1905, when Britain had some trouble with local tribesmen in that locality (probably instigated by Persian and/or Russian agents), Shakespear had dealt with it very effectively, also maintaining a steady 'one-man war' with the Russians.[27] He was also supposed to be quite at home with a number of languages, including Urdu, Hindi, Farsi and Arabic, probably a much more natural and accomplished linguist than Leachman. Although Shakespear had a bit of a start on Leachman, as far as his involvement in the Middle East/Gulf area was concerned the latter caught on quite rapidly. Both had been 'earmarked' by Britain to serve her special interests in Mesopotamia and the Gulf, as well as the deserts of Central Arabia at a time when clandestine activities of the major powers took on new urgency within Ottoman dominions.[28] Indeed, they almost both descended on Constantinople at the same time - Leachman in April 1907 and Shakespear in May of that year - where both men were introduced to the British military attaché and spymaster Colonel Surtees; and through him to the 'peppery and outspoken'[29] Captain Mark Sykes, an important common influence.[30]

After spending the summer in England, both returned to India in the late autumn. Shakespear eventually found himself at Kuwait, trying to establish contact with Ibn Saud when Leachman was with the Rashidi, and also trying to somehow penetrate down to Riyadh, past Hail, in 1910.[31] In all respects, this comparison deserves more serious, scholarly inquiry.

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[26] Winstone, *Leachman: OC Desert, op cit* p.60

[27] *Ibid*, p.61
[28] *Ibid*, p.67
[29] *Ibid*, p.68

[30] Captain [later Colonel Sir] Mark Sykes was at this time 'Honorary Attaché to the British Embassy in Istanbul. He became a protégé of Kitchener during WW1, and played a key role in Middle East affairs. He was never as single-minded an advocate of the Arab cause as T.E. Lawrence or Sir Percy Cox, and over time his sympathies extended to Armenians and Jews as well as Turks. Ironically, from being one of the few fair-minded Westerners with a reasonable outlook on the Turks, he became an engineer of the eventual disestablishment of their empire, being instrumental in forging the Sykes-Picot Agreement that apportioned spheres of influence in the post-war Ottoman Empire to Britain, France and Russia.

[31] It is significant, too, that both Shakespear and Leachman turned out to be strong supporters of the Wahabi house of Saud, backing it and promoting it and generally urging Britain to cultivate Ibn Saud at a time (1910) when Lord Morley's foreign policy emphatically stated that there should be 'no entanglement with Wahabees [sic]'. They stand in sharp contrast to T.E. Lawrence and his support for the Sharif of Mecca in the Hijaz. In the post-World War I era, it seems that the Shakespear-Leachman analysis as to the real potential of the Saudis as

In the end, it is right to say that G.E. Leachman - in all sorts of comparisons, by all standards, possessed of all his controversial strengths and weaknesses - emerges as a truly unique, colourful, bold and exciting character in the intricate saga of Middle Eastern politics before and after the First World War. He is also one of the most distinguished recipients of the MacGregor Memorial Medal. All the recipients have been strong, resourceful men but even amongst them, Leachman stands out in stark relief. It is to be hoped that in years to come, he shall be reinstated in the pantheon of the great 'Arabian Paladins' and that he will receive the recognition and the accolades that he so richly deserves.

the major force in Arabian politics, turned out to be the right one - ultimately garnering more and more Western support and favour, generally.

THE TWILIGHT OF HENRY MAYNE'S CAREER

C.J. Parrett

If the primary origin of the Central India Horse were to be narrowed down to any one regiment, it is Mayne's Horse to whom this attribution would be most appropriate. The regiment was raised *de facto* on 15th December 1857 by Captain H.O. Mayne[1] on the authority of Colonel Henry Marion Durand, officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Central India. Durand saw the urgent and immediate need for a mobile mounted arm to improve security, and Mayne was ordered to provide a temporary solution by strapping together a body of irregular cavalry from the loyal cavalry remnants of four H.E.I.C. contingents, all of which by that time had disintegrated as a result of mutiny. They included the 2nd Gwalior Contingent Cavalry, the Bhopal Contingent Cavalry, the United Malwa Contingent Cavalry and the Kotah Contingent Cavalry.[2] Durand had actually put before the Government of India a recommendation for a corps of three regiments of irregular horse to be formed with HQ at Goonah, and this was approved in principle on 5th February 1858 – although at first only one regiment of Mayne's Horse was authorised.

As soon as he knew that the formation of his regiment was approved, Mayne set about bringing it up to establishment strength which called for eight troops. He was determined to maintain a high level of efficiency, believing that this was achievable only if Sikhs represented a high proportion of total personnel. This brought Mayne into conflict with Government which had prohibited the enlistment of any more Sikhs, and he was instructed to desist and look elsewhere. But it was too late to prevent his recruiting agent, one of his own risaldars, from bringing in a number of Cis-Sutlej men and by September 1858 the class composition of Mayne's Horse included two troops of Sikhs, the remainder being Hindustani Muslims, Jats, Rajputs and Kaimkhanis.

It was not until 9th November 1859 that the Government of India gave its assent to Durand's recommendation for a second and third regiment to be raised. The recommendation had been resubmitted three days earlier by Sir Richmond Shakespear, the new Political Agent at Indore.[3] The embracing title became, rather more grandly, the Corps of Mayne's Horse. It

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[1] Captain Henry Otway Mayne, 6th Madras Light Cavalry; born March 1819, cornet 1 Mar 1838, lieutenant 17 Sep 1841, captain 11 Mar 1853, major 24 Mar 1858. During the Punjab Campaign in 1848-49 he served as ADC to the C-in-C Lord Hugh Gough and was present at the battles of Chillianwallah and Gujerat. In 1856 he had been sent to assist in reorganising the 1st Cavalry Hyderabad Contingent which had been showing signs of insubordination. Between July and September 1857 he served as Intelligence Officer with General Donald Stewart's Bombay Column in Central India. In October he had already begun to assemble a body of irregular cavalry, although the authority for this is not known, and so he was the ideal candidate for raising Mayne's Horse.

[2] Major General W.A. Watson, CB CMG CIE, *King George's Own Central India Horse, the Story of a Local Corps* (London 1930). Much of the background to this article is taken from Watson's excellent and detailed unit history.

[3] Sir Richmond Campbell Shakespear CB, Bengal Artillery [1812-1861] was a formidable character with a record of extensive campaign service commencing in 1838 and covering Afghanistan, Gwalior and the Punjab. He was wounded at Gujerat on 7th March 1849 when in charge of a heavy artillery battery. More relevant to his role in Central India was a long history of political duties, many of them in most precarious situations. In 1840 he was sent to Khiva to negotiate the release of Russian hostages; 416 of them were liberated and escorted safely to Orenburg [then on the eastern frontier of Russia and now in modern day Kazakhstan]. This feat earned him a knighthood. He was in political charge in Gwalior from 1843 to 1848 and in Baroda from February 1858. His appointment as Agent to the Governor General in Central India commenced from 30th April 1859 and he remained thus until his death. There are additional biographical details in Major V.C.P. Hodson's *List of*

was specified that the complete Corps be embodied 'for service, ordinarily, in Central India, but available, on emergency, for general service anywhere in or out of India.' It was to be placed under the orders and at the disposal of the Agent to the Governor General at Indore.[4] In addition to his military responsibilities, the commandant of the three regiments had certain 'political duties' to perform.

As soon as this approval was published, Mayne returned to his headquarters at Goonah[5] to write down his proposals for the composition and organisation of his new corps, and his observations upon his new political role. Mayne considered that the latter would occupy a considerable proportion of his time and should entitle him to a commensurate financial allowance. He immediately fell out with Shakespear who disagreed strongly with what he considered to be Mayne's exaggerated perspective of his political role and the level at which it should be remunerated.

The relationship between the two men soured further when it became clear that Mayne was intent on enlisting a large proportion of Sikhs into his expanded Corps. Based on his own experience, Mayne believed strongly that they were the best material in terms of martial qualities and dependability. This conflicted directly with the Government's policy, based more on considerations of financial and political expedience, of using redundant sowars from regiments raised during the Indian Mutiny campaign that had been targeted for eventual disbandment. It was inevitable that Shakespear, responsible *inter al* for compliance with Government policy in his area of political responsibility, would have his way. Thus in April 1860 orders were received for the Corps of Mayne's Horse to absorb the 1st and 2nd Beatson's Horse[6] as well as Eckford's Mainpuri Levy[7]. This should have put paid to Mayne's plans to recruit new Sikhs, but he was tenacious and headstrong and was not to be deterred. He determined in his own mind, whether rightly or wrongly, that a large proportion of the men from these regiments were of poor quality. On the basis of declaring them 'inefficient' he was able to discharge them on a technicality and thus find room for more of the Sikhs he dearly wanted to employ. But he went too far.

The regimental history gives a good account of the problems that beset Mayne's relationship with the Political Agent, drawing largely upon correspondence between the two protagonists originally held in [India] Political Department Consultations files. A minute paper, circulated by the Military Department in February 1861, usefully summarises the main elements from this correspondence. It is transcribed hereunder. [8]

Officers of the Bengal Army 1758-1834 (London 1847), and frequent mentions of his exploits in narratives describing the 'Great Game' of geo-political intrigue in Central Asia.

[4] In effect Mayne's Horse was by definition a civil force and thus came under the Foreign Department, rather than a military force under the Military Department.

[5] Goonah was a military station in Central India strategically placed midway between Gwalior and Indore.

[6] Lieutenant Colonel William Fergusson Beatson, 65th Bengal Native Infantry, raised the 1st and 2nd Regiments of Beatson's Horse at Hyderabad in February 1858, and in 1860 they became the 2nd and 3rd Regiments of the Corps of Mayne's Horse

[7] Capt John James Eckford, 6th Bengal NI; served with the 2nd Punjab Infantry, Punjab Irregular Force in 1850-51, with the Meerut District volunteers in 1857, at the siege of Delhi in 1857, and against the rebels in the Mainpuri District in 1858.

[8] *Draft and copy correspondence, minutes and proceedings on the formation of a body of irregular horse under Major Henry Otway Mayne for service in Central India, with a nominal roll of Robert's Rohilla Horse [sic], 1859-60*; British Library, India Office Records, shelf mark L/Mil/5/426, folios 106 to 171. The correspondence is bound into one large volume. The description is incorrectly recorded as the correspondence actually includes the 'Nominal Roll of 257 men of Robart's Horse, late a portion of the Rohilcund Auxiliary Levy'. The credit for

In October 1857 Major Mayne, doubtless under some instructions from higher authority, which are not however quoted in this correspondence, commenced to raise a Corps of Irregular Cavalry.

In a letter dated February 1858, he argued strongly for fixing the pay of the Sowars of his Regiment at Rs. 30 a month, and that of other grades in proportion.

Frequently between that date and November 1859, Major Mayne represented that he had no official authority such as would be recognized by the Military Auditor General for the establishment and pay of his Regiment, that he had raised the men, and having drawn advances 'to account', the unadjusted amount had become so large as to be very inconvenient to the Treasury Officers and to himself. He had completed one Corps in January 1859.

In October and November 1859, the Government N.W.P. [North Western Provinces] proposed with the concurrence of Major Mayne to transfer the Mynpoorie [sic] Levy to Mayne's Horse.

On the 6th November 1859, Sir R. Shakespear, Governor General's Agent, Central India, submitted a proposal for the formation of Mayne's Horse into an Irregular Cavalry Brigade, consisting of three Regiments under one Commandant.[9] These were to be formed on the new organisation of the Cavalry of the Hyderabad Contingent and to have like them 578 men, the Head Quarters being at Goona [sic] with detachments at Gwalior, Angur and Sehore. This proposal was founded on a letter from Major Mayne in which he adverts to his political functions and what he thinks would be an appropriate remuneration for them.

On the 9th November 1859, the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, replied to this letter sanctioning the proposal generally on the understanding that the cost should not exceed that of three Regiments of Bengal Irregular Cavalry. The details were to be submitted afterwards.

On 22nd November 1859, Sir R. Shakespear submitted a letter from Major Mayne on the subject of the organisation of these Corps. He proposed to incorporate with them 480 of the Mynpoorie Levy and 257 of the Rohilcund [sic] Horse, not entertaining any new men. The total number of all ranks in each Corps was to be 578. The cost for each Regiment was to be Rs. 18,328 per month, or for all three Regiments with the addition of Rs. 3360 for Commandant and Brigade Major etc. was to be Rs. 58,344 per month, the pay of the Sowars being Rs. 25 per month. The cost of a Cavalry Regiment of the Hyderabad Contingent (the pay of the sowars being Rs. 30) is Rs. 22,593 per month. The Commandant (Major Mayne) was also to have political functions.

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drawing the writer's attention to this interesting volume is due to Ron Windebank. The minutes reproduced here are only a relatively small part of it.

[9] *Ibid*, folio 133 verso; letter from Shakespear to Cecil Beadon, Foreign Secretary to Government, dated 6th November 1859. Shakespear was determined that he should retain close control of Mayne's Horse, and the letter that accompanied his recommendations emphasised the requirement for 'the whole to be under the orders of the Agent to the Governor General of Central India through whom all correspondence should pass.'

Sir R. Shakespear did not approve of Major Mayne's distribution but proposed to post:

1 Regiment at Gwalior
½ Regiment at Angur
½ Regiment at Sehore
1 Regiment at Goona

He (Sir R.S.) had advocated the formation of the Corps, not to furnish Escorts for Political Officers, but to take all the Cavalry duties of Central India. If each Corps had consisted of 800 men, the three Regiments would have been sufficient for this purpose. But with the proposed strength, there must be an additional Cavalry Corps at Gwalior.

On the 3rd December 1859 the Secretary, Government of India, proposed to complete the three Regiments of Mayne's Horse by transferring to them the two Regiments of Mahratta Horse (now divided between Gwalior and Sepree), but this proposal appears to have come to nothing.

On the 14th February 1860, Sir R. Shakespear wrote to Government urging the necessity for the issue of formal orders for the formation of 'Mayne's Horse' and the allowances to be made [to] him for the performance of political duties.

On the 22nd March 1860, Sir R. Shakespear submits a proposal from Major Mayne to transfer the two Regiments of Beatson's Horse to his own Corps on certain conditions regarding the rejection of unfit men and sale of those Assamees which were largely indebted to Government.[10] If this proposal were agreed to, Major Mayne could still take the Mynpoorie Levy but not the Rohilcund Levy.

On the 5th April 1860 the Secretary to Government in the Foreign Department, Mr Beadon[11], replies to this letter. He recapitulates a good deal of what has gone before, approves generally of Sir R. Shakespear's views, prohibits enlistment of fresh men into the three Regiments and wishes men of Beatson's Horse to be drafted into it. The pay of the Sowars to be Rs. 25 a month. The three Regiments to be considered sufficient for all Military duties in Central India.

[10] H.E.I.C. irregular cavalry regiments were organised as *silladar* cavalry – a sort of yeomanry cavalry. The sowar supplied his own horse, equipment and arms, and he was known as a silladar. His place in the regiment, including the possessions he brought with him, was known as an *assamee* [asami]. This had a well-defined and important value and was considered to be the property of the silladar. Typically it was bequeathed from father to son, although it could also be sold to a third party. The assamee was not always filled by the silladar himself, and this might be the case if the silladar died before a suitable male relative could be found to fill his vacated place in the regiment. There were also cases where a silladar owned more than one assami. To deal with such situations, there was a system of substitution that relied upon a *bargheer* [barghir], appointed by the silladar himself, taking the place of the silladar. He drew one third of the silladar's pay, the balance going to the silladar [or his estate].

[11] Cecil Beadon, Bengal Civil Service; 2nd Class Civil Servant (season of appointment 1836). It is interesting to note that an identically named officer, Lieutenant Cecil Beadon of the 1st Madras Light Cavalry, presumably a close relative, possibly his son or nephew and first commissioned in 1858, was appointed adjutant of the 2nd Corps of Mayne's Horse in the same letter of 5th April 1860.

The further correspondence, forwarded with a despatch No. 157 Political Department dated 8th November [1859], contains a report on the scheme by the Military Auditor General, who seems to approve the proposal of giving the Sowars Rs. 30 a month and suggests a plan by which the expense of this increase could be met by other reductions. The Government however authorised the original scheme, giving the Sowars Rs. 25 a month.

But after this a new complication arose. The three Regiments of Mayne's Horse were each to have an Establishment of 578 men of all ranks or 1734 men. The several Corps out of which these were to be formed were:

Mayne's Horse		825
1st Beatson's Horse	520	
2nd Beatson's Horse	560	
Mynpoorie Levy		468
G.G. Agent's Bodyguard		120
		2493
Difference to be got rid of		759

But besides this, Major Mayne desired that one third of his Horse should be Seikhs, viz. 578, and of this class he had in the above regiment only 336, leaving 242 to complete his compliment. And he proposed to effect this by selling 242 of the Assamees of Beatson's Horse (selecting the most inefficient and the most indebted men) and obtaining Seikh purchasers for them, and in anticipation of the sanction of this scheme, he set measures on foot to obtain the Seikhs and commenced discharging his men (*viz.* 759 + 242 = 1001).[12]

It may be observed that Major Mayne had been warned not to discharge more men than enough to reduce his Corps to the Establishment and also not to entertain new men. But he had obtained permission to sell the Assamees, which was in fact equivalent to the entertainment of new men (see Sir R.S. to Govt letter 26th May 1860 para 6; sanctioned by Govt in letter No. 2020 of 15th June 1860).

On 23rd July, Sir R. Shakespear reports that 'considerable excitement had resulted from disbanding the 860 men whose discharge was unavoidable' in order to reduce the Establishment, and adds that 'few things could be more injudicious at the present moment than discharging 400 additional men unnecessarily.'

He does not consider that the sanction to sell the Assamees necessarily involved the dismissal of the Bargheers. On the contrary, he supposed that the purchasers [of the Assamees] would be glad to have Bargheers ready. But this is probably a mistake. The new owners of Assamees would naturally prefer to have their own men. [13]

[12] This seems to be a wily financial manipulation. Presumably the assamees of indebted silladar-sowars would be confiscated, their values being offset against their debts. In this way the regiment would become the proprietor of the assamees and then sell to suitable Sikh candidates. The Auditor General was understandably ready to agree with this means of liquidating debts that would otherwise be difficult if not impossible to recover.

[13] Shakespear has here exposed a significant weakness in Mayne's planning. It is difficult to believe that a silladar would under any circumstances accept a barghir that he did not know and had not personally approved.

Particulars of the excitement above alluded to are mentioned in Sir R. Shakespear's letter, on receipt of which Government prohibited the Seikhs being entertained as proposed by Major Mayne and called for further explanations.

On the 2nd August 1860, Sir R. Shakespear reported to the Government of India that the reduction of numbers in Mayne's Horse had been going on rapidly and that 1 Jemadar, 4 Duffadars and 20 Sowars at their own request resigned the service within five days. The three Regiments, on the 30th July, were below their compliment by 7 Duffadars, 308 Sowars and 313 horses.

Under these circumstances, Sir R. Shakespear told Major Mayne that he was at liberty to entertain 236 Seikhs.

The political weight behind the Government's policy of limiting new recruitment was immense and, even though it seems unlikely, it must be that Mayne simply failed to appreciate this. Going up against Government policy in such a patently obvious manner, by dismissing substantially more men that was absolutely necessary, was bound to put his career at great risk.

In September 1860, no doubt as a result of Shakespear's earlier and strongly worded reports, Government finally stepped in. The despatch that brought together the lengthy correspondence regarding the formation of Mayne's Horse was brief and to the point, and came from India's highest civil and military authority – all four members of the Council of the Government of India including the Governor General himself and the Commander in Chief.

Fort William, Foreign Dept, 22nd September 1860, No. 128
To the Right Hon'ble Sir Charles Wood, Bart., G.C.B., M.P.
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council
We have the honour to transmit copies of correspondence as detailed in the accompanying abstract, respecting the formation of a body of horse, under the command of Captain H.O. Mayne of the Madras Cavalry for service ordinarily in Central India but available on emergency for general service.

You will observe that the Agent was desired expressly to prohibit the officer commanding the force from enlisting any new men into the force until all reductions in the irregular Cavalry and other levies of Horse in Bengal should be completed; and that in fact the formation of this force, while it provides the means of maintaining order in Central India in the least expensive and most manageable form, has enabled the Government to disband the two regiments of Beatson's Horse, the Mynpooree Levy, and other small bodies of irregular horse in the only way in which that measure could have been carried out with economy and without danger to the peace of the country.
(signed) *Rt Hon. the Earl Canning, Hugh Rose, H.B.E. Frere, J. Wilson*

It is evident that Shakespear had been pressured against his better judgement to lend his support to Mayne's recruitment of Sikhs, thereby risking his own political neck. He had to give way to Mayne or face the prospect of a perilously weak cavalry arm to maintain security in Central India which could not yet be described as being anywhere near pacified. His

initiative in subsequently reporting Mayne probably saved his career. However there was going to be no similar reprieve for the unfortunate Mayne.

For allowing his Corps to fall so far below establishment strength, Mayne was given a severe reprimand. The fact that the shortfall was the result of blatant disregard for Government policy was bad enough. On top of this, Mayne had further isolated himself by putting the Political Agent in a very uncomfortable position. Nobody was on his side and thenceforward his military career was doomed. The 'Sikh experiment' was specifically forbidden. Mayne never got his additional Sikhs. In due course the embarrassing shortfall in personnel was made up by the absorption of Meade's Horse[14] in February 1861, although this was several months after Mayne's association with the Corps of Mayne's Horse had come to its unhappy conclusion.

From April 1860 another unfortunate relationship had begun to develop, this time between Mayne and the officer newly appointed by Government to command his third regiment, Lieutenant Charles de Kantzow.[15] Until then De Kantzow had been acting in command of Robart's Horse.[16] He was an intrepid officer with a strong personality whose gallant exploits during the critical early days of the Mutiny were widely known. Apart from his role in Robart's Horse, he had helped to raise another irregular cavalry regiment, the Mainpuri Levy, and had established a reputation for the efficient handling of raw troops. But Mayne's Horse was too small to accommodate the personalities of two such single-minded officers and the antagonism between them became an open sore. Even the Political Agent got involved, intervening in a dispute centred upon De Kantzow's failure to pass a mandatory language exam. This failure was seized upon by Mayne as an opportunity to get De Kantzow removed from the regiment. Officially, no officer could serve in an irregular cavalry regiment without an appropriate language qualification. Predictably, Shakespear took De Kantzow's side. The whole business came to a head when the frustrated Mayne supported an evidently spurious accusation, made by some junior officers of his regiment, to the effect that De Kantzow had cheated in the auction of a dead officer's personal effects. Unwisely as it turned out, Mayne referred the matter to a Court of Enquiry which soon concluded that the charges were frivolous and overturned them.

It seems bizarre that Mayne should cock a snoop at the Government of India in Council and get away with it by the skin of his teeth, only to be relieved of his command as a result of an internal dispute over a relatively trivial matter. The most likely explanation is that Government seized upon the confrontation between the two officers as an opportunity to get rid of Mayne on the grounds that it could not allow the officer cadre of the Corps of Mayne's Horse to be riven in two. Thus on 8th September 1860 both Mayne and De Kantzow were

[14] Captain Richard John Meade, 65th Bengal Native Infantry, attached as Brigade Major and Paymaster to the Gwalior Contingent from December 1851; raised this irregular cavalry regiment at Agra on 31 October 1857 from loyal elements of the mutinied Gwalior Contingent. It must have seemed unfair to Meade's Horse that it suffered the fate of absorption, having served with great distinction during the Indian Mutiny campaign.

[15] Lieutenant Charles Adolphus De Kantzow, 9th Bengal Native Infantry. He was an officer of aristocratic Polish extraction. His career is recorded in detail by Major F.C.C. Yeats-Brown in *The Star and Crescent, being the Story of the 17th Cavalry from 1858 to 1922* (Allahabad 1927).

[16] De Kantzow raised the Rohilkhand Auxiliary Police Levy in 1857; it was also known as De Kantzow's Horse in 1857 and was embodied into Robart's Horse circa April 1858. This regiment became the 17th Bengal Cavalry in 1861. It should not be confused with the Rohilkhand [Rohilcund] Horse, which became the 16th Bengal Cavalry in 1862. When his regiment was absorbed by Robart's Horse, De Kantzow was posted to the 48th Bengal Native Infantry, and in the January 1860 edition of the *East India Register* he is shown as serving with the Meerut Irregular Horse [sic].

relieved of their duties. The services of both officers were placed at the disposal of the Military Department. Command of the Corps was given to Colonel J. Travers.[17] As a further rebuff, and on the very day that he was relieved of his command, Mayne's name was removed from the title of his Corps which became thenceforward the Central India Horse.

It is recorded that Mayne had been suffering from a constantly recurring fever, the result of campaigning in the pestilential regions of Central India during the long and arduous months of 1858 and 1859. This may well have impaired his judgement as well as his efficiency as commander of an irregular cavalry corps. He did not suffer his humiliation for long. His career and indeed his life were all but over.

Henry Mayne was posted back to the Madras Army on an ignominious attachment to the 1st Light Cavalry, his old regiment having in the meantime been disbanded. With his health continuing to decline he applied for home leave. He got no further than Allahabad where he passed away on 2nd November 1861. He was laid to rest there beside his brother in the Christian cemetery.

Of the other protagonists, Sir Richmond Shakespear managed to distance himself from Mayne's downfall and survived with his reputation intact. He was made a Companion of the Order of the Bath on 18th May 1860, and continued in his role as Political Agent in Central India. Yet he also had little time left and predeceased Mayne, dying at Indore on 29th October 1860. He lies buried there in the Christian cemetery. The early promise shown by Charles de Kantzow never came to fruition although he did at least live a long life. He held a number of civil appointments, and during the Bengal famine of 1874 he was responsible for the distribution of grain to the seriously affected districts of Bihar. Later he became superintendent of the Delhi bazaars. He served altogether thirty-eight years in India and retired as a colonel. He died in Brighton in 1927 at the ripe old age of 92.

The process of reorganisation of the Indian Army, following inevitably upon the dissolution of the H.E.I.C. in 1858, brought about a multitude of changes, many of them far from popular with the officer cadre. During the major restructuring that unfolded during 1861, the 1st Central India Horse became 38th Central India Horse, the 2nd became 39th Central India Horse, and the 3rd was disbanded. The 38th and 39th amalgamated in 1921 and became 21st King George's Own Central India Horse, and the regiment continues until today in the army of the Republic of India as the Central India Horse.

[17] Colonel James Travers VC, 2nd Bengal Native Infantry. Travers was awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry during the attack by mutineers on the Indore Residency in July 1857 when in command of the Bhopal Contingent (*London Gazette*, 1st March 1861).

A VICTORIA CROSS – A PILE OF STONES

William Whitburn

Part I

In November 2007, my brother Darrell and I paid a visit to St Andrew's Church in Ferozepur, India. The church was erected in 1846 in memory of all the officers and men who had been killed, or had died of their wounds, during the Sutlej Campaign (First Sikh War), December 1845 to February 1846. The total number of casualties on the British side during this seventy-day war amounted to 7,000.

It was my interest in the Sikh Wars that had brought us to Ferozepur to check the tablets and memorials in the church, and the host of graves in the old cemetery. Despite the fact the church had been burned down at the start of the Indian Mutiny, the structure is in fairly good condition and the memorials have been well maintained. The same cannot be said for the old cemetery, which is fast disappearing under a quilt of shrubbery.

During our visit to the church the Caretaker showed us a letter he had received from Canada requesting information about the grave of Captain William Raynor VC. We were given to understand that a reply to the letter had not been sent. Darrell, who has spent many years in Canada, undertook to follow up with the author of the letter, on his return, with all the details he could muster and a photograph of the pitiful state of the grave.

Having thoroughly checked out the church, we were taken by the Caretaker, through the winding lanes of the old bazaar, to the equally old cemetery. Here, our purpose was to check on the graves of the Sutlej Campaign warriors and Plot 358, the grave of Captain William Raynor VC, who had died in Ferozepur on 13th December 1860, aged sixty four.

The old section of the cemetery is a thriving jungle with trees growing out of the rubble of the larger tombs. Gone is the noble tomb and dedication under which, with full military honours and bugles sounding the Last Post, the mortal remains of the gallant Captain were laid to rest; one of a special breed of men, the bravest of the brave.

Looking down on this miserable pile of bricks my heart sank, not because of the state of the grave which, in the circumstances, is understandable, but more because of an acute sense of loss. As time creeps on, the jungle of apathy obliterates the memory and sadness grabs the heart. I resolved then to find out the circumstances in which Captain Raynor won his Victoria Cross and to write an article to cut back some of the jungle. The Victoria Cross was instituted by Royal Warrant on 29th January, 1856. It was created to address the recognition gap in the award of honours for gallantry, especially to junior officers and other ranks. Up to the time of the Crimean War (1854-1856), junior officers and other ranks who bore the brunt of combat with the enemy were issued a campaign medal with a clasp for the particular battle in which they had taken part. There was no recognition of any individual act of gallantry apart from a possible mention in despatches, which was rare for other ranks, or a field promotion, a brevet for officers and a field commission for senior NCOs; the latter usually dictated by the number of young officers killed. Field officers and above were eligible for the Order of the Bath awarded for outstanding service.[1] Significantly, more than 50% of the recipients were on staff appointments.

However, there were exceptions. In 1848 the CB was awarded to young Lieutenant Edwardes of the Bengal Artillery. The proposal to make this award ran into much opposition in the House of Lords as it was deemed extraordinary to allow such an award to so young a person. The Duke of Wellington then pointed out that an extraordinary recognition should be given for an extraordinary deed. In another case, four soldiers of HM's 80th Foot (South Staffordshire) were issued the Sutlej Campaign medal with the Aliwal clasp, for a battle fought on the 22 January 1846 despite the fact that these four men had been killed at Badhowal twelve days earlier; an anomaly lost in history. I was to find a few more in checking into the individual awards of the Victoria Cross during the Indian Mutiny, 1857 - 1859.

Media coverage of the Crimean War highlighted many incidents of individual courage of junior rank and file in this bloody and messy conflict. The Victoria Cross was created as a badge of honour for valour in the face of the enemy and made retrospective by four years so to encompass the period of the Crimean War. All Commanding Officers were instructed to submit lists of worthy heroes for this new and exciting award. The responses gave an indication of the divergent opinions in the Army at that time. HM's 77th Foot (Middlesex) submitted a list of thirty eight names while the COs of the 42nd (Black Watch), 50th (Royal West Kent), 56th (Essex), 62nd (Wiltshire), 71st (Highland Light Infantry) and the 79th (Cameron Highlanders) all replied that they had no names to bring forward. Many of the old guard felt that the new award would lead to a rash of derring-do exploits by young officers and men to the detriment of discipline and the principle of keeping formation in battle where heroic deeds were accomplished in the line of duty. Equally, HM Queen Victoria was concerned not to have her award cheapened and so allow it to be abused. The lists were thoroughly vetted and a total of one hundred and ten were eventually submitted to the Queen for approval. On 26th June 1857 in Hyde Park, the Queen, mounted on her pony, Sunset, invested sixty two warriors with the Victoria Cross gallantly won during the Crimean War.

[1] There were three classes of this Order, the third or lowest being Companion (CB).

This included the first ever VC, won by Shipmate Charles Lucas for an action on 21st June 1854. Another person to receive his VC from Her Majesty was Lieutenant Alexander Dunn of HM 11th Hussars for action in the Charge of the Light Brigade on 25th October 1854. After the War, Dunn had sold his commission and went to Canada with Rosa, the wife of his CO, Colonel Douglas. Dunn returned to England to receive his VC and borrowed Colonel Douglas's uniform for the big event; a gesture of either great generosity or much gratitude.

The proclamation of the Victoria Cross came with a set of fifteen rules governing the circumstances in which it could be awarded and to whom. As the proclamation was retroactive, the rules were readily applicable to the one hundred and ten men honoured in the Crimean War. Of the fifteen rules the following are the more relevant to this article

Rule 3 decreed that the names of those receiving the VC were to be published in the London Gazette. Although nowhere in the Rules was a posthumous award disallowed, this Rule gave implied support to the contemporary interpretation that it could only be awarded to persons alive at the time of gazetting. The time lag between the recommendation and gazetting was not considered, regardless of the action's distance from London and the time it took to deliver the report. This was to be the cause of some injustice in the granting of awards during the Indian Mutiny.

Rule 5 clearly laid down that the VC was intended only for wartime courage in the face of the enemy and that the recipient must have performed some single act of valour or devotion to duty. It was the qualification of devotion to duty that permitted Caption Raynor, at the time a Lieutenant, to be awarded his VC.

Rule 6 made the award democratic in that all ranks, regardless of the length of service, were eligible; albeit only members of HM Forces.

Rule 7 empowered General Officers in Command (GOC) to confer the award on the spot if they had personally witnessed the act

Rule 13 provided for the granting of awards to a Regiment or Battalion which had been involved in an action. In such cases, four recipients (one officer, one NCO and two other ranks) were selected by ballot of their comrades. In this form of recommending awards, first used in the Indian Mutiny, the methods of balloting were varied, causing the actual number of awards granted to vary.

It is worth noting that at the time of the proclamation, the VC could not be awarded to civilians, priests, women, or British officers and soldiers of the East India Company Army.[2] Also, it could not be awarded in a non-combat situation.

The day after HM Queen Victoria held her first investiture of the Victoria Cross, the Prime Minster received Lord Canning's (Governor General of India) report informing him of the Sepoy Mutiny in Bengal. The message had been sent on 19th May and was received with total shock. The Indian Mutiny was not to be a war of formations, attacks and withdrawals as in the Crimea; it was a fight, sometimes at section level, on city streets and villages against an enemy often indistinguishable from passive civilians. The chaotic nature of this fight lent itself to a host of opportunities for young officers and men to perform single acts of courage

[2] The amending warrant extending eligibility to officers and soldiers of the HEIC Army is discussed below

and valour, sometimes in the absence of witnesses who, having survived, were able to report the act. The Indian Mutiny took thirteen months to put down[3] and during this period no less than three hundred recommendations were made for the award, of which only one hundred and eighty two were approved. The Crimean War lasted for about the same period with a VC count of only one hundred and ten and in World War II, which lasted much longer, only one hundred and seventy nine awards were made.

The very first act for which the VC was awarded in India involved Lieutenant Raynor, who was a member of a group of old soldiers to came to be known in history as 'The Devoted Nine'. Lieutenant Raynor is also the oldest ever recipient of the Victoria Cross.

At this point some background is essential to understand the circumstances that prevailed at the time of this act, the second day of the Indian Mutiny.

There are myriad reasons for the cause of the Indian Mutiny but most will agree that the fuse was the dreaded greased cartridge, and more particularly, the way this sensitive issue was handled. In Berhampore, near Calcutta, the 19th Bengal Native Infantry (BNI) had refused to handle the cartridge, and on 31st March 1857 it was marched to Barrackpore and disbanded. The men handed in their uniforms and muskets, were paid off and sent home. News of this event spread like wildfire to become the topic of gossip in the Sepoy Lines and a subject for discussion in the Officers Mess. Commanding officers of other native regiments preened themselves as advocates for the continued loyalty of their regiments. A week later, the Commander in Chief (C-in-C), General the Hon'ble George Anson, left Calcutta for his tour of the Northwest areas and a summer sojourn in the cool of Simla. His whole Staff accompanied him. On the way, he took a sounding on the matter of the greased cartridge and on 23rd March reported to the Governor General that, in his opinion, they should "allow the excitement to die down". Clearly the consensus was not to aggravate the situation.

On 23rd April, fifty three year old Lieutenant Colonel Munro Carmichael Smyth, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, returned to Meerut from leave. Meerut was a big garrison town with two British regiments plus European Artillery, the 11th and 20th BNI plus the Colonel's own regiment. The following morning, the Colonel paraded his regiment, against advice, for instruction on the use of the new cartridge. His sowars refused to touch the cartridge. The Colonel then told them that if they fired off their cartridges the C-in-C would be much pleased and they would have a great name and that he would also get praise. They still refused. The parade was dismissed and a Court of Inquiry was held. Consequent to this, eighty five sowars were court martialled.

On Saturday 9th May, the Regiment was again paraded, under the watchful eyes of the two British regiments, HM's 60th Foot (K.R.R.C.) and HM's 6th Dragoons (Carbineers) plus the European artillery, to have the sentence of the Courts Martial read out and executed. The 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry was a crack regiment and much honoured in the Bengal Army; it had many battle honours including Aliwal, during the Sutlej Campaign, where it had executed a

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[3] After thirteen months of intense campaigning, the rebel cause was lost. But fierce resistance continued, requiring major military operations for the pacification of Central India, Rohilkhund and Oudh that lasted until April 1859.

brilliant charge with HM's 16th Lancers. The men were proud of their record of service. Now, sentenced to ten years hard labour, their accoutrements were taken away and their uniforms stripped off their backs. They were shackled with leg and hand irons, converted into felons and herded through the cantonments to prison. One can only imagine that it was not only shame they felt, but a massive degree of resentful indignation. The fuse had been lit, a mere thirty nine days after the disbandment of the 19th BNI.

Sunday 10th May has been accepted as the start of the Indian Mutiny and in Meerut the Europeans were resting, gossiping, going to church, drinking and playing cricket. The sepoys were brooding and plotting mayhem. In the late afternoon, the reprobates of the bazaar joined the sepoys and all hell broke loose. The eighty five prisoners were released and a horrific massacre of both Europeans and Natives ensued. The British officers of the affected regiments were charging around in an effort to calm their soldiers down and also to protect the European families. Lieutenant Colonel John Finnis, commanding the 11th BNI galloped to the lines of the 20th BNI accompanied by Lieutenant Everard Lisle-Phillipps. On arrival, the Colonel was shot dead and the young Lieutenant barely managed to escape. Colonel Finnis was the first casualty of the Indian Mutiny. A memorial plaque to him is in St Paul's Cathedral, arranged by his brother who happened to be the Lord Mayor of London.

Major General William Henry Hewitt of the Bengal Army was in command of the Meerut Division. Hewitt was over seventy and had soldiered in India for fifty years. The sun and mulligatawny had got to him and he was totally ineffective as a leader. In mitigation, it must be said that to have the whole of his Native force in mutiny must have been a massive shock to his system. By nightfall, his remaining forces had drawn a perimeter around the cantonment and sat there. Two and half thousand sepoys were allowed to rise and murder thirty five Europeans under the noses of two thousand British troops who let them go triumphantly to Delhi. One can only imagine the utter confusion and chaos that reigned that fearful night. General Hewitt had failed to manage the situation in Meerut, but his biggest error was not to allow any form of pursuit, to the great detriment of Delhi, thirty five miles away and in his Divisional operational area.

On the morning of 11th May there were no British troops in the old Imperial City of Delhi despite the fact that it had developed into a commercial hub of European-led business. The first to rise at 'gun fire' at 5.00 a.m. were the Garrison's native troops who, under their British officers, were paraded at 6.00 a.m. on the huge parade ground on the western edge of the Ridge. They heard their Garrison commander, Brigadier Harry Graves, read out the sentences meted out to criminals at Barrackpore. Brigadier Graves had previously been the CO of the 74th BNI, a post he had held for many years. The Delhi Garrison consisted of the 38th, 54th and the 74th BNI plus a Native Light Field Battery of artillery. After the parade the sepoys marched off to their lines, while their officers returned to their quarters for breakfast and the boring routine of a Monday in 100 degrees Fahrenheit.

The Commissioner, Mr Simon Fraser, a lonely old widower, had also risen early. Some authors of the Indian Mutiny report that on the evening before, the Commissioner had received a message from Meerut and had put it in his pocket. In any event, from the Residency, Ludlow Castle, he saw some sort of commotion at the Bridge of Boats and by 6.00 a.m. had taken off in his buggy for the Calcutta Gate along with Mr John Ross Hutchinson, the Collector. Mr Todd, the Supervisor of the Telegraph Office, had also bestirred himself early and had gone out in his buggy, over the Bridge of Boats, to detect and repair the cut in the telegraph line to Meerut that had been reported the evening before. He

did not expect to be long. Another character, who was to feature explosively in the drama shortly to take place, was Lieutenant George Dobson Willoughby of the Bengal Artillery, who was at breakfast in his quarters in the huge Arsenal. He had arrived in Delhi three months earlier to command the Delhi Arsenal and Magazines.

Bahadar Shah Zafar, the eighty year old King of Delhi, had also woken early when the Muezzin called the faithful to prayer. For ceremonial purposes the King was allowed to maintain a small guard of infantry and artillery under the command of Captain Charles Douglas, of the Bengal Army. As Commander of the King's Guard, he was titled Killidar or 'Keeper of the Fort'. In this capacity he also doubled as the Assistant to the Commissioner. He had been in the job for five years and lived in palatial quarters above the main gate to the Palace or Red Fort (Lai Qila). He had generously allowed the Reverend Midgeley Jennings and his family to share these quarters. The previous morning, at the Reverend's invitation, the Assistant Collector of Goongoan, Mr Wigram Clifford, had brought his eighteen year old sister, Mary, to stay with the Jennings to keep their daughter Annie company and to allow Mary more of a social life than she had in boring Goongoan seventeen miles away. This household was at breakfast at 7.00 a.m. and by now people were going to offices and businesses. Vendors in the fly-haunted bazaars were opening up their shops and stray dogs were taking cover from the heat and trampling feet. The Imperial City of Delhi was awake.

The Duty Battalion on the morning of 11th May was the 38th BNI, a corps which had a tradition of successful disobedience, having refused a few years before to go over the Kala Pani, the 'black water', to Burma.[4] This battalion furnished all the guards and sentries for the Garrison. The Main Guard, fifty strong, was posted at the Kashmir Gate under Lieutenant Proctor. Detachments and sentries were positioned at the Arsenal, Calcutta Gate, Bridge of Boats and the main Magazine at the Northern end of the cantonments.

At about 7.00 a.m., looking out of his study window at Metcalfe House, Sir Theophilus John Metcalfe, Bart., the Joint Magistrate, saw a group of cavalry troopers assembled at the Palace side of the Bridge of Boats. No doubt this group had already killed the poor unsuspecting Mr Todd, who had gone out earlier to fix the telegraph line. Metcalfe saddled up his horse and made directly for the Kashmir Gate. While this was going on, the group of troopers, still in their French-grey uniforms and identified as the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, stopped on the river bank between the Selimgarh and the Palace, and called out to the King for succour and protection. Strangely enough the river side of the Palace did not have ramparts. They informed him that they had raised the rebellion against the British and had now come to re-establish the great Mogul regime. The Killidar was summoned and told the sowars not to annoy the King and to go away. By now, many more of the Meerut blood-hungry mutineers had arrived. As the Calcutta Gate was closed, they rode off to the left and through the Raj Ghat Gate. This Gate was adjacent to Darya Ganj, the main subordinate European and Eurasian residential area. An orgy of bloodletting now started. The mutineers were quickly joined by the rabble of the Bazaars and to blood was added looting and destruction of property.

At the other end of the City, the elderly Mr Eraser and his party, now with Captain Douglas in tow, were at the Calcutta Gate trying to establish order. These officials were quickly surrounded by the mob, which attacked them. Eraser called in vain on the 38th BNI guard to

[4] For high class Hindus there were serious problems in crossing the Kala Pani or ocean, as this could result in a serious loss of caste.

fire, snatched a musket from a policeman and shot the leading sowar. He then drove off in his buggy to the Palace gate. Mr Hutchinson and Captain Douglas jumped into the citadel ditch. Eventually, both managed to get to Captain Douglas's quarters. They found that much of Douglas's command had joined in the bloody madness that was quickly engulfing Delhi. Eraser, Hutchinson, Douglas, Reverend Jennings and his wife, their daughter Annie and friend Mary were all dead by mid-morning and the killers then moved on to new targets. Meanwhile, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe had driven through the Kashmir Gate, gone to Lieutenant Forrest's house and together they rode to the Arsenal. It was Metcalfe's idea to take two guns through the Calcutta Gate and start blasting away at the Bridge of Boats. Unfortunately, this was not possible as they had no draught animals at the Arsenal.

Already alerted, the Garrison Commander issued his orders and by 9.00 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel John Ripley, the CO of the 54th BNI, was on his way, with half his regiment, and the band playing, to the Kashmir Gate. The remainder followed, under Major Francis Stuart Paterson, once the artillery troop was ready. The 54th BNI entered the Gate with muskets unloaded, the Main Guard presented arms and this force fanned out over the open ground towards St James's Church, where they were confronted by the mutineers. The Colonel ordered his men to load but none moved. The mutineers then fired a volley and killed four officers and mortally wounded the Colonel who was dragged from his horse and bayoneted. His sepoys had melted away.

At about this time the remainder of the 54th BNI had arrived with a troop of artillery. The guns were quickly laid but the mutineers had by now taken cover. The sepoys who had melted away now returned with apologies and excuses, but the British officers were none too confident of their continued loyalty. The mortally wounded Colonel Ripley was sent back in Dr Stuart's buggy and the bodies of the four dead officers were put onto a bullock cart and sent to Flagstaff Tower. On arrival, the bullock was unhitched and the bodies remained in the cart until the British .were back on Delhi Ridge some four weeks later. The unfortunate Colonel Ripley died later that evening.

Brigadier Graves had also sent a detachment to secure the New Magazine on the riverbank. By the time this detachment had arrived the 38th BNI guard had turned and allowed the mutineers to take over. In the confusion, Conductors Nolan and Woods, and Sub Conductors Connor and Settle, who were on duty at the Magazine, were all killed. The Magazine of 3,000 barrels of gun powder was now in the hands of the mutineers and was to successfully sustain them in their defence of Delhi for the next hundred and twelve days.

It was now 1.00 p.m. and the Garrison Commander, on being told of the drastic situation at Kashmir Gate, committed his reserve of the 74th BNI, the steadiest of all, under their CO Major Jacobs, to the disorderly situation at the Kashmir Gate. He also provided an escort for the Telegraph Staff to return to their office to send the message to Ambala that is reputed to have saved India. He, like everyone else, sincerely believed that the business on hand was a matter of containment until the expected relief by British troops from Meerut. To this end he had despatched Dr Batson, a volunteer and in disguise, to Meerut with a message for General Hewitt. The Doctor's blue eyes gave him away and caused his wife to become a widow. Five months later Mr Thomas Kavanagh was to do the same thing, survive and become the first ever civilian to be awarded the Victoria Cross. With each hour the mutineers extended their rampage of terror and any hope of relief faded with the sun.

At the Arsenal, Lieutenant Willoughby closed the gates and with his eight British compatriots and about fifty native clerks, artisans and coolies, entered into a frenzy of preparation for the inevitable assault by the mutineers. Again, this defence was undertaken in the firm belief of eventual relief by troops from Meerut. Here a brief introduction to Willoughby's eight compatriots is appropriate. All of them, with the exception of Lieutenant Raynor and Conductor Shaw, had originally enlisted into the Bengal Artillery so they knew what they were about in preparing the Arsenal for what was fully expected. Two of them had 'Quartermaster' type commissions on the Bengal Veterans List.

Lieutenant William Raynor was from Nottinghamshire and had been in India for forty five years, the last fourteen of which serving at the Delhi Arsenal. He had seen action in the Nepal War with his regiment, the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers. He had recently been posted to Ferozepur, but as his Movement Order had not arrived, he was still in Delhi on 11th May, aged nearly sixty two. He was married with three sons, Percy, Arthur and Frederick who were not with their parents at the time. Percy was the only one to have children, his son Vere Owen becoming the Deputy Commissioner of the West Railway. Lieutenant William Raynor was fluent in the local language and had many Indian friends in Delhi.

Lieutenant George Forrest was from Dublin and had been in India for thirty eight years. He had transferred to the Ordnance Commissariat Department in 1825. He was in fact Raynor's replacement and had been in Delhi for only five months with his wife and three daughters. The eldest, Annie, was being courted by Lieutenant Harry Gambier, the Adjutant of the 38th BNI. George Forrest was fifty seven years old in May 1857.

Conductor George William Shaw was from London and had arrived in India in 1829 and was posted to the 1st Bengal European Fusiliers, later to become the Royal Munster Fusiliers. On becoming a Sergeant he was employed with a number of native regiments in various capacities such as Baggage Master. He was awarded the Silver Medal for good conduct. In 1853 he was transferred to the Ordnance Commissariat Department. In 1856 he had been posted to the Delhi Arsenal. He was forty seven at the time of the mutiny.

Conductor John Buckley was from Cheshire and enlisted in the Bengal Artillery in 1832. For most of his service he had soldiered in the Bengal Foot Artillery. In 1840 he was transferred to the Ordnance Department as a Laboratory Sergeant. In 1856 he was appointed Conductor and posted to Delhi. He had first married fourteen year old Mary Ann Broadway with whom he had three children. His wife and two of the children were dead by 1846. He married again, and had two sons. Sadly his second wife, their two sons, and the remaining son of his first marriage were all dead by 1856. Just before his arrival in Delhi he married for the third time, a widow with three children. The family lived in the Darya Ganj area. On 11th May, Buckley was forty seven years old.

Sub Conductor John Scully was an Irishman and in 1841 enlisted in the Bengal Foot Artillery. In 1855 he was placed at the disposal of the Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines as a probationer for the Ordnance Commissariat Department. Having gone through a course of training at the Artillery School of Instruction at Meerut, he was posted to the Delhi Arsenal where he had been for seventeen months. He lived with his wife and two children in the Darya Ganj area. He was forty three years old.

Conductor William Crow was a Scotsman and had enlisted in the Bengal Artillery in 1841. He spent most of his service with Foot Artillery field batteries. In 1849 he was transferred to

the Ordnance as a Laboratory man. In 1852 he was promoted to Magazine Sergeant at Delhi and in 1854 was appointed Sub Conductor. He had been in Delhi for six years. He was thirty six years old.

Sergeant Benjamin Edwards. In the dedication to the 'Devoted Nine' he is listed as Brian Edwards, son of a British soldier serving in India. He was born in Karnaul and brought up in an orphanage in Calcutta. At age twelve he was sent for training to the Governor General's Band and he was enlisted into it in 1844. He was discharged from the Band in 1849 and immediately enlisted in the Bengal Artillery where he rose to the rank of Corporal in the Mountain Train Battery. In 1855 he was posted as Laboratory man to the Arsenal in Delhi. On 11th May he was thirty two years old.

Sergeant Peter Stewart was a Scotsman and a tailor by trade. He enlisted in the Bengal Horse Artillery in 1840. During his service with the Horse Artillery he saw action in Afghanistan under General Pollock, then in the Gwalior War and subsequently in both Sikh Wars. He was the most decorated man in the Arsenal on 11th May and had joined only two weeks earlier. On this fateful day he was thirty seven years old.

These eight men, under their fubsy twenty seven year old commander, Lieutenant George Willoughby, constituted the famous 'Devoted Nine'. Willoughby was from Dorset and had arrived in India in 1847 and was commissioned into the Bengal Artillery. He had seen active service in Burma and in 1856 was posted to the Delhi Arsenal and actually arrived on 15th April 1857 to take charge.

A word of explanation about the term 'Conductor'. It is not a rank but an appointment peculiar to the Ordnance (known as the Royal Logistics Corps in the British Army). The origin of this appointment stems from the twelfth century when artillery trains accompanied armies and the need arose to appoint Conductors to manage these trains. All arsenals and magazines in India came under the control of the Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines at Fort William, Calcutta. The Inspector-General in 1857 was Colonel Augustus Abbott CB of the Bengal Artillery.

The final part will appear in the next edition of Durbar.

AN UNDATED GROUP PHOTOGRAPH OF COKE'S RIFLES



In this group of Coke's Rifles officers and other ranks two of the men seated in the front row - a Sikh and a Pathan respectively - are clearly wearing the title '55' on their shoulder straps. This shoulder title was in use by 55th Cokes Rifles from 1903 to 1921. The general pattern buttons carry 'ERI', the Royal and Imperial cipher of Edward VII, surmounted by a crown.

The second medal worn by the drill instructor (standing far right) is the China 1900 medal with 'Relief of Pekin' clasp, authorised in 1902.

The British Officer and Viceroy's Commissioned Officer are both wearing the shoulder belt plate and the waist belt plate of the 1st Punjab Infantry, the pre 1903 title of this regiment. This anachronism is not surprising. In many cases it took a couple of years before suitable badges became available if, as was usually the case, these relatively high-quality badges were supplied by UK-based manufacturers.

Bearing in mind that the shoulder title '55' was authorised for use from 1903 and would have come into service very quickly, and the buttons with the ERI cipher were worn until 1910, it may be assumed that the photograph was taken between 1903 and 1910.

During the period of currency of the badges described above, only one British officer who served with 55th Coke's Rifles was entitled to both the Distinguished Service Order and the India General Service 1895 medal with three clasps. This officer was Captain E.C. Alexander who served extensively on the Northwest Frontier and in Waziristan between 1897 and 1902.

He was advanced to Captain on 28th September 1904 and was detached from his regiment w.e.f. 24th January 1909 on account of a staff appointment as Brigade Major at Nowshera. There seems little doubt that the photograph was taken between these latter dates. The probability of this dating is further assured by the notable absence of the second General Service medal to which Captain Alexander was entitled, with the single 'North West Frontier 1908' clasp, sanctioned in December 1908.

This 1st Punjab Infantry group photograph resides in Sean Weir's collection. The expert eyes of Rana Chhina and Ashok Nath have helped to put the badges and buttons into context.

INFORMATION SOUGHT

Michael Elsey seeks information on Warrant Officers in the Indian Army, both European and Indian. When were European WOs and Conductors introduced, when were Indian WOs introduced, and when were both ranks abolished? Were there different classes of WO, what were their badges of rank and where on the uniform were they worn? Michael understands that there are WOs in today's Indian Army, but only for Posting Sorting Assistants seconded from India Post to the Postal Service Corps, and he further understands they wear the same badge of rank worn by the obsolete appointments of Regimental Havildar Major/Regimental Daffadar Major, i.e. the Asoka Lion on a Spinning Wheel all within a wreath of lotus, but these badges are worn on the shoulder strap rather than the wrist.

Lieut. Colonel Neville Poulsom has acquired some postcard views of pre-1947 India and wonders whether Members can throw any light on the following two locations (as captioned): Gate of Chenob Bridge; Barian Camp from Bazaar (tented military [?] camp).

[The Editor would appreciate receiving a copy of responses for possible publication in Durbar]

BOOK REVIEW

- Kaushik Roy, *BROWN WARRIORS OF THE RAJ – RECRUITMENT & THE MECHANICS OF COMMAND IN THE SEPOY ARMY, 1859-1913*; Manohar Publishers, New Delhi 2008; 350 pages, case-bound, Rs 875 (circa £10.50), ISBN 81-7304-754-5.

This book is a modified version of the author's Ph.D. thesis submitted in 2000, with the focus intended to be on identifying who, in the second half of the 19th century, were inducted into the army and how they were controlled. In fact his period of study is from the end of the

Mutiny, which saw "massive changes in the social architecture and organizational format of the army" and the beginning of the First World War which "registered massive expansion".

This is certainly a topic that merits further analysis and the author's basic conclusions are sound. The army needed a mechanism for selecting suitable recruits and this led, for much of the period under review, to the birth and exercise of the Martial Race theory. It had its opponents, however, in the Balanced Recruitment policy and there was thus a continuing debate between the two opposing schools of thought. Similarly, once recruited into the service, the army needed a mechanism for maintaining the discipline of a fighting machine. The author contends that a combination of the court martial mechanism, the regimental fabric and the welfare bureaucracy achieved this, though there are obviously many who would argue that the regimental fabric came first. So far so good, but from this reviewer's perspective the significant distraction of attaching modern sociological labels to every aspect of the subject, many of the labels seemingly the invention of the author, made it a difficult book to get through; and so we have technical determinist approach, strategic culture approach, societal determinists, military synthesis model, nationalist approach, functionalist perspective, diplomacy perspective, demographic determinists, history of ideas approach – and so it goes on with the egalitarian recruitment school, Bengal school open door policy, liberal lobby, Sind school, Punjab school.

There is no doubt that the author has done considerable research, as one would expect of a Ph.D. thesis, and one of the enormous benefits of this book is that it points the reader to some outstanding original source material, including, for example, the ratio of European to Indian soldiers proposed by different lobbies. For those interested in pursuing the subject of recruitment further this is an invaluable guide.

This reviewer, and probably others as well, will take issue with the author's contention that the British withdrawal from east of Suez was partly linked with the loss of imperial control over the subcontinent's military forces. While there is no doubt that the Indian Army played a significant role in a number of campaigns outside India, including the Far East, the British withdrawal from east of Suez, some twenty years after Indian Independence, was a reflection of the UK's changing strategic requirements of the time, coupled with the realisation during the sterling crisis of 1967 that the cost of maintaining a military presence east of Suez could no longer be borne – and the Indian Army had played no part in those post-war campaigns.

There are also some silly minor errors. 'William Bentinck (the Governor-General or Viceroy of British India, 1832-5)' was never Viceroy. That position was not introduced until October 1858 when Queen Victoria named Lord Canning as her first Viceroy, thus reflecting the transfer of control from the Court of the East India Company to the Crown.

There is some extremely valuable material here, as well as ideas for further areas of research, but it takes perseverance to reach some of it. For those keenly interested in this aspect of Indian military history it will be worth the journey; for the generalist, however, it could be a journey too far. [Tony McClenaghan]

- *From Mr Geoffrey Daniel (a non-member from Tasmania):*

You may be interested in the attached photograph of the Bangalore Hunt hounds with Sergeant Jones of the Welsh Regiment, taken outside Bangalore Military Hospital in about August 1945. Sergeant Jones was the full time huntsman of this army pack of hounds. The quarry hunted was Jackal and the meets were at 6 a.m. on Sunday mornings during the dry season.

I estimated the date of the photograph from one of my letters home dated 19th October 1946. 'We had a good day with the Bangalore Hounds this morning. We moved off at 6 a.m. and almost immediately found an old jackal going home. The first two miles were across deep paddy fields and the pace was fairly steady, then got up on the high ground and ran like smoke for the best part of six miles, eventually killing in a nullah where the Jack tried to go to ground in a small drain.' The hunt finished with a big breakfast on trestle tables and starched white tablecloths. After breakfast I used to go back with the hounds and Sergeant Jones and then on to the Bangalore Gymkhana Club in time to play cricket for the rest of the day. The horses we rode were kindly lent by the Maharaja of Mysore's Lancers. I was, at this time, an Officer Cadet at the O.T.C. Bangalore. My Company was the last British company to pass out before Indian Independence.